Problems of Communism

MARCH-APRIL 1976



The Brezhnev Era

Jerry F. Hough
Gregory Grossman

Communist Agriculture

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Book Reviews

George Breslauer
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Paul Marantz
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MARCH-APRIL 1976 VOL. XXV

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SUBSCRIPTIONS: Within the United States, annual subscriptions or single copies of *Problems of Communism* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Price per copy: $1.60. Subscription price: $9.35. Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may in most cases be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. The journal can also be ordered directly from the US Government Printing Office for foreign mailing, at a price of $2.00 per copy and $11.70 per subscription. A discount of 25% is offered for orders of 100 or more copies.

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INDEXING: Articles in *Problems of Communism* are indexed, *inter alia*, in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, the *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), *ABC POL SCI*, and *International Political Science Abstracts*.

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Cover: Soviet Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev addresses the 25th CPSU Congress on February 24, 1976. Photo by V. Musselyan/TASS via Sovfoto.

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The Brezhnev Era

EDITORS' NOTE—The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union took place from February 24 to March 5, 1976. Such meetings traditionally afford the party an opportunity to appraise the international situation, to take stock of the country's political and economic state of affairs, to articulate new economic plans, and to promulgate changes in the leadership. The following two articles look at the Congress developments in two key spheres, internal politics and the economy, viewing them in the broader context of recent trends in these areas of Soviet life. Mr. Hough assesses the Brezhnev era in Soviet history—the character of the man and his interaction with the polity and the society. Mr. Grossman examines the performance of the Soviet economy over the last five years and evaluates the nature of the outline targets for the Tenth Five-Year Plan and the prospects for their attainment.

The Man and the System

By Jerry F. Hough

As of March 1976, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev has been General Secretary (or First Secretary) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for nearly eleven and a half years. Thus, he has been party leader twice as long as Vladimir Lenin, and if he remains in the job until July, his tenure in office will have exceeded that of Nikita Khrushchev. (Formally, indeed, he has already been party leader longer than Khrushchev, for the latter did not receive the title of First Secretary until September 1953.) To put things another way, nearly one-fifth of the Soviet experience has taken place under Brezhnev's stewardship.

With the completion of the 25th Party Congress, with Brezhnev's imminent replacement of Khrushchev as the man with second-longest service as party leader in the history of the Soviet Union (next to Josef Stalin), with age and health problems suggesting that he may not be General Secretary at the 26th Congress in 1981, it is perhaps a convenient time to look back over the Brezhnev era to try to see what he has attempted to accomplish (or at least what has been accomplished during his period of leadership), and to try to speculate about the consequences of his rule for the long-term development of the Soviet political system.

Mr. Hough is Professor of Political Science at Duke University (Durham, N.C.) and author of Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making, *1969, as well as of numerous articles on Soviet politics. At present, he is preparing a revised edition of* How Russia Is Ruled, *originally written by the late Merle Fainsod.*

Brezhnev's Political Role

The first problem in the analysis of the Brezhnev era is to decide whether or not it actually has been the Brezhnev era. Whatever one wants to say about the power exercised by Lenin, Stalin, or Khrushchev at any particular date, each of these men unquestionably put his personal stamp on the political system and the policies of his time. Even if these former leaders may occasionally have suffered de-

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feats, they still dominated the political process, and many of the key policy initiatives of the time are identified closely with them. The whole tone of the last decade, however, has been quite different.

In many respects, of course, Brezhnev too has clearly been the dominant official in "his" period. To be sure, in the first months after the removal of Khrushchev, Brezhnev's public profile was a relatively low one—a real effort seems to have been made to keep his status on a somewhat comparable level with that of the other top party leaders. Alexey Kosygin participated in all important foreign policy negotiations and even handled some independently of Brezhnev. When medals were given to the major hero-cities of World War II in the summer of 1965 as part of the new regime's reemphasis of that war's victory, Brezhnev went to Leningrad, while Kosygin awarded the medal to Volgograd and Mikhail Suslov the one to Odessa.[1]

In the summer and fall of 1965, however, the situation seems to have undergone fundamental alteration. Between April and December 1965, one-half of the Central Committee's department heads were changed. That Brezhnev had a major hand in these changes is suggested by the fact that the replacements in such key units as the Science and Education Department, the General Department (which distributes communications to the Central Committee and is also apparently in charge of security matters[2]), and the Business Office (*upravleniye delami)* were former associates of the First Secretary while he was in Dnepropetrovsk or Moldavia. Then in December, Nikolay Podgornyy was ousted from his position in the Central Committee Secretariat and transferred to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, the Party-State Control Committee was abolished, depriving Aleksandr Shelepin of what seemed to be his main base of power.

Most of the traditional indicators of political preeminence suggested that Brezhnev's position continued to strengthen over the next decade. His former second secretary in Zaporozh'ye, Aleksey Kirilenko, moved into the crucial Organizational Secretary slot; a longtime subordinate in both Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia, N. A. Shchëlokov, took over as the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs; and three former Dnepropetrovsk and Moldavia officials became deputy chairmen of the KGB. Other men said to be Brezhnev supporters also fared well. At the same time, his reported enemies slipped into minor posts or into retirement. In one case that was widely discussed on the Moscow rumor network, N. G. Yegorychev, the First Secretary of the Moscow Gorkom and a former subordinate of Shelepin while in Komsomol work, was removed from his post almost immediately after reportedly attacking Brezhnev's Middle East policy in 1967.[3]

The various symbolic indicators of the Soviet political system likewise seemed to point to a steady rise in Brezhnev's strength. In February 1966, he received the title of General Secretary, and over time Soviet officials increasingly spoke of "the Politburo headed by Brezhnev." As the Politburo member whose name came first in alphabetical order, his name naturally appeared first in the listing of Politburo members from the very beginning, but when Yu. V. Andropov was added to the Politburo in 1973, Brezhnev's name remained in first place, with the names of the other members given in alphabetical order. In 1970 and 1975, Brezhnev alone signed the published drafts of the new five-year plans (quite an inappropriate step in protocol terms), and by 1975 his statements were liberally quoted in newspapers, and even in scholarly books. His pictures (with quotations attached) abounded on billboards in Moscow.

The 25th Party Congress afforded a number of Politburo and Central Committee members the opportunity to raise the encomiums of Brezhnev to a new level—one superior both in quantity and quality to that accorded Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.[4] The speakers called the General Secretary an "outstanding fighter for peace and communism," "a tireless champion of peace and real social justice," or the like, and they praised his rather unremarkable and businesslike report inordinately (*e.g.*, as "a contribution to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism"). V. V. Shcherbitskiy referred to him as the "universally-accepted leader [*obshchepriznannyy lider*] of our party," while Sh. R. Rashidov labeled him "the most [*samyy*] outstanding and most [*samyy*] influential political figure

[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1965, p. 1; July 12, 1965, p. 1.

[2] Leonard Schapiro, "The General Department of the CC of the CPSU," *Survey* (London), Summer 1975, pp. 53-65.

[3] *The New York Times*, June 29, 1967, p. 7, and July 12, 1967, p. 21.

[4] See, for example, the speeches of V. V. Shcherbitskiy, *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1976, p. 3; Sh. R. Rashidov, *ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1976, p. 2; A. F. Vatchenko and P. P. Grishkyavichus, *ibid.*, Feb. 29, 1976, p. 6; G. I. Chiryayev, *ibid.*, March 3, 1976, p. 3; V. I. Prokhorov, *ibid.*, March 4, 1976, p. 3.

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

The "inner core" of the CPSU leadership: (from left) L. I. Brezhnev, A. P. Kirilenko, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgornyy, and M. A. Suslov.

—Photos by Henri Bureau/Gamma; V. Yegorov, V. Sobolev and V. Budan/TASS via Sovfoto; and Musselyan/TASS via EUPRA.

of contemporary times." One Central Committee member remarked upon his "exceptionally great international authority," and another asserted that "all accomplishments—both inside the country and in the international arena—are indissolubly linked with his name." In the words of the First Secretary of the Lithuanian CP, Brezhnev is "a man with a great soul in whom is embodied all the best qualities of Man in capital letters."

Yet, in a number of respects, the succession after Khrushchev's removal differed strikingly from those which had followed Lenin's and Stalin's deaths. Within seven years of Lenin's death, all but one of the voting members of the 1923 Politburo had been ousted in disgrace, and essentially within the same length of time after Stalin's death all but two of the 1953 voting Presidium members had suffered the same fate. The turnover within the Central Committee was not quite so great. Nevertheless, 69 percent of that body's voting members elected in 1930 had not occupied this position in 1923, and 77 percent of the voting members elected in 1961 had not yet achieved this status in 1953.

By comparison, the post-Khrushchev leadership has been surprisingly stable—especially given its age. In the months after Khrushchev's fall, four men emerged as the dominant figures within the leadership—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyy, and Suslov. (Characteristically, when the results of the election of Politburo members were announced to the 23rd Congress in 1966, the names of these four men, the stenographic report of the Congress indicates, were greeted by "prolonged and stormy applause," while the other names received only "applause." [5]) A decade later, these four—now joined by Kirilenko—are still part of a clearly-defined inner bureau within the Politburo, although all will be at least 70 years of age in 1976. There have been removals from the Politburo, but except for the aging Mikoyan (who retired in late 1965), the men involved have been relatively junior members—Dmitriy Polyanskiy, who had become a voting Presidium member in 1960; Gennadiy Voronov, who had achieved this status in 1961; and Aleksandr Shelepin and Pëtr Shelest, who had been named full members only in November 1964 after Khrushchev's removal. As late as 1975, one scholar could express his opinion that Brezhnev still had not gained his own majority on the Politburo,[6] and there certainly is no way to demonstrate the incorrectness of this position on the basis of the pattern of changes in Politburo membership.

Turnover has also been quite low among voting members of the Central Committee. Sixty-one percent of the voting members elected to the Central Committee in 1961 and still alive in 1971 were reelected to the Central Committee in the latter year, and the figure would be higher if Khrushchev and his closest associates were excluded. (Eighty-one percent of the living full members of the 1966 Central Committee retained their membership in

[5] *XXIII s"yezd kommunisticheskoy partii sovetskogo soyuza (29 marta-8 aprelya 1966 goda), Stenograficheskiy otchët* (23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [March 29-April 18, 1966], Stenographic Record), Moscow, Politizdat, 1966, Vol. II, p. 292. Actually, the applause for Brezhnev was described as "stormy, not ceasing for a long time [*dolgo ne smolkayushchiye*]," while that for the other three was termed "stormy, prolonged [*prodolzhitel'nyye*]."

[6] Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, p. 8.

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CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, nearest the camera with earphones, leads the Soviet delegation to the European Security Conference in Helsinki last summer.

—Black Star.

1971.) An expansion of the Central Committee both in 1966 and 1971, as well as the death of a number of old members, permitted the election of a larger number of new members than the removal rates would suggest, but the proportion of 1971 voting members who had not enjoyed this status seven years earlier under Khrushchev (55 percent) was still considerably lower than the comparable figures in 1930 and 1961.

Despite the aging of the Central Committee implied in this state of affairs, the pattern of stability was, if anything, more pronounced in the five years leading up to 25th Party Congress. An incredible 89 percent of the living full members of the 1971 Central Committee were reelected in 1976, and 59 percent of the 86 newly-elected full members had been candidate members of the Central Committee or members of the Auditing Commission since at least 1971.[7] As a result, the average age of the voting members of the Central Committee (excluding worker and peasant members) rose to 60 in 1976 as compared with 52 in 1961, and even the voting members newly elected averaged 55 years of age.[8] Twenty-eight percent of the voting members will have passed their 65th birthday by the end of 1976. In this respect at least, the Soviet leadership seems intent on following the Chinese model of socialism.

Not only did Brezhnev fail to follow the lead of Stalin and Khrushchev in ousting first his old equals on the Politburo and then the Central Committee members who had put him in power, but he also has not put any unmistakable personal stamp on the policy of the last decade. It is true that at least since the 24th Congress in 1971 the General Secretary has been extremely prominent in foreign policy, personally conducting key negotiations on SALT, the rapprochement with West Germany, and the Helsinki Conference. Despite the symbolism involved, however, these negotiations, as well as the public espousal of the policy of *razryadka* (relaxation), have entailed far fewer changes in actual policy than were evident in the first post-Khrushchev years when Kosygin was the major Soviet spokesman in relations with the non-Communist world (as discussed later).[9]

In domestic policy, Brezhnev has, as befits an old *zemleustroitel'* (specialist in land rationalization and utilization), pushed a vigorous land reclamation program with much more than incremental budgetary increases and has been associated with a policy of specialization of land use within the kolkhoz (collective farm) sector.[10] However, there has been

[7] The Central Committee was expanded from 241 voting members to 287, and 15 members had died between congresses. Hence, the number of new members far exceeded that of members newly elected.

[8] At the time of this calculation, it was not possible to identify the occupations or ages of two of the members and to learn the ages of four additional identified members. However, unless these members are either unbelievably old or young, their inclusion cannot change the average age indicated.

[9] Brezhnev had always had a good deal of contact with foreigners (usually around 90 days a year, according to Soviet press reports), but originally it was overwhelmingly with foreign Communists—East European or otherwise. As late as 1969, for example, Brezhnev had official meetings with foreigners on some 92 days, but on only 9 of these days was the contact with non-Communists (counting even representatives of leftist Third World regimes, such as Egyptians, Syrians, Algerians, and so forth). It was Kosygin who mediated the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965, who visited France and Britain in 1967, who met President Johnson at Glassboro in 1967, and so on. However, the changing nature of Brezhnev's role is reflected in the fact that the proportion of his foreign contacts devoted to non-Communists rose to 26 percent in 1970, 30 percent in 1971, 43 percent in 1972, and 60 percent in 1973 (out of 109 days of contact), and 57 percent in 1974 (out of 100 days of contact). These counts are based on listings in a US government periodical publication, *Appearances of Soviet Leaders* (Washington, DC).

[10] Brezhnev's identification with the reclamation program was emphasized from the March 1965 Central Committee session onward. The interfarm specialization program was said to have emanated from a special memorandum he wrote. *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1976, p. 7.

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little drama in these undertakings, and the more visible reform of industrial management was identified with Kosygin. To top things off, nowhere in the domestic sphere (including the economic reform) can one point to dramatic policy changes or to the type of frontal challenge to major power centers of the type that were so noticeable in the years prior to Khrushchev's ouster.

Indeed, the lack of drama in Soviet policy has at times taken on the appearance of real sluggishness. The replacement of the bureaucratic main administrations (*glavki*) of the industrial ministries by groupings of enterprises called "associations" (*ob"yedineniya*) has gone much slower than early decisions indicated it would, and various experiments that have been conducted (*e.g.*, the creation of an agricultural administrative system in Moldavia based on "kolkhoz councils" [11]) seem neither to have been repudiated or to have been carried through to completion.

In addition, high-level personnel vacancies have been filled with incredible slowness. The chairmanships of the People's Control Committee and the State Committee for Prices remained open for 13 months, the presidency of the Academy of Sciences for six months, and the post of ideological secretary of the Party Central Committee for 15 months. At this writing, the chairmanship of the All-Union Trade Union Council has not been filled for 10 months, and that of the State Committee for Labor and Wages for 21 months.

There is, therefore, an anomaly in the evidence about Brezhnev's role in the last decade. On the one hand, his early political maneuvers had all the appearances of classic and successful steps in a consolidation of power, and all the prestige indicators of subsequent years suggest that he has become undisputed leader. On the other hand, if his position actually has been a dominant one, Brezhnev clearly has not used his power to push through dramatic policy changes or to shake up the administrative-political system. On the whole, the policy outcomes of the last decade are those that one might well have predicted would emerge from bargaining among the country's most powerful interests in committee politics—and at times the results have even hinted at the possibility of temporary deadlock.

What are we to conclude about this anomaly? At the present time, the evidence cannot be definitive, but it should be noted that the speeches at the 25th Party Congress suggest one possible answer—namely, that Brezhnev has been in an extremely strong position, but that he has deliberately chosen to delegate a great deal of authority to subordinates. The implication of these speeches emerges more clearly if one examines them after rereading the stenographic report of the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.[12] One is struck by the relative honesty of the comments made by the delegates at that Congress about Khrushchev. Almost no one spoke of the First Secretary with real affection, and the words of praise stressed his "tireless energy," "revolutionary fervor," "daring," "decisiveness," his "principled" and "demanding" nature, and so forth. The words *"smelyy* [bold]" and *"smelost'* [boldness]" appeared with particular frequency.

The tone of the speeches at the 25th Congress was quite different. To be sure, the speakers may have felt that, despite repeated references to Brezhnev's "tireless" and "inexhaustible" energy, this was Brezhnev's last congress, and that a warm farewell was especially appropriate. Whatever the reason, however, warmth and even affection were there. Brezhnev was credited with initiating many actions, and, like Khrushchev, he was repeatedly called a "true Leninist," a "staunch fighter for peace and communism," etc. But the strongest emphasis was placed upon such personal qualities as "deep humanity, considerateness, and attentiveness to people," as well as his modesty.

In particular, it was often said that Brezhnev has "established comradeliness, trust, and a respectful relation to people in the party"; he has created "a good atmosphere for work," a situation in which people can "breathe easily, work well, and live peacefully"; he has "an ability to establish an atmosphere of trust, respect, and dedication to standards among people" and "to coordinate [*nalazhivat'*] strong and friendly common work by a large number of people"; under his leadership, "the Central Committee consistently raises the role of the local party

[11] The experiment began the day after V. V. Matskevich was replaced as Minister of Agriculture in February 1973. That it was a Politburo initiative was stated in the Moldavian press at the time and was reemphasized by Ivan Bodyul, the First Secretary of the Moldavian CP, at the 25th CPSU Congress (see *ibid.*, p. 5). It is worth noting that in his speech to the Congress Bodyul described the experiment as a success. This could conceivably mean that it will now be introduced more generally.

[12] *XXII s"yezd kommunisticheskoy partii sovetskogo soyuza (17-31 oktyabrya 1961 goda), Stenograficheskiy otchët* (22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [October 17-31, 1961], Stenographic Record), Moscow, Gospolizdat, 1962, *passim*. Brezhnev's speech provides an excellent example of this treatment of Khrushchev. See Vol. 1, p. 340.

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organs, widely consults with them, attentively examines initiatives and proposals from the localities." As the First Secretary of the Georgian CP, E. A. Shevardnadze, summarized this theme, "one of Leonid Il'ich's best qualities is that he does not clothe himself in the mantle of a superman, that he does not try to do everyone's thinking and working." [13]

In short, the top officials of the party do not convey the impression in their speeches that Brezhnev is engaged in some struggle against the bonds of oligarchical control. Rather, they look upon him as "the universally-recognized leader" who has turned out to be a wonderful man to work for—a fact for which they are enormously grateful (especially given their memories of his predecessor). One could dismiss these quotations as meaningless flattery. But party officials presumably have some choice in how to flatter, and their flattery of Khrushchev, to repeat, was very different in substance—and reasonably accurate in communicating a true sense of their characterization of him.

On other grounds, too, it seems to this observer that Brezhnev must be relatively happy—perhaps completely happy—with the role he plays in the policy process. Struggles for power, in the narrowest sense of that phrase, involve so many inherent elements of instability that a ten-year period in which a *kto-kogo* conflict is unresolved is extremely hard to imagine. The long delays in some personnel decisions could have resulted from a combination of Brezhnev's growing weariness of administrative detail and the need to obtain his approval for any actions to be taken, rather than from political deadlocks. Similarly, the explanation for the lack of turnover may well be that Brezhnev is more comfortable with old colleagues and—perhaps most likely of all—has not wanted to replace them with younger men who might have the aspirations of potential successors.[14]

A shopgirl of Nurek discusses business with L. I. Brezhnev during the General Secretary's visit to Tadzhikistan.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

Brezhnev's Actions and Policies

If the last decade has indeed been a Brezhnev era, how ought we to characterize it? What has the General Secretary attempted to accomplish, and what has he in fact succeeded in accomplishing?

The instinctive way to answer such questions when they are posed about the Soviet Union is to try to ascertain (or to speculate about) the basic changes that the leader has attempted to introduce into the Soviet system—or perhaps the basic changes that he has been blocking. "Transitional figure," "transformation," "ossification," "rationalizer," and "bureaucratic counterrevolution" are the kind of words and phrases used in this type of analysis. In such a framework, a "liberal" becomes defined as a man who strives to move the system in the direction of a constitutional democracy or market socialism, not one who promotes egalitarian social welfare policies.

While the author of this article will not be able to resist speculation about systemic change in the Soviet Union, he believes that at the outset we should recognize that the approach just described is quite foreign to that which we employ in our analysis of Western leaders. We take for granted that very few leaders seek to alter the political system in a fundamental way—except, perhaps, in response to some major crisis. Indeed, we often attribute no higher policy goal to a leader than the desire to be reelected. Moreover, we say that when leaders (particularly American Presidents) develop serious policy interests, it is often international relations that comes to absorb them—partly because

[13] See the speeches, respectively, of Prokhorov, *loc. cit.*; Grishkyavichus, *loc. cit.*; A. E. Voss, *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1976, p. 3; E. A. Shevardnadze, *ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1976, p. 3; Vatchenko, *loc. cit.*; S. F. Medunov, *Pravda*, Feb. 27, 1976, p. 3; Shevardnadze, *loc. cit.*

[14] A striking feature of the present Soviet scene is that it contains no individual who can be termed a "logical," or even reasonable, successor to Brezhnev in terms of age, breadth of experience, centrality of current position, and so forth. (The situation was very different both in 1952 and 1964.)

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they do not want to get embroiled in bruising conflicts in the domestic sphere.

It may well be that we would understand Brezhnev better if we interpreted him in these Western-like terms rather than focusing on his relationship (pro or con) to fundamental changes in the political and economic systems. The First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Obkom asserted at the 25th Party Congress that the General Secretary has earned "universal love, gratitude, and deep respect," [15] and perhaps Brezhnev has really not sought a great deal more. Without doubt, most world leaders would be overjoyed at such a statement about themselves after they had been in office a decade even if it were only a half-truth, and they might well consider the development of such a set of attitudes a major goal to pursue. Khrushchev's fate serves as a reminder that a General Secretary holds his post only so long as the Central Committee is willing to support him against challenge and, further, that the price of failure can be virtual house arrest and expungement from the history books. Only a fool would fail to be concerned about a similar fate.

If one looks at Brezhnev's actions and policies in the light of the hypothetical requirements of "electoral" politics, it is indeed striking how many of them can be explained in those terms. For example, it can be argued that by allowing the specialized state-party-scientific complexes some autonomy in deciding policy questions within their fields of competency and by giving nearly all the complexes an incremental budgetary increase each year, Brezhnev has sought to avoid the type of anger that Khrushchev's "voluntarist" and "subjective" interventions clearly provoked among some Central Committee members. Similarly, it can be contended that by guaranteeing Central Committee members a high probability of job security, he has given these officials a good reason to wonder whether a change of leadership would be in their own personal interest, while by expanding the size of the voting membership of the Central Committee by 64 percent over the last decade, he has afforded himself the opportunity to create a group within the body who are beholden to him for their promotions.

In addition, of course, those officials chosen for entry into the expanding Central Committee have often had reason to be grateful to the Brezhnev leadership for policy reasons as well as personal ones. It surely was not accidental that the reunification of the industrial ministries took place before, rather than after, the 23rd Congress in 1966, for this action meant the creation of a number of highly-delighted new candidates for Central Committee membership. Similiarly, it scarcely seems fortuitous that the regime launched a major new investment program in the non-black-earth regions of the RSFSR in 1974 (at the personal initiative of Brezhnev, it was said at the 25th Party Congress) and that the 29 oblasts benefiting from this program provided 12 (really 13) first secretaries who were promoted to full membership in the Central Committee in 1976 for the first time in conjunction with its expansion.[16] Perhaps these promotions are just the result of the increased importance of the posts in question, but one can hardly ignore the possibility that Brezhnev is tailoring his policies and his co-optations into the Central Committee in such a way as to maximize his support.

A second possible key to an understanding of Brezhnev is that he may have become as fascinated with foreign policy as many American Presidents have. In the realm of external affairs, a leader serves as the symbol of the nation, and history's judgment of the "greatness" of Presidents and "Tsars" ultimately seems to rest overwhelmingly on the degree of success of their foreign policies. (This is surely one reason that so many Russians have real difficulties with an all-out attack on Stalin.) Moreover, in the conduct of international relations, a leader usually has more autonomy, less need to antagonize powerful institutional interests (at least if he is careful in his handling of the military), and—by no means least—a chance to meet and negotiate with the great of the world.

The enormous attention Brezhnev has given to foreign visitors and travel abroad in recent years suggests that he, too, has felt the attraction of foreign policy. If one assumes that he operates on a five-day workweek and a month's vacation each year (which he almost always takes in late December and early January, invariably leading the Western

[15] *Pravda*, Feb. 29, 1976, p. 6.

[16] The 13th member of this group is V. N. Bazovskiy, now Ambassador to Bulgaria but recently First Secretary of the Novgorod Obkom. The 29 oblasts include those in the Northwest, Central, and Volga-Vyatsk regions, plus Perm, Sverdlovsk, and Kaliningrad oblasts and the Udmurt Autonomous Republic. See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo RSFSR v 1973 g.* (The National Economy of the RSFSR in 1973), Moscow, Statistika, 1974, p. 185. In all, 26 of the 29 obkom first secretaries in these regions are now full members of the Central Committee, in addition to 4 of the lower oblast officials from Moscow and Leningrad (not counting 6 more city officials in these two cities) and 14 former obkom first secretaries from the non-black-earth region.

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press to speculate that he is medically or politically ill), then 100 days of contact with foreigners in Moscow or abroad constitute 41 percent of the available working days in a year—even if one excludes from the calculation the time he must also spend on foreign policy briefings and decision-making. Some contacts can be brief and permit time for a full workday on other subjects, but Brezhnev has tended to get involved in very long discussions with many of his visitors. Hence, it may be no coincidence that the period during which major vacancies began to remain unfilled and during which criticisms of economic performance at the December plenary sessions of the Central Committee were not followed by decisive action was precisely the period that Brezhnev became increasingly active in foreign policy negotiations with the non-Communist world.

Of course, no political leader is interested solely in personal survival or in foreign relations. Inevitably, his name gets associated with a set of concrete policies even if he serves as no more than a broker mediating proposals advanced by others, and Brezhnev is no exception. However, there has been such an incredible misunderstanding in the West about the nature of policy in the Brezhnev era that it is really best to begin with negatives—to state what policy has not been. The Brezhnev period has *not* been a period of growing repression of individual freedom; it has *not* been a period of declining citizen participation; it has *not* been a period of greater privileges accorded to the "New Class" in comparison with other strata of society; it has *not* been a period of neglect of the consumer; it has *not* been a period of recentralization of the Soviet political system. On the contrary, the trend in policy has been in the opposite direction in these areas. Indeed, the policies of the last decade in each of these areas have represented a continuation of those of the Khrushchev era. In this respect, then, the Brezhnev era has in fact been (to use the phrase of the mid-1960's) "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev."

A meeting between Soviet party chief Brezhnev and West German Chancellor Willy Brandt in the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1973.

—Black Star.

The basic direction of policy on the questions mentioned in the last paragraph has been so clear that it should be a source of great wonderment that so many Westerners writing about the Soviet Union consider the statements of the last paragraph controversial or even incorrect. Perhaps the problem has been that many Westerners have come to identify so much with dissidents in the Soviet Union that they have judged the current regime by the standard of the hopes and rhetoric of the Khrushchev period rather than of its reality. Perhaps journalists, as Adam Ulam suggests, have grown frustrated because they cannot collect "news" as it is understood in the West—"constant streams of revealing and often scandalous goings-on in high circles, spectacular crimes, and social disturbances"—and have let this frustration affect their judgment.[17] Perhaps, also, too few scholars have been conducting primary research on the Brezhnev period and have been relying on the journalists' reports or their own sense of the style of the present leadership.

Most probably, however, the problem in our understanding of the Brezhnev era has been confusion about the phenomenon of "conservatism." In style and rhetoric, Brezhnev and his associates have been much more "conservative" than Khrushchev. The new regime has likewise been much more "conservative" in the way that it tackles problems. No longer is policy implementation characterized by a succession of rather wild campaigns, and no longer is the governmental and party machinery subjected to drastic reorganization almost yearly. Moreover, as will be discussed later, the new leadership is also

[17] Adam B. Ulam, "Americans in Russia," *Saturday Review* (New York), Feb. 7, 1976, p. 29.

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

Leonid I. Brezhnev, then Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, with the late Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in the Kremlin on June 14, 1963, as the latter speaks by telephone to Soviet cosmonaut V. F. Bykovskiy.

—Novosti via Wide World.

more "conservative" with respect to challenging the professional judgments of the various specialized establishments in the country.

In the foreign policy realm, the term "conservative" both can and does denote a real change in policy. Early in the Brezhnev era, the Khrushchev prediliction for crises and for confrontations and near-ultimatums (as over Berlin) gave way to a tendency to mute conflicts and even to settle them in some cases. Soviet mediation of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 indicated not a desire for conflict for its own sake, but quite the opposite. Yet except for the way in which conflicts have been handled (which in the foreign policy realm is, to be sure, a difference of substance), *razryadka* has had many elements in common with Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence." In negotiating SALT agreements, the Soviet leadership has been no more willing than the American leadership to seek accords that would really cut back on what its military has wanted; in conducting policy in the Third World and even in Europe, the Soviet leaders have shown no more inclination than the American leaders to renounce support for those forces likely to be friendly to their side in the future; even in dealing with the other great superpower, the Soviet Union (maybe not Brezhnev himself) has been no more willing to control its enthusiasm for the encouragement of Angela Davis and other "progressive" elements in America than the United States (maybe not the President and Secretary of State personally) has been able to do with respect to the Soviet Union's dissidents and Jews. Brezhnev may have proclaimed the end of the cold war, but both sides continue the essence of the "competitive peace" policies that have marked their relationship in the past.

Yet, the word "conservative" can be highly misleading, especially in the realm of domestic policy. Certainly "conservative" in the sense of "cautious" does not necessarily mean "conservative" on freedom-of-speech or social-welfare issues. In the former sphere, the continuation of restrictions on dissent should not blind us to the fact that dissenters have been treated with considerably more gingerliness than they were in the Khrushchev era. (Our increased exposure to the dissenters has been one of the clearest indicators of this phenomenon. Paradoxically, however, we have interpreted the beginning of the visibility of dissent and its repression as the beginning of repression itself.) The variety of statements that can pass the censors into published works is greater than prior to 1964, and the debates are fuller and more wide-ranging. Even Soviet historians writing about the postrevolutionary period—persons widely thought to have suffered the greatest restriction during the Brezhnev period [18]—have

[18] In an article published in this journal in March-April 1972 ("The Soviet Political System—Petrification or Pluralism?"), the present author advanced such a position. Since then, he has had more opportunity to read Soviet histories on the prewar period and to discuss this question fully with a historian who is much more familiar with the subject (Sheila Fitzpatrick), and it seems clear to him that his earlier judgment, which reflected the conventional wisdom, was completely wrong. While current Soviet historians appear to be less free than previously to condemn the Soviet past, they are generally freer to describe sensitive aspects of it in neutral terms. See, for example, E. N. Burdzhalov, *Vtoraya russkaya revolyutsiya. Vosstaniye v Petrograde* (The Second Russian Revolution. The Uprising in Petrograd), Moscow, Nauka, 1967; B. Ts. Urlanis, *Istoriya odnogo pokoleniya* (A History of One Generation), Moscow, Mysl, 1968; L. M. Spirin, *Klassy i partii v grazhdanskoy voine v Rossii* (Classes and Parties in the Civil War in Russia), Moscow, Mysl, 1968; F. M. Vaganov, *Pravyy uklon v VKP (b) i yego razgrom (1928-1930 gg.)* (The Right Deviation in the VKP [*b*] and its Destruction [1928-1930]), Moscow, Politizdat, 1970; S. I. Sheshukov, *Neistovyye revniteli. Iz istorii literaturnoy bor'by 20-kh godov* (Frantic Zealots. From the History of the Literary Struggle of the 1920's), Moscow, Moskovskiy rabochiy, 1970; E. N. Burdzhalov, *Vtoraya russkaya revolyutsiya. Moskva. Front. Periferiya* (The Second Russian Revolution. Moscow, The Front, The

(Continued on page 10)

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Table 1: Political Participation in the USSR, 1954-76

Group	1954-55	% Increase 1954-63	1963-64	% Increase 1963-76	1975-76
Adult population[a]	120,751,000	16	140,000,000	17	163,510,389
Party members and candidates[b]	6,864,864	51	10,387,196	51	15,694,000
Deputies to local soviets[c]	1,536,310	27	1,958,565	13	2,210,932
Trade union members[d]	40,240,000	60	68,175,600	57	107,000,000
Komsomol members[e]	18,825,324	17	22,000,000	59	35,000,000
"Controllers"[f]	apparently 0	—	4,300,000	118	9,370,000
Activists in "independent organizations"[g]	?	—	20,000,000	55	31,000,000
People's auxiliary policemen (*druzhinniki*)[h]	0	—	5,500,000	27	7,000,000

[a] The effective adult population is defined here in terms of the number of persons registered to vote in elections. In years when comparable election and census data are available, the adult population as measured by electoral registration is 2-3 percent lower than that as measured by the census. Figure for 1954: *Pravda* (Moscow), March 18, 1954, p. 1. Figure for 1963: *ibid.*, March 7, 1963, p. 1, and March 21, 1963, p. 1. Figure for 1975: *Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya* (Moscow), No. 8, 1975, p. 20.

[b] Figures for 1954 and 1963: T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership USSR, 1917-1967*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 53. Figure for Jan. 1, 1976: *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976, p. 7.

[c] Figures for 1955 and 1963: N. A. Petrovichev (chief author), *Partiynoye stroitel'stvo* (Party Construction), 3rd. ed., Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p. 403. Figures for 1975: *Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya*, No. 8, 1965, p. 24.

[d] Figures for 1954 and 1963: Petrovichev, *op. cit.*, p. 411. Figure for 1976: *Pravda*, March 4, 1976, p. 2.

[e] Figure for 1954: *Komsomol'skaya pravda* (Moscow), March 20, 1954, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), March 12, 1954, p. 9. Figure for 1964: V. M. Chkhikvadze, Ed., *Sotsializm i narodovlastiye* (Socialism and Popular Authority), Moscow, Politizdat, 1965, p. 86. Figure for 1976: *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1976, p. 6. The proportion of young people of the appropriate age group who are in the Komsomol rose from 34 percent in 1959 to 43 percent in 1965, and to over 50 percent in 1970. See *Slavnyy put' leninskogo komsomola* (The Glorious Path of the Leninist Komsomol), Moscow, Molodaya Gvardiya, 1974, Vol. 2, pp. 469, 580.

[f] Figure for 1964: *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 13, 1964, p. 123. Figure for 1975: *Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), No. 10, 1975, p. 132.

[g] Figure for 1964: Chkhikvadze, *op. cit.*, p. 84. Figure for 1976: *Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1976, p. 3.

[h] Figure for 1963: V. E. Poletayev, Ed., *Rabochiy klass SSSR* (The Working Class of the USSR), Moscow, Nauka, 1969, p. 425. Figure for 1971: F. S. Razarenov, Comp., *Narodnomu Druzhinniku* (To the People's Auxiliary Policeman), Moscow, Znaniya, 1963, p. 115.

NOTE: The data for 1954-64 (*i.e.*, the first four columns of the table) appeared earlier in the author's "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1976, p. 8.

generally been able to publish richer, more solid, and more objective work than had been the case earlier.

The broadening of participation in policy debates has been matched by an increase in the scale of participation in different types of groups and in voluntary work for governmental and other political institutions. The "populism" of Khrushchev did not disappear with him, and as Table 1 indicates, the rate of growth in political participation has been much more rapid than that in the size of the adult population. Even the much-discussed slowdown in the increase in party membership resulted less from a reversal of policy than from the movement of the small cohort of World War II babies through the age levels at which persons normally enter the party (see Table 2); certainly, the party has expanded much faster than the adult population.

The relationship between participation and power is always a peculiarly difficult thing to measure in any country, and one certainly should be wary of concluding that an increase in citizen participation in the Soviet Union automatically means an increase in citizen power. Yet certain types of decentralization of power clearly have occurred. However one wants to conceptualize or label the Soviet political system of the last decade, the General Secretary and/or the Politburo obviously have done much less to override the judgments of the relevant specialists (and power centers) in the various policy areas. Despite the unquestioned right of the Politburo to

Periphery), Moscow, Nauka, 1971; V. M. Kuritsyn, *Perekhod k NEPu i revolyutsionnaya zakonnost'* (The Transition to NEP and Revolutionary Legality), Moscow, Nauka, 1972; N. A. Ivnitskiy, *Klassovaya bor'ba v derevne i likvidatsiya kulachestva kak klassa* (The Class Struggle in the Countryside and the Liquidation of the Kulaks as a Class), Moscow, Nauka, 1972; L. S. Rogachevskaya, *Likvidatsiya bezrabotitsy v SSSR, 1917-1930 gg.* (The Liquidation of Unemployment in the USSR, 1917-1930), Moscow, Nauka, 1973; E. G. Gimpelson, *Sovetskiy rabochiy klass* (The Soviet Working Class), Moscow, Nauka, 1974; I. Ya. Trifonov, *Likvidatsiya ekspluatatorskikh klassov v SSSR* (The Liquidation of the Exploiting Classes in the USSR), Moscow, Politizdat, 1975; B. M. Leibzon and K. K. Shirinya, *Povorot v politike Kominterna* (The Turning Point in the Policy of the Comintern), 2nd. ed., Moscow, Mysl, 1975. It is particularly instructive to compare the last-named book with the first edition published in 1965, for the condemnation of Stalin for destruction of the Polish Party in the Great Purge of the late 1930's and Stalin's disagreements with foreign Communists in the Comintern in 1934 are introduced for the first time in the more recent edition. It should also be emphasized that the titles in this list are merely a sample of those that could be given.

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intervene, the actual exercise of power and influence has often drifted to lower levels of the hierarchy.

While, as will be discussed later, the most obvious decentralization of power has been to the specialized ministerial-party-scientific complexes centered in Moscow, there also seems to have been some *de facto* delegation of authority to the republic and regional levels as well. For example, an examination of the pattern of increase in hospital beds from region to region of the RSFSR strongly suggests that the effort to enforce rigid central norms slackened in the late 1960's and that local factors became more important in determining the pattern.[19] The degree of actual authority exercised at the republic level—and the degree of variation from republic to republic—has been studied far too little in the West, but the impression grows of greater autonomy (within, of course, well-defined limits).

An outsider cannot judge whether these political changes have had an impact upon policy outcomes, but at a minimum it can be said that the improvement in the living conditions of the consumer and particularly of the low-income citizens that began under Khrushchev continued after 1964 as well. The average wage within the worker and employee category rose 62 percent between 1964 and 1975

Table 2: CPSU Membership in Relation to USSR Population, by Age Groups

(in percent)

Age Group	1965	1967	1973
18-25	3.1	2.2	2.5
26-40	11.0	11.5	11.2
41-50	10.7	11.8	13.0
51+	5.5	6.5	8.0
TOTAL	7.9	8.3	8.9

SOURCES: The age distribution of party members may be found in *Partiynaya zhizn'*, No. 10, 1965, p. 13; No. 19, 1967, pp. 9, 16; No. 14, 1973, p. 19. The age distribution of the population in 1965 and 1967 was extrapolated from 1959 and 1970 census data. See *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1970 goda* (Results of the All-Union Population Census of 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1972, Vol. 2, pp. 12-13. The age distribution of the population in 1973 was taken from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1972 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1972), Moscow, Statistika, 1973, p. 34. In the case of 1965, the actual age categories were 18-25, 26-39, 40-49, and 50+. For a full discussion of the questions raised by this table—including a breakdown by sex for 1973—see Jerry F. Hough, "Party 'Saturation' in the Soviet Union," in a forthcoming memorial volume for the late Merle Fainsod of Harvard University.

NOTE: The data in this table appeared earlier in the author's "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1976, p. 9.

Table 3: Changes in Soviet Diet, 1958-73

(annual per capita consumption in kilograms)

Foodstuff	1958	1964	1973
Meat	36	38	53
Milk and dairy products	238	238	307
Eggs (units, not kilograms)	108	113	195
Vegetables	71	74	85
Potatoes	150	140	124
Grain products	172	159	143

SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1965), Moscow, Statistika, 1966, p. 597; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1973, g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1973), Moscow, Statistika, 1974, p. 630.

(from 90 rubles to 146 rubles),[20] and the income of the collective farmer (excluded from the above category) increased even more rapidly. Table 3 indicates the improvement in diet that has accompanied the rise in incomes. The most dramatic change in living standards, however, has involved the acquisition of major appliances. In 1965, only 24 percent of Soviet families had a television set, but in 1974 this figure had reached 71 percent. The percentage of families owning refrigerators grew from 11 percent in 1965 to 56 percent in 1974, while the percentage of those owning washing machines increased from 21 percent to 62 percent.[21] The amount of living space available to the average urban dweller rose from 10.1 square meters in 1964 to 11.8 meters in 1973,[22] and by 1975 over 70 percent of worker and employee families lived in unshared apartments.[23]

Western newsmen going to the Soviet Union always seem to discover to their shock that income

[19] Jerry F. Hough, "Centralization and Decentralization in the Soviet Administrative System," to be published in a collection of essays, *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1977.

[20] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1973 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1973), Moscow, Statistika, 1974, p. 586; *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1976, p. 2.

[21] *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 23, December 1975, pp. 7 and 9; *Politicheskoye samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), No. 10, 1975, p. 19. In 1960, 8 percent of Soviet families owned television sets, 4 percent owned refrigerators, and 4 percent owned washing machines. See G. S. Sarkisyan, *Uroven', tempy i proportsii rosta real'nykh dokhodov pri sotsializme* (Level, Rates, and Proportions of Growth of Real Income under Socialism), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1972, p. 103.

[22] These figures were arrived at by dividing the total number of urban residents into the total fund of urban living space. See *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 g.*, (The National Economy of the USSR in 1964), Moscow, Statistika, 1965, pp. 7 and 610; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1973 g.*, pp. 7 and 615.

[23] *Sotsialisticheskiy trud* (Moscow), No. 9, 1975, p. 128.

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Refrigerators roll down the production line at the Kishinëv Refrigerator Factory in 1972.

—D. Shevchuk/Novosti via Sovfoto.

and privileges are distributed unevenly, but in reporting that "news," they have totally missed the real news of the last decade in this realm: a continuation of the sharp reduction that began after Stalin's death in the degree of inequality of incomes in the Soviet Union.[24] (After a most careful survey of the data, Peter Wiles asserts that "the statistical record since Stalin is a very good one indeed. I doubt if any other country can show a more rapid and sweeping progress towards equality."[25]) The ratio of the average earnings of the top 10 percent of Soviet workers and employees (collective farmers excluded) to the average earnings of the bottom 10 percent declined from 4.4 in 1956 to 3.7 in 1964 and to 3.2 in 1970; a ratio of 2.9 was planned for 1975.[26] (Wiles calculates an after-tax ratio of 6.7 for the United States in 1968 and roughly 3.0 for the Eastern European countries.[27]) If the earnings of collective farmers were included in the calculation of the ratios (as they are in Eastern Europe), the ratios would be higher, but the rate of decline would also be greater. As Table 4 indicates, the rate of decline would also be greater if the party leadership could break out of its Marxist frame of mind and understand that white collar personnel, particularly in occupations staffed primarily by women, often belong to the truly oppressed strata of society. The wages of members of the working class have been growing much more rapidly than those in the managerial-professional class, and if the lowly-paid clerks were arbitrarily labeled proletariat and paid accordingly, the system might become considerably more egalitarian.[28]

The efforts of the Brezhnev regime to improve the situation in the countryside have been particularly noticeable. Investment in agricultural productive facilities, amounting to some 14 percent of total capital investment under Khrushchev, rose steadily thereafter, to 20 percent in 1973.[29] The electrification program was pushed through to completion, so that 99 percent of peasant homes are now electrified and the amount of electricity used in agriculture has more than tripled in the last decade;[30] the wage policy toward agriculture is reflected in Table 4. Still other steps have been taken to benefit the peasant. Collective farmers were brought under a guaranteed-income system and made eligible for state pensions early in the Brezhnev period, and they were granted an unconditional right to a passport in late 1974. Moreover, the drive for universal secondary education is a program which has its greatest impact in the countryside, while the 1974 decision to step up agricultural production in the non-black-earth regions of the USSR brought about increased cultural as well as economic investment in one of the poorer rural areas of the country.

It should be emphasized once again that all the statements in this section have been comparative ones. The question asked has been: How do the trends in various Soviet policies during the Brezhnev era compare with those in the policies followed by Khrushchev and/or Western leaders? Nothing said here should be taken to imply that censorship has

[24] Unfortunately, the two most recent books by reporters fit within this time-worn category. See Robert G. Kaiser, *Russia: The People and the Power*, New York, Atheneum, 1976; and Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, New York, Quadrangle, 1976.

[25] Peter Wiles, *Distribution of Income: East and West*, Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1974, p. 25.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 25, Table IV, and Sarkisyan, *op. cit.*, p. 132. Wiles, incidentally, draws his data from Sarkisyan, *op. cit.*, pp. 125, 126, and 132.

[27] Wiles, *op. cit.*, p. 48, Table VIII.

[23] In 1970, sales clerks were arbitrarily transferred from the category of "mental laborers" to that of "workers." Besides "improving" such statistics as the percentage of workers in the party, this change may also have had a real impact on the way sales clerks are treated by the regime. (Compare, *e.g.*, their wage increases from 1965 to 1973, as shown in Table 4, with those of other "white collar" groups.)

[29] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo v 1973 g.*, p. 549.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

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withered away or that certain types of dissent (particularly those of a nationalistic type) do not carry with them a very serious risk of prison. Obviously, top officials in Moscow retain powerful weapons if subordinates attempt to use any delegated authority "unwisely." Similarly, in the realm of social policy, any improvement in living standards continues to be limited by the continuing high rates of investment in heavy industry and the high levels of military expenditure. Conditions on the collective farms have scarcely reached a quality-level which would stimulate a migration from the major cities. Yet if the question is the nature of the policy goals of the Brezhnev regime, and if the standard of judgment is not the utopian Marxist image of a Communist society but the performance of political leaders of other industrial countries grappling with the problems of industrial society, then trends in outcomes should be considered more important than the fact that the millenium has not been achieved.

Implications

If the phrase "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" were a completely accurate characterization of the Soviet policies of the last decade, of course, there would have been little reason to overthrow Khrushchev, and Khrushchev was, after all, overthrown. We cannot forget that there have been differences between the Khrushchev and the Brezhnev regimes—differences reflecting greater conservatism in rhetoric and style, greater unwillingness to make drastic policy changes, and much lower rates of turnover among top personnel. Naturally, the term "conservative" is used only in foreign discussions of the current leadership; however, the Soviet press itself recognizes and hails the change with its repeated emphasis upon a "scientific" approach to decision-making.

Marxism-Leninism has always laid claim to being a science, but in the past there was a strong tendency to focus upon the "scientific discoveries" made by the founders. (In the words of Engels, uttered at Marx's grave, "just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history." [31]) The consequence of this focus was to give—or to try to give—peculiar scientific authority to the few who designated themselves the true interpreters of Marx and Lenin. This traditional use of "scientific" has not disappeared from the scene, but in the last decade the word has increasingly assumed a different meaning in political discourse: the making of decisions through a balanced weighing of facts and evidence rather than on the basis of the *a priori* values and insights of the decision-maker (regardless of the source of these values). According to Soviet commentary, the essence of a Leninist style of party work is a "strictly scientific approach to the solution of problems that arise," and this approach is defined as "an all-sided deep analysis and careful taking into account of objective processes and phenomena of social-economic life and their interconnections and interrelationships, a realistic evaluation of existing possibilities." [32]

The crucial questions about the evolution of the Soviet political system during the Brezhnev era revolve around the issue of whether or not change in the pattern of decision-making and the change in the meaning of "scientific decision-making" are permanent in character. It is quite possible that the current style of decision-making simply reflects Brezhnev's preferences or the values of the present

Table 4: Changes in Average Wages and in Pensions in the USSR, 1965-73

Group	1965	1973	Increase
	(in rubles)		(in %)
Employees of the state apparatus	106	126	19
Industrial engineering-technical personnel	148	185	25
Education and culture employees	94	121	29
Trade and service employees	75	102	36
Industrial white collar workers	86	119	38
Industrial workers	102	146	43
State-farm workers	72	116	61
Collective farmers	49	87	78
All workers and employees (excluding collective farmers)	97	135	39
	(in billions of rubles)		(in %)
Total budgetary expenditures on pensions	101	184	82

SOURCES: Most of the figures come from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1973 g.* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1973), Moscow, Statistika, 1974, pp. 586-87. Those on pensions come from p. 780 of the same work. The figures for collective farmers were calculated by the author on the basis of a Soviet assertion (*Partiynaya zhizn'* [Moscow], No. 20, October 1975, p. 16) that the wages of the collective farmer were 68 percent of those of the state-farm worker in 1965 and 75 percent of them in 1974. It is conceivable that private-plot income for the collective farmer is not included in these figures.

[31] Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *The Marx-Engels Reader*, New York, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972, p. 603.

[32] *Pravda*, Jan. 21, 1975, pp. 2-3.

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oligarchy, and that the next General Secretary will behave differently. (The most striking fact about the Soviet political system is that in nearly 60 years of existence it has had four leaders—whereas the United States has had 11 Presidents in the same period—and that all four have been associated with drastically different "political systems.") It is also quite possible that the discussion of "scientific decision-making" is little more than an "ideology" in Karl Mannheim's sense of the word—a doctrine that has consciously or unconsciously been developed to forestall attacks upon the status quo and the policies emanating from the current leadership.[33]

However, the possibility should at least be considered that a more basic change in the system has occurred—or, perhaps, that a conscious attempt is being made to introduce such a change. The Soviet leadership today looks upon the men who led the Soviet regime during 40 of its first 47 years as so flawed that their names can hardly be mentioned in print in mass journals, and important figures within the Soviet elite certainly must be concerned about this fact. Someone—surely including top-level officials of the type that are likely to be removed if large-scale personnel changes are instituted—must have been thinking about the need to "constitutionalize" the Soviet system in some sense of that term. It is at least possible that the changes in the patterns of policymaking are the result of an effort of this sort—perhaps by Brezhnev himself, perhaps by others.

If an attempt has been made to introduce a more constitutional system in the Soviet Union, then the *de facto* definition of that system, at least as it has appeared thus far, must include many elements of the type embodied in the model of institutional pluralism that this author presented earlier.[34] In this definition, decisions should be based on specialized knowledge; hence, those with such knowledge should have a major role in the decision-making process. Ministerial officials should not be permitted to make decisions unchecked. But the various control agencies—the Central Committee apparatus, Gosplan, the trade unions, the Komsomol, the People's Control Committee—have all been structured internally along branch lines, and the officials in the different subdivisions usually have specialized knowledge and experience in the area they are supervising, in order to facilitate their work. Indeed, they often come from the ministries they control.

As a result, the specialized controllers inevitably have much in common with the controlled, and one can speak of "complexes" (in the sense of a military-industrial complex) and of "whirlpools" (to use the term of Ernest S. Griffith) of specialized party, state, "public," and scientific personnel working within the respective policy areas.[35] The definition of goals formally remains the responsibility of the party leadership, but except for ensuring that the Marxist goals in social policy are pursued, the leadership is not to act with "voluntarism"—that is, it generally should follow the advice of the specialized "complexes" or "whirlpools" in their respective party areas, limiting itself to a mediation of the conflicts that arise among them. In practice, policymaking power informally comes to be delegated to these complexes.

The degree of individual freedom to be permitted within a system of institutional pluralism is a problem with which the party leadership has been uneasily grappling. Clearly, it feels that advocacy of incremental change in policy should be permitted on most questions if phrased carefully, but that such advocacy should not be accompanied by the type of confrontation politics, dramatization of demands, and public criticism of the leadership found in the West—let alone by negative moralizing about the system as a whole or about the past. There also seems to be a growing sense of the need for some rule of law, at least in the sense of a guarantee against punishment for dissent that is applied without warning. Such innovations as the introduction of some possibility for emigration, the liberalization of the divorce laws,[36] and the relaxation of Khrushchev's overt pressure on religion suggest a lessening of the determination to interfere in people's private lives and to throttle all iconoclasm.

If important Soviet leaders (maybe even Brezhnev) have been trying to institute and perpetuate such a system—in effect, to establish constitutional norms that would prevent a future leader from returning to the "voluntarism" of Stalin and Khrushchev—then a very fundamental change has occurred in the

[33] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1936.

[34] "The Soviet System—Petrification or Pluralism?," *loc. cit.*

[35] Ernest S. Griffith, *The American System of Government*, 4th ed., New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, pp. 102-03.

[36] The meaningfulness of this reform is suggested by the fact that when it was instituted in 1966, the divorce rate immediately jumped from a level of 1.3-1.6 per thousand population (in the late Khrushchev era) to a 2.6-2.8 level. *Narodnoye khozyaystvo v 1973 g.*, p. 48.

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Public and artists meet at an exhibition of abstract art in Moscow's Ismailov Park. The October 1974 showing had earlier been postponed by city authorities.

—Black Star

Soviet political system. However, before accepting such a conclusion, we need to ask ourselves a number of questions—questions that must be faced in any case, regardless of the cause of the patterns of the last decade.

The first set of questions centers on the desirability of delegating decision-making power to specialists. Those aspects of Marxism which suggest that ideas and philosophies are shaped by basic economic interests (a notion that in modified form has become an inherent part of Western sociology of knowledge) have been slow to penetrate into the way that Soviet officials and intellectuals think about their own country. In particular, in the new fascination with "science" many—even including Soviet scholars of state and law with whom this author has spoken—fail to recognize that specialists have interests and that their judgment may be affected by those interests.

While many Western political scientists have been very favorably disposed toward "whirlpool" decision-making in Western polities, others have been much concerned that it leads to subordination of the public interest to the interest of the specialized forces making the decision.[37] Certainly, those who have spoken of a military-industrial complex in the United States or of US regulatory agencies entering into a close relationship with the regulated scarcely do so in order to praise. One would think that such dangers would be particularly great in the Soviet Union, where the partial discipline of market forces is largely absent. And when one reads of a doctor-dominated Soviet public health system producing an unchecked expansion in the number of hospital beds and using a number of devices to keep them filled, when one sees a transportation "whirlpool" whose top officials are almost all railroad men and whose decisions are weighted against highways and truck transportation, one suspects that the danger is not an imaginary one. (Obviously, the same analysis could be made of Soviet defense policy.)

[37] See, for example, Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism*, New York, Norton, 1969.

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The second set of questions to be faced about the recent pattern of decision-making is its stability. As the experience of Great Britain and many other parliamentary democracies demonstrates, constitutional norms are largely psychological restraints felt by the elite, and they need not rest on institutional checks and balances. (Indeed, even in the United States, the psychological restraints are probably more important than the institutional ones.) Consequently, it would be wrong to assume that such restraints cannot develop within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, especially since some are almost surely developing—*e.g.*, one against the execution of political opponents within the party.

Nevertheless, the fact that the movement toward more "scientific decision-making" has been associated with such an abnormally low level of turnover among the Central Committee members must lead to real questions about its durability. In institutional terms, the Soviet system is unique in that the system's "parliament" (the Party Central Committee), which has the responsibility for selecting and controlling the leader, is in turn composed of officials who, directly or indirectly, are responsible to the leader in their daily work. The problem created by such an arrangement is serious indeed. If the leader can freely replace top subordinates in an effort to maintain administrative efficiency and dynamism, how can the subordinates effectively control him? If the subordinates' position on the Central Committee is secure, how can the leader maintain administrative efficiency? One can imagine ways in which this problem might be solved, but the personnel policy of the last decade provides little assurance that it has been.

This article has basically accepted the proposition that Brezhnev's position over the years has been a dominant one and that he himself has provided the job security enjoyed by most Central Committee members; however, if such a policy has been forced on the General Secretary, the fundamental dilemma of the system obviously remains unresolved. In such a case, there would be a real possibility that the system is moving toward a state of inflexibility and sluggishness that courts the possibility of explosion. Earlier Western talk about an immobilized system made little sense when the sub-Politburo administrative elite was in its mid-50's and had largely risen to the top fairly recently; in fact, there has been no immobilism in such areas as social policy. But by the time of the projected 26th Party Congress in 1981, members of the present Central Committee will average 65 years of age, and if most are still in high positions, the administrative elite by any comparative standard will be extraordinarily old.

Furthermore, even if the basic argument of this article is correct and it has been Brezhnev himself who has chosen to refrain from replacing most members of the Central Committee, there is still little reason to suggest that the institutional dilemma of limiting the General Secretary has been solved. Indeed, if Brezhnev remains General Secretary for a considerable period of time and does not change

[38] While inference of a man's policy position from his career pattern or present post is admittedly dangerous, at least on the surface the last five additions to the voting members of the Politburo scarcely have the appearance of a core of a liberal bloc: the Chairman of the KGB (Yu. V. Andropov); the Minister of Defense (A. A. Grechko); the 67-year-old Minister of Foreign Affairs (A. A. Gromyko); the secretary of the Central Committee in charge of defense, defense industry, and the police, who is also a former Minister of Defense Industry (D. F. Ustinov); and an engineer of the shipbuilding industry with a decade of work in a shipbuilding plant before moving into industry-related work in the defense industry center of Leningrad (G. V. Romanov). Add to these Kirilenko (an aviation-industry engineer with a life of party work in the heavy industry/defense industry centers of Zaporozh'ye, Dnepropetrovsk, and Sverdlovsk), D. A. Kunayev (a former director of an ore-mining administration in the nonferrous-metallurgy industry, who, as First Secretary of the Kazakhstan party, never seems to have biographies of purge victims published in his republican newspaper), and A. Ya. Pel'she (a true Old Bolshevik who joined the party in 1915 and became First Secretary of the Latvian Party Central Committee in 1959 in the wake of a major purge of top republic officials for nationalistic policy positions); and suddenly men like Suslov and Shcherbitskiy (a metallurgical engineer from Dnepropetrovsk) start looking—at least on the basis of their biographies—like the moderates of the Politburo. In short, the majority of the post-Brezhnev Politburo appears to be shaping up as a group of hardliners sympathetic to pro-defense-industry policies.

Although it may also be dangerous to suggest that the aging Central Committee is wildly different in outlook from the Politburo, it is nonetheless intriguing to note that only 33 percent of the former's voting members have been intimately associated with the military or heavy industry or have been engaged in party work in heavy-industry areas. Moreover, the last elections to the Central Committee changed its face considerably. After one more or less matches up the backgrounds of 40 of the newly-elected full Central Committee members with the backgrounds of the 40 who had died or been removed since the 24th Party Congress and then looks at the careers of the remaining 46 "new" members, one finds that the largest group of them (some 20) consists of obkom first secretaries in regions with a percentage of rural population above the average and that among the rest are six high state officials supervising light industry and health plus several obkom secretaries from light-industry regions, three ministers with responsibilities in oil-related spheres plus the First Secretary of the Tyumen Obkom (all of whom probably have a major self-interest in trade with the West), and six younger media-ideological officials who (with one exception) are in their early or mid-fifties. Conceivably, party officials from the provinces may be truly provincial and traditional in their views, but this new group does not on the surface seem to have the "military-industrial complex" coloration of the Politburo—particularly its new members.

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his personnel policy, then the dangers of ossification may be at their greatest. If he dies, retires, or is removed in the near future, then the argument for a policy of massive replacement of the aging elite will become a strong one (and appeals for a demanding attitude toward personnel did receive applause at the 25th Party Congress). However, the difficulty of effecting such a "renewal" without giving someone an opportunity to create a powerful machine and free himself from collective restraints is enormous.

In the past, Western specialists on the Soviet Union often talked of succession crises, but such a crisis has never occurred in any meaningful sense of the word. Changes in leadership have taken place in an orderly fashion through established procedures. In the past, however, there was always a logical successor (or successors) and a political-administrative situation conducive to a relatively smooth transition.

Today, instead of talking about unanimity within the leadership and the inevitability of "Brezhnevism without Brezhnev" after his departure, we should at least consider the possibility that the succession to him may in fact involve a genuine crisis—if not immediately after his departure, then within a few years. If Brezhnev has been following an "after me, the deluge" line instead of trying to guarantee his policies after he has gone (a distinct possibility in this observer's opinion), some type of deluge cannot be ruled out.

In fact, the coming succession seems fraught with an unusually large combination of problems. There is no Politburo member with the "right" set of experiences and age to be General Secretary; there is a major problem of controlling a successor who has every excuse to rejuvenate the political-administrative elite; there is the possibility that the elections to the Politburo and Central Committee in the last few years may have created a real cleavage between these two bodies on such questions as investment priorities.[38] If the singling out of Suslov as the second secretary in the listing of secretaries elected after the recent Congress implies that he is now the designated emergency or interim successor (as it quite conceivably could), then one would have a very old General Secretary (Suslov is now 73) who probably has not had the opportunity to build the type of organizational support that Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev did and that Kirilenko presumably enjoys.

Particularly if the succession is accompanied by an unexpected crisis event—and such events inevitably occur in all countries periodically and always seem to be unexpected—the degree to which "scientific decision-making" has been constitutionalized in the Soviet Union will be very seriously tested, and elements in the leadership may be driven to major institutional change (*e.g.*, at a minimum, limitation of the General Secretary to one five-year term in office) in an attempt to solve the inistitutional dilemmas of the system.

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An Economy at Middle Age

By Gregory Grossman

As 1975 slipped into history, the USSR completed its ninth five-year plan period and started its tenth. Forty-five years is middle age for an individual; it may also be so for the Soviet planned economy—a possibility that the Tenth Five-Year Plan (FYP), or at least the outline for it just approved by the 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party,[1] appears to confirm. Now that the USSR rivals the United States in industrial output, it has used up some of its chief reserves for rapid industrialization; its institutions have become more rigid; both the society and the economy have become increasingly intractable; popular expectations and other pressures are mounting; and the whole economic organism is slowing down markedly.

Many of these trends are not at all new. Some have been in evidence since Stalin's death almost a quarter of a century ago; others are even older. But in one very important respect the Soviet economy turned a crucial corner in its history only around 1970—this was when it began to run out of plentiful reserves of labor for industrialization and modernization. Through the 1960's, large additions to the industrial labor force were a key ingredient of the Soviet Union's "extensive" formula for industrialization (a formula which also included plowing back a very high proportion of the national product into capital formation, large-scale manpower training, and massive importation of Western technology). By 1970, for both demographic and economic reasons, this resource was greatly depleted. Thus, whereas between 1950 and 1970 total nonagricultural employment had increased at an average annual rate of 3.9 percent and industrial employment at 3.7 percent, during 1971-75 the corresponding average annual rates of increase were only 2.5 and 1.3 percent, respectively.[2] The prospect for the second half of the 1970's is equally or even more tight in this regard; the Tenth Five-Year Plan implies an average increase in industrial employment of less than one percent per year.[3] And tighter still is the outlook for the 1980's, when the total working population of the USSR will presumably grow at less than one-half of one percent per year, and industrial employment may well not grow at all.[4]

If rather high rates of economic growth are to be maintained—and this is necessary if the economy is to satisfy rising consumer expectations and pressing claims from other economic sectors and interest

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[1] See "Basic Directions for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1976-1980" (hereafter "Basic Directions"), in *Pravda* (Moscow), March 7, 1976. Although, as will be discussed below, no "Tenth Five-Year Plan" *per se* yet exists, in the text we shall use the term to describe the basic outlines for the development of the Soviet economy in the next five years which were presented in "Basic Directions" and in an earlier draft version of this document (hereafter "Draft Basic Directions"), published in *ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1975. In assessing performance during the Ninth FYP period (1971-75) below, we shall rely on the following sources: the "Basic Directions" and "Draft Basic Directions"; data on 1975 performance reported by N. K. Baybakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), in "On the State Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1976" (hereafter, "1976 Plan"), *ibid.*, Dec. 3, 1975; the report of the Central Statistical Administration on fulfillment of the 1975 annual plan, in *ibid.*, Feb. 1, 1976; and projections by the author from data published for part of the 1971-75 period (when complete data were not available). Further, we shall rely on the two major addresses to the Congress, those by CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev (*ibid.*, Feb. 25, 1976) and Premier A. N. Kosygin (*ibid.*, March 2, 1976).

[2] See Murray Feshbach and Stephen Rapawy, "Labor Constraints in the Five-Year Plan," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, Tables 14 and 15.

[3] See Table 1 below, where a growth of 2-4 percent is indicated for the five years.

[4] See Murray Feshbach, "Soviet Society in Flux: Manpower Management," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1974, pp. 25-33.

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groups—then the leveling-off of nonagricultural employment will have to be offset by a considerable stepping-up of the *rate of growth* of the capital stock (other things, such as average efficiency of resource use, remaining approximately the same). This would require even larger and more rapidly growing volumes of annual investment—and even faster rates of technical progress. Yet such a prescription is not an easy one for the Soviet economy to follow. First, the system has not shown itself easily amenable to effective substitution of capital for labor and to rapid technical innovation; and second, accelerating the rate of capital formation is likely to be difficult in any case.

The proportion of Soviet GNP going into gross investment is already very high and even under favorable circumstances could not be stepped up without impinging on such high-priority sectors as consumption and defense. But conditions are not favorable: the very slowdown of economic growth itself will make this transfer of resources to capital formation even more difficult, both technically and politically. Furthermore, new claims on real investible resources have lately emerged from several quarters. The recent emphasis on motorization calls for large investments in the infrastructure and ancillary facilities of automotive transport, which until recently were mostly ignored. The need to replace depleted traditional sources of energy and other mineral resources has occasioned highly capital-intensive investment, often in remote and frontier areas where wages are high and infrastructure requirements are great, and such projects are now doubly necessary to meet as well the growing needs of the rest of Eastern Europe. Rising attention to the preservation of the environment places still other new claims on capital in the USSR as in all other industrial countries. Then there is a costly new railroad, the Baikal-Amur Mainline, being built in the wilderness of Eastern Siberia, and port facilities are being expanded. And finally, there is also agriculture.

The crop failures of 1963, 1965, 1967, and 1972, and, most seriously, that of 1975 have progressively enhanced the priority accorded to agriculture in the allocation of resources and investment funds. One can now speak of a veritable Soviet "Project Independence," a concerted program designed to achieve fairly dependable and steadily rising grain harvests with a view to future self-sufficiency at high per capita levels of consumption of animal products. It is not a cheap program. Whereas in the second



Claimants on Soviet capital resources: (from top) construction on the Baikal-Amur Mainline; superphosphate fertilizer production in Turkmenia; anchoring of oil and gas pipelines in the Samotlor fields of Tyumen Oblast.

—Wide World, Sovfoto, and I. Sapozhkov/TASS via Sovfoto.

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half of the 1960's the share of total gross fixed capital investment going to agriculture averaged 23 percent, in 1973 it reached 26.5 percent, and in 1975 it may have attained 27 percent.[5] In fact, during the first half of the 1970's, the value of fixed capital in agriculture (exclusive of livestock) grew nearly half again as fast as in industry, though output grew much more slowly in the former sector than in the latter (even if one discounts the effects of adverse weather).[6] For 1976, if one also includes investment going to branches of the economy supportive of agriculture (the tractor and agricultural machinery industries, the fertilizer industry, etc.), agriculture in this sense is to receive over 34 percent of the gross fixed investment in the whole economy for the current year. This is a major dent in the country's resources of investment capital, amounting in fact to over 10 percent of the expected national income (Soviet series) for 1976.[7]

By 1970, moreover, it was already clear that the efficiency of utilization of the USSR's scarce resources was not going to be appreciably improved by the economic reforms launched with some fanfare five years earlier. The most important consequence of the reform had been and would continue to be to heighten the emphasis placed on material incentives as a means of eliciting compliance from the work force at all levels of skill and responsibility and in all walks of life.

The Ninth FYP: Ambitious Goals

It was in this setting that the just-concluded Ninth FYP (1971-75)—the second FYP under the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership—was launched and ran its course. It was an ambitious plan, not so much because the targets were uncommonly high, but because the growth of the resource base, especially of the labor force, had already begun to level off. In fact, in percentage terms, most production and real-income targets of the Ninth FYP were set very close to the claimed achievements of its predecessor, the Eighth FYP (1966-70)—at times a little lower, but at times even a little higher.[8] Yet, whereas during 1966-70 the total nonagricultural labor force had increased by 19 percent, and the industrial labor force by 15 percent, for 1971-75 the Ninth FYP envisaged increases of only 13 and 6.5 percent, respectively. Accordingly, the Ninth Plan assumed an acceleration in the rate of growth of labor productivity and large economies in the utilization of major industrial materials and energy. Since the economic reform was already in retreat, such striking qualitative improvements seemed dubious, and therefore the Ninth FYP was widely adjudged by Western observers (and hinted by some Soviet authors) to be ambitious. In the event, it was substantially underfulfilled in various respects, and not only in agriculture, where of course the Plan fell far short of its targets.

It is not clear to what extent the drafters of the Ninth FYP counted on Western economic assistance in the form of credits, technology, and capital-goods imports. Even the book-length version of the Plan, which went to press in April 1972,[9] was still very laconic on economic relations with the West, hinting that these would expand only at a moderate pace. Quite possibly, this stance was tactically motivated: to avoid giving the impression that the success of the Plan depended on the West's cooperation. Be that as it may, there is little doubt that, if the Ninth Plan stood any chance of coming close to its goals, it needed (in addition to favorable weather) large-scale economic assistance from the West. Conceivably, a very bold and far-reaching economic

[5] Data for 1966-70 computed from *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1970 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1970), Moscow, Statistika, 1971, pp. 483, 486; for 1973, *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1973 g.* (The USSR National Economy in 1973), Moscow, Statistika, 1974, pp. 549, 552. The 1975 estimate rests on the figure of 131 billion rubles for 1971-75 given in "Basic Directions." These figures pertain to the "comprehensive series," which includes investment in housing and certain subsidiary facilities of farms and organizations servicing them (see footnotes to cited sources).

[6] *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1974 g.* (The USSR in Figures in 1974), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, p. 42.

[7] See report of N. K. Baybakov, "1976 Plan," *loc. cit.* This is only fixed investment. It does not include the accumulation of inventories and reserve stocks; nor does it include the very large subsidies on current account borne directly by the budget in the double attempt to stimulate agricultural production and hold down official retail prices. The exact sums of such subsidies in recent years are not precisely known, and in any case vary widely according to what is comprised within the concept. However, a fairly safe guess is that—*as a minimum*—such subsidies in 1976 will come to about 20 billion rubles, or over 5 percent of the expected national income (Soviet series) of about 380 billion rubles. Nor does the figure in the text include the external outlay on grain and other food imports, which may come to around US $5 billion in the 1975-76 crop year.

[8] See the contributions of Douglas B. Diamond and the present author in Norton T. Dodge, Ed., *Analysis of the USSR's 24th Party Congress and the 9th Five-Year Plan*, Mechanicsville, Md., Cremona Foundation, 1971. See also various contributions published in *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, cited above.

[9] N. K. Baybakov, Ed., *Gosudarstvennyy pyatiletniy plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva SSSR na 1971-1975 gody* (State Five-Year Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-75—hereafter, *1971-75 Plan*), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1972.

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reform could have boosted the economy's overall efficiency and in this fashion substituted for Western help, but such a move has been out of the question in Brezhnev's Russia for internal political reasons. To put it in terms of our opening metaphor, only a massive infusion of technology and resources from the West—if that—could preserve the Soviet economy's youthful élan and rapid growth once it had entered its middle age around 1970. And for this to happen, the West, and especially the United States, had to be persuaded that the international political climate had changed sufficiently to justify large-scale economic assistance to the Soviet Union. Thus, the Soviet post-1970 policy of détente, with its heavy emphasis on the "normalization" of economic relations, has been quite consistent with the USSR's domestic economic imperatives of the 1970's and 1980's.

Efforts to fulfill the ambitious goals of the Ninth FYP met with both bad and good luck. The worst luck came in the form of natural conditions that—on top of the usual inefficiencies of Soviet agriculture—occasioned two severe crop failures, in 1972 and 1975. Although adverse weather, especially droughts, have been a recurring phenomenon in Russian and Soviet history, two major crop failures in five years *is* bad luck.



US grain is loaded at Houston, Texas, in February 1973 for shipment to the USSR. Heavy Soviet purchases resulted from the 1972 Soviet crop disaster.

—Wide World.

The magnitude of the latest catastrophe must be fully grasped. The official Soviet figure for the 1975 grain crop is 140 million metric tons.[10] This is to be compared with an average crop of 192 million tons over the preceding four years—an average which includes the very low harvest of 1972 (168 million tons), following which some 30 million tons were hurriedly purchased in the West. The 1975 figure is also to be compared with the revised target of 215.7 million tons contained in the 1975 annual plan.[11] This would indicate a shortfall of some 76 million tons, or around 70 million tons if one allows for normal rates of harvesting waste. (The drought of course also affected other field crops, though apparently less severely; cotton, on the other hand, did very well in 1975—for details, see Table 4, on page 30.)

To gauge the significance of a 70-million-ton shortfall in grain production, one need only recall that the original target for 1975 procurement of grain by the government from all domestic producers was 87 million tons. Carry-over stocks are probably not large owing to the mixed production record of the preceding several years. Thus, the 1975 crop failure has triggered large new grain purchases in the West, primarily in the United States. However, imports probably cannot come close to filling the gap caused by the latest crop failure, for the shortfall is more than double the reputed annual throughput capacity of Soviet ports, *i.e.*, more than double what it is physically possible to import during the current crop year. Consequently a considerable volume of demand will presumably remain unsatisfied until at least the next harvest, resulting primarily in a substantial shortage of fodder for animals, even if possibly not of grain and potatoes for direct human consumption. And indeed, excessive slaughter of hogs and sheep is already indicated in the end-of-year statistics, which explains in part the high reported production and sales of meat. The consequences of the 1975 grain crop failure will be heavily felt not only this year but for some time to come (see below). It may well be that this is the

[10] See Table 4 below.

[11] *Pravda*, Dec. 19, 1974. The Ninth FYP had set a target of 214 million metric tons. See Baybakov, *1971-75 Plan.*

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largest single blow suffered by the Soviet economy since the German invasion of 1941.

But not all was bad luck. One should note on the positive side the ability and willingness of the West, particularly the United States, to come to the USSR's rescue with grain in both 1972 and 1975. (Moreover, in 1972, American grain was sold to the Soviets at bargain prices.) These acts of accommodation on the part of Moscow's superpower adversary in the Soviet Union's hours of dire necessity—acts for which apparently no political compensations were sought or obtained—surely are worthy of special note in the annals of history, and in any case must be counted as instances of Soviet good luck.

Another bit of good fortune for the Soviets in the first half of the 1970's was the large amount of credit extended to the USSR by Western governments and private interests for the purchase of capital equipment, often at preferential interest rates and on preferential terms. Lastly, there was the shift in relative prices in world markets after 1972-73, which—at least initially—heavily favored Soviet ex-

Table 1: The Soviet Economy, 1960-80—Performance and Plans

Index	Seventh FYP 1965/actual (1960=100)	Eighth FYP 1970/actual (1965=100)	Ninth FYP 1975/plan (1970=100)	Ninth FYP 1975/actual (1970=100)	Tenth FYP 1980/target (1975=100)
National income utilized[a]	132	141	138.6	128	124-28
Civilian employment, all	113	110	n.a.	(108)	(108)
Workers and employees, all	124	117	112	113	n.a.
Fixed capital stock	157	144	n.a.	*144*[b]	n.a.
Fixed capital stock ("productive" only)	159	148	n.a.	150	n.a.
Energy consumed (calories)	132	125	n.a.	*119*[c]	n.a.
Investment, gross fixed[d]	145	143	141.6	142	124-26
Industry:					
Gross output, all branches	151	150	147	143	135-39
Gross output, Group "A"[e]	159	151	146.3	*145*	138-42
Gross output, Group "B"[e]	136	150	148.6	137	130-32
Ingot steel produced	139	127	126	122	113-21
Electricity produced	174	146	144	139	130-34
Fixed capital stock ("productive" only)	168	152	n.a.	*147*[b]	140
Workers and employees	121	115	106	*107*	102-04[f]
Electricity consumed in industry	169	140	n.a.	*134*[b]	n.a.
Capital/person employed	139	132	n.a.	*137*	137
Output/capital	89	99	n.a.	97	*96-99*
Labor productivity	125	132	139	134	130-34
Agriculture:					
Gross value of output[d]	112	121	123	113	114-17
Grain output[d]	107	129	116	108	118-21
Agricultural labor force	99	95	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Average money wage or salary	120	126	122.4	120	116-18
Real income per capita	119	133	130.8	124	120-22
Retail sales, state and cooperative, in current rubles	133	148	141.8	136	127-29

n.a.—not available. Figures in parentheses—projections by Murray Feshbach (see sources below). Figures in italics—extrapolations or computations by the author.

[a] Soviet concept.

[b] Extrapolated from 1971-74.

[c] Extrapolated from 1971-73.

[d] Ratios of investment totals or of average annual output for five-year periods ending in the stated year and in the earlier base year.

[e] Group "A" is a catch-all Soviet category of producer goods, *i.e.*, all manufacturing, mining, and utilities other than those producing finished consumer goods (the latter being designated Group "B").

[f] Depending on whether the number employed is estimated via the targets for labor productivity or for capital per person.

SOURCES: For results of the Seventh and Eighth FYP's, see official Soviet statistical yearbooks; for results of the Ninth FYP see sources cited in footnote 1 to the text. For the Tenth FYP, see "Basic Directions for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1976-80," *Pravda* (Moscow), March 7, 1976. Data on total civilian employment and agricultural labor force are from Murray Feshbach's contribution to US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 520. It should be noted that Soviet aggregative production and productivity claims (the "actual" figures above) usually contain substantial overstatement. However, they may nonetheless be usable to compare trends for five-year periods, as in the present and following tables.

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ports (including gold). The last two developments should be counted as positive, even though most of the Western capital goods whose purchase was financed by the credits and the hard-currency windfall could not have arrived and been put to use in time to appreciably affect the fulfillment of Ninth FYP's production targets for 1975.

A Plan Underfulfilled

The net result of all these factors—shrinking resources and ambitious planning, bad luck and good—was a considerable underfulfillment of the targets originally envisaged in the Ninth FYP. But the student of the Soviet economy is faced with the problem of separating out that portion of the shortfall which derived from longer-term retardatory trends in the Soviet economy (and which, as noted above, probably were not sufficiently reflected in the Plan) from that portion which was ascribable chiefly to nature's lapses.

Some idea of the dimensions of the shortfall can be seen in Table 1. Thus, according to the "Basic Directions," total national income utilized (Soviet series) was 28 percent higher in 1975 than in 1970 (representing a growth of 5.1 percent per year on the average) instead of the planned 38.6 percent (6.7 percent per year). Agricultural production, in average-annual gross-value terms, increased in 1971-75 by 13 percent instead of 21.7 percent over 1966-70. Industrial output in 1975 was 43 percent higher than in 1970 (a growth of 7.4 percent per annum) instead of a planned 47 percent (8.0 percent per annum),[12] and within this category, the figures for consumer goods rose 37 (6.5) percent against a planned 48.6 (8.2) percent. Thus, although the Ninth FYP was the first in Soviet history to provide for a faster rate of output growth of consumer goods than of producer goods, the actual relationship was the reverse, as usual.

Rarely in the postwar period have such underfulfillments of global production categories been admitted. There is reason to believe, moreover, that these official data—as has generally been true of official data in the past—overstate growth and therefore do not reveal the full extent of the 1975 setback and of underfulfillment of the whole five-year program. Thus, the Soviet national-income series is almost certainly subject to appreciable inflation, perhaps by at least a percentage point per year; hence, a corrected rate of 4 percent per year for 1971-75 is not unlikely.

In addition, there is reason to suspect that the claimed growth of overall industrial output—7.4 percent per year, representing 97 percent fulfillment of the targeted production level for 1975—is very likely overstated. While the output of electricity and some basic fuels and industrial materials —coal, oil,[13] steel, cement, mineral fertilizers—hit the respective targets or came within a few percent of them, output of other products, many of more advanced fabrication, generally fell considerably short of their targets, at least insofar as can be determined at this writing. This was true of commodity groups such as nonferrous metals, basic chemicals, synthetics and plastics, paper and paperboard, dairy products, other foods, textiles, footwear, knitwear, and a number of major consumer durables, and, last but not least, machinery.[14]

Most items of civilian producer machinery and equipment fared not too well, despite the high priorities accorded to them. Data for 21 such machinery groups indicate a median degree of plan fulfillment of 89 percent,[15] although the Soviets claim to have achieved the planned index for machinery and metalworking as a whole.[16] (Incidentally, the increased

[12] The official assertion (see "Basic Directions") is that the growth in industrial output of 43 percent just achieved the target laid down in the "Directives" for the Ninth FYP. It does indeed correspond to the lower end of the range stipulated in the "Directives for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1971-1975" (hereafter, "Directives for the Ninth FYP") published in draft form in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (Moscow) on February 14, 1971, and, as approved by the 24th CPSU Congress, in *ibid.*, April 11, 1971. However, the final version of the Ninth FYP (see *Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1971 and Baybakov, *1971-75 Plan*, p. 345) called for a 47-percent increase in industrial output. This final version generally narrowed the range of target figures to single figures, typically moving to the upper ends of the ranges. Although the annual plan for 1975 scaled down some targets, the present article presents all 1975 targets as they appeared in the final version of the Five-Year Plan, unless otherwise stated.

[13] For natural gas the figure is about 91 percent.

[14] Nevertheless, production of passenger automobiles (which in the Soviet Union are only partly intended for the domestic consumer) did relatively well at 95 percent of the target.

[15] *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1976, and *1971-75 Plan*.

[16] The index in 1975 was 173 (with the base of 100 in 1970), which just exceeded the target of 172. As indicated in the text, such an attainment is very doubtful. In past quinquennia it has also been common for the machinery and metalworking index to "run away" from the component commodity groups. Since only data on civilian machinery are published, it is quite possible that higher-than-planned production of munitions may explain the high performance of the overall machinery category. But another, very likely reason (given the way the index is compiled) is the much discussed steady, if slow, inflation in machinery prices, which one Soviet source puts at an average rate of some 2 percent per year (*Sotsialisticheskaya industriya*, [Moscow], July 31, 1975, p. 2), or say, 10 percent for the five years.

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importation of machinery and equipment from the West, probably above levels anticipated in the Ninth FYP, tended to partly compensate for shortfalls in domestic production of such items. This points again to the importance of détente for the Soviet economy.)

The USSR claims to have just met the planned volume of gross fixed investment, in ruble terms. However, it is highly doubtful that the target for the real physical volume of capital formation was even approximately achieved. This much is evident from the as yet partial data on capacity installed in various industries in relation to increments planned in the FYP;[17] for 14 industries, mostly basic materials and transport, the median percentage fulfillment in this regard is only 66 percent. As in previous periods, housing construction fell short of the target, this time by about 6 percent. The attainment of the overall target for fixed investment (in rubles) seems to have been facilitated by chronic cost overruns, a problem that has attracted much attention in the Soviet press lately.

We have already adverted to the crop failure of 1975. Its effects on industrial production (and on consumption levels) may not show up fully in the 1975 statistics owing to the drawing-down of domestic stocks of foodstuffs and industrial materials and to imports of grain. However, the uncommonly modest targets of the 1976 annual plan (see Table 2), bear witness to the profound effects of a disastrous crop on the whole economy, both direct and through such indirect links as the balance of payments.

Increases in labor productivity did not match the optimistic targets of the Ninth FYP,[18] even on the basis of official statements, let alone after correction for the likely overstatement of global output magnitudes. It is also probable that the hoped-for economies in the utilization of materials and fuels were not fully realized in view of the generally poorer fulfillment of plans for production of highly fabricated goods (requiring inputs of energy and basic industrial materials) compared to the fulfillment of output plans for energy and materials themselves. This is probably not unconnected with the fact that during the Ninth FYP period, *i.e.*, 1971-75, the economic reform was in steady retreat, as already noted —a retreat that in turn stemmed in part from the ambitiousness of the Plan itself, which tended to heighten the pressure on resources and therefore to prompt recentralization in planning and management. (Such reciprocal action between institutions and performance is not at all uncommon in Soviet experience.)

This centralized control was able to muster certain successes. The Ninth FYP's best record may well lie in the least publicized sector, namely, munitions production (see footnote 16 above). Traditional heavy industry did quite well in relation to plan, too,

Table 2: 1976 and 1980 Targets *vs.* 1971-74 Results

(percent increase per annum)

	1971-74 actual[a]	1976 target	1980 target[b]
National income utilized[c]	5.5	5.4	4.4-5.1
Industrial output, total	7.4	4.3	6.2-6.8
in Group "A"[d]	7.8	4.9	6.0-7.3
in Group "B"[d]	6.6	2.7	5.4-5.7
Fixed capital investment, gross	6.6[e]	5.1[e]	4.4-4.7[f]
Freight, ton-kilometers	6.6	5.7	5.4
Agricultural output	3.1	6.7[g]	—[h]
Grain output	9.7	6.9[g]	—[h]
Average money wage or salary	3.6	2.7	3.7-4.1
Average collective farmer earnings, public sector	5.1	5.0	4.4-4.8
Real income per capita	4.4	3.7	3.7-4.1
Retail sales	6.2	3.6	4.9-5.2
Labor productivity:			
in industry	5.9	3.4	5.4-6.0
in construction	5.1	5.5	5.2-5.7
on railroads	4.7	3.0	3.4-3.7
Housing construction	0.6	1.5	0-1.0[i]

[a] Expressed as average annual increase between 1970 and 1974.
[b] Expressed as average annual increase between 1975 and 1980.
[c] Soviet concept.
[d] See footnote "e" to Table 1 above.
[e] By state only, *i.e.*, excluding investment by collective farms and households, which is relatively small.
[f] For all investments (including that by collective farms and households), expressed as average annual increase between 1971-75 and 1976-80.
[g] In relation to the average value or amount for 1971-74, *i.e.*, excluding the 1975 crop disaster.
[h] Comparison with 1971-75 would be misleading because of the bad crop failure of 1975, and therefore no figures are given.
[i] Five-year total in relation to preceding five-year total.

SOURCES: For the 1971-74 data, see *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1974 g.* (The USSR in Figures in 1974), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, *passim*; for the 1976 plan targets, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 3, 1975; for 1976-80 targets, see Table 1 and sources listed in footnote 1 to the text.

[17] *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1976, and *1971-75 Plan.*

[18] An exception was the increase in labor productivity on the railroads, which slightly exceeded its target. This seems to have been due to the exceeding of the ton-kilometer target by the railroads (which still account for over 60 percent of all ton-kilometers hauled), which in turn was mostly accounted for by increasing the length of the average haul.

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as (for a change) did the production of mineral fertilizers [19]—no doubt spurred by the pressing needs of agriculture.

Exactly what happened to consumption levels cannot yet be ascertained. The official statistic is that real income per capita rose over the five years to an index of 124, as compared with the planned level of 130.8; in other words, consumption per capita in 1975 was supposedly five percent short of plan. Domestic production of consumer goods and services generally fell even more below the respective targets, but it must be remembered that an increasingly significant role in the consumption picture is played by imports, quite apart from the emergency grain imports. The shortfall in housing construction has already been noted. In his address to the 25th Party Congress, General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev placed (shifted?) heavy blame for the shortcomings of recent years on those responsible for planning and managing the consumer goods industries.

Whatever the exact increase in average consumption during the Ninth FYP—the first five-year plan in Soviet history to hold forth the target of raising consumption as a paramount objective—there is little doubt that it was substantially less than during the preceding five years. (This might have been the case even without the unusually bad weather conditions of the first half of the 1970's because of the long-term trends discussed above.) Furthermore, as noted below, the latest FYP (for 1976-80) foresees an increase in per capita real income which is even slightly lower than the claimed achievement during 1971-75. Given the central importance of steadily increasing consumption levels in the outlook of the Soviet public and in its assessment of the party's leadership, and given the leaders' awareness of the public's attitude, the leveling-off of the per-capita consumption curve after 1970 is a phenomenon of great political importance. Coming as it does at a time of serious retardation in the expansion of the economy's resources and of uncertainty in the evolution of détente, it may well have appreciable bearing on the foreign as well as domestic policies of the USSR.

It is in this setting that the USSR has embarked on its Tenth FYP. The "Basic Directions" for the Plan are closely similar in length and format to the corresponding document for the Ninth FYP (the "Directives" published in April 1971).[20] They are equally sparse in quantitative data. Possibly, a year or so from now, a book-length version will finally appear, as in the case of the Ninth FYP, and we shall then know a good deal more of what is in store for the USSR in 1980. If no such book is published on the Tenth FYP, it may mean either that no comprehensive plan will have been drawn up by the planners, or that such a plan will have been drawn up but withheld from publication.

The Tenth FYP: Will It Exist?

One is inclined to see the former as more likely, for Soviet five-year plans seem to have a serious "existence problem." In the postwar period, these plans have customarily been heralded by quite brief and ostensibly tentative documents, such as the present "Basic Directions," and only in the case of the Ninth FYP were they followed by the publication of a more or less comprehensive, book-length document. There is some reason to believe that in most or all cases before 1972 no final version was published simply because no agreed-upon comprehensive plan was completed, although this fact was never publicly admitted.[21] If so, how do we interpret the role of medium-term plans in Soviet economic development? What does the Soviet Union's claim that its economy develops according to five-year plans really amount to if in fact, between World War II and 1972, few (if any) comprehensive plans were drawn up? Moreover, major new programs and revisions of old ones are frequently adopted in the course of the quinquennial period. What then is the meaning of FYP's being fulfilled or not fulfilled?

The marvel is not that Soviet medium-term plans are not fully drawn up, but rather that the job is attempted at all, for it is basically an infeasible one, given the degree of detail and rigidity that the

[19] Much of the increase in mineral fertilizer capacity came from equipment imported from the West.

[20] The choice of the words "Basic Directions" (*osnovnyye napravleniya* in Russian) is an unexplained departure from established practice. On five previous occasions, the corresponding document was entitled "Directives . . ." (*direktivy* in Russian), indicating that the document represented the directives from the party leaders to the planners regarding the drawing up of the final version of the Five-Year Plan. Perhaps the change in the case of the Tenth FYP is a recognition of the fact that the fundamental directives are actually given much earlier by the party to the planners. Or it may reflect the somewhat tentative nature of the present document owing to the hasty revision that planning for the Tenth FYP period most likely had to undergo when the crop failure became apparent in mid-1975.

[21] See our discussion in Dodge, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

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Soviets require of it. The job takes several years (whether it can be significantly speeded up and qualitatively improved with modern data processing equipment remains to be seen), in the course of which the statistical base for planning needs continual updating, the whole world is changing, the leadership's goals and priorities are shifting, and sometimes the leadership itself changes. Even after the initial "Directives" (or "Basic Directions") are adopted by the CPSU Congress, it must still be very difficult, if not impossible, to produce within a reasonable time (for the quinquennium in question is already running its course) a comprehensive document that will be at once internally consistent and not out of tune with both reality and the leadership's priorities of the given moment. (At the Congress, Kosygin spoke quite frankly on this general problem.) The 1972 publication of a book-length version of the Ninth FYP—as noted, the first such publication since before the last world war—is a good case in point: it was already partly obsolete the moment it came off the press, owing to the major crop failure of that year. And one wonders how good the "Basic Directions" for the Tenth Plan are, considering that they must have been hastily revised at the last moment because of the latest crop failure.

If it is very difficult to draw up a comprehensive, completed five-year plan, it is that much more difficult in some respects to draw up a *fifteen*-year plan. Therefore one is hardly surprised to find that the "Basic Directions" fail even to mention the fifteen-year plan for 1976-90 that has been under intensive concurrent preparation (and of which the Tenth FYP was to be the first five-year segment).

The record of Soviet long-term (15- or 20-year) plans is not a happy one. Although repeatedly attempted since the late 1920's, they have generally suffered from excessive optimism and minimal longevity. The latest—and most highly publicized—such attempt was Khrushchev's "Twenty-Year Program" for 1961-80, announced in October 1961,[22] at the apogee of his post-Sputnik optimism. It will be recalled that the Program was to bring Soviet society to the threshold of full communism, *i.e.*, material abundance. Although its targets (at least the published ones) were only global and very general, and pertained only to the years 1970 and 1980, its lack of realism ensured its being officially forgotten even before Khrushchev stepped out of power four years later. It is perhaps of some historical interest to compare the targets of the just-approved Tenth Five-Year Plan for 1980 with those of Khrushchev's 20-Year Program for the same year. Such a comparison is provided in Table 3, where the figures are ratios (expressed as a percent) of targets in the Tenth FYP to those of the Program. Where targets are in the form of ranges, the ratios employ mid-point values. Items in the top portion of the table—comparing index series—may be overstated owing to probable price inflation occurring between 1960 and 1975 (when the Tenth FYP was compiled).

But to return to Brezhnev's 15-year program. Referring to it as "guidelines" rather than as a plan, the General Secretary devoted a fair amount of time to it in his address to the Congress. He observed that 15-year guidelines are not of a directive nature nor

Table 3: The Year 1980—A Revised Prognosis

(in percent, ratios of 10th FYP targets to those in Khrushchev's 20-Year Program)

Index series	
National income	65
Industrial output	70
Producer goods	70
Consumer goods	71
Machine building	79
Agricultural output[a]	50
Labor productivity in industry	71
Physical output series	
Electricity	48
Ingot steel	66
Crude oil	90
Natural gas	60
Coal	67
Cement	62
Mineral fertilizer	110
Plastic and synthetic resins	28
Synthetic fibers	46
Fabrics, altogether	61
Grain	73
Meat (slaughter wt.)	49
Milk	54
Eggs	53
Raw cotton	86
Sugar beets	94

[a] In the calculation of this ratio, the numerator was first derived by computing the percent increase between total output for the five-year period ending in 1960 and total output planned for the five-year period ending in 1980.

SOURCES: "Basic Directions for the Development of the USSR National Economy in 1976-80," *Pravda*, March 7, 1976, and *ibid.*, Oct. 18, 1961.

[22] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1961.

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as detailed as five-year plans. Rather, their goal is "to determine the nature and size of the tasks facing [the USSR] in good time and to concentrate efforts on solving them; to have a clearer view of problems and difficulties; to facilitate the working-out and fulfillment of programs and projects beyond the framework of one five-year period." Noting that there "is still a great deal of work to be done on the concrete figures and tasks for the future," Brezhnev predicted that during 1976-90, the USSR would "have at its disposal approximately twice as many material and financial resources as in the last 15-year period," as compared with an approximately 2.4-fold increase "in the volume of material goods and of services" in the preceding 15 years.[23] No other figures were mentioned. Although such grandiose visions of course have great propaganda value both at home and abroad, one suspects that the 1976-90 plan, if ever completed, will soon join its predecessors in the archives of *Gosplan* (The State Planning Committee).

A Restrained FYP

Setting aside the question of whether or not there will ever be a definitive Tenth Five-Year Plan, let alone a complete Brezhnev 15-Year Plan, let us return to an examination of the anticipated course of the Soviet economy over the 1976-80 period, as presented in the "Basic Directions." In terms of targeted growth rates, the Tenth FYP is by far the most modest medium-term plan in Soviet history—a reflection of both long-term retardation in the growth of the Soviet economy and the 1975 agricultural disaster.

The restraint in the Plan is evident if we compare the targets for 1976-80 with those planned for 1971-75 and the results actually achieved in that five-year period (see Table 1 above).[24] Thus, the 1980 goal for national income utilized is set at a level 24-28 percent higher than that of 1975, compared to a 38.6-percent planned gain and a 28-percent gain reportedly achieved from 1970 to 1975. For industrial output, the corresponding figures are 35-39, 47, and 43 percent; for output of industrial consumer goods (Group "B")—30-32, 48.6, and 37 percent; for output of producer goods (Group "A", admittedly a catch-all category of limited analytical significance)—38-42 [25], 46.3, and 46 percent; for agricultural output (measured by averages of annual output for the quinquennia ending in 1980 and 1975, respectively)—14-17, 23, and 13 percent; for gross fixed investment (total value for the whole five-year periods)[26]—24-26, 41.6, and 42 percent; and lastly, value of retail sales (state and cooperative)—27-29, 41.8, and 35 percent.

The general picture of retardation that emerges from these global magnitudes is also confirmed by such detail as appears in the "Basic Directions." This is especially marked in regard to personal consumption (on which more presently), but it is also quite evident in several basic industries and in some machinery items. Thus, the "Basic Directions" provides for the following percentage increases in the output of energy and basic materials during the Tenth Plan period (for comparison, actual increases during the Ninth FYP are shown in parentheses): electricity—29-33 (40); crude petroleum—26-30 (39); natural gas—38-50 (46); coal—13-16 (12);[27] ingot steel—13-20 (22); rolled steel (finished)—17-22 (22); aluminum, copper, and nickel—20-30 (36 [28]); mineral fertilizers—59 (63); synthetic resins and plastics—90-110 (67); synthetic fibers—52-57 (53); cement—18-21 (28); and paper and paperboard—15-25 (28). Although the figures show a high target for plastics and synthetic resins relative to achieved growth in the previous plan period and

[23] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976. The 15-year increases work out, respectively, to 6.0 and 4.7 percent per year on the average. If the category in question is similar to Western-style gross national product, then 6 percent for 1961-75 would be regarded as a high estimate by many Western specialists (see Douglas B. Diamond in Dodge, *op. cit.*, p. 48), while the 4.7 percent for 1976-90 may well be regarded by them as optimistic. Notable, however, is Brezhnev's reference to an economic aggregate including services, which is counter to the traditional Soviet ("Marxist") concept of national income.

[24] The figures for 1971-75 used here are official claims, which in some cases may be seriously overstated for reasons generally applicable to Soviet official data. Moreover, in some cases, they are extrapolations by the author of somewhat earlier statistics.

[25] It may be worth noting that the range in the Group "A" target is twice as wide as in the Group "B" target. This was not the case with the "Directives" for the Ninth FYP.

[26] These figures are in rubles, and the reported data are therefore particularly subject to upward bias due to cost overruns.

[27] The absolute production targets for 1980 in the energy area are: electricity—1,340-1,380 billion kwh. (but some 100 billion kwh. should be deducted for power-station use to make the figure internationally comparable); crude oil—620-640 million metric tons; natural gas—400-435 billion cubic meters; coal (all types)—790-810 million metric tons. Construction of large, multi-purpose hydroelectric projects is to be continued, although increased emphasis is to be placed on atomic power in the generation of electricity, especially in European Russia, which is relatively poor in fossil energy sources.

[28] This is our estimate of the official figure for the *whole* nonferrous metal industry.

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indicate an intention to maintain approximately the same rates of output growth as were achieved in recent years for mineral fertilizers and synthetic fibers, it seems overall that even if the mid-point values of the respective ranges are attained by 1980, growth in the total supply of energy and basic materials will have slowed appreciably.

As for machinebuilding and metalworking, the target is to increase output by 1980 some 50-60 percent over 1975, which is to be compared with the planned increase of 72 percent for the previous FYP, and an actual increase (apparently for machinebuilding alone) of 73 percent—a claim that, as already noted, we have found difficult to substantiate. For the few specific groups of machinery for which Tenth FYP data are given, the targeted percentage increases (and, in parentheses, claimed increases during the 1971-75 period) are as follows:[29] automation equipment—60-70 (80); computer equipment and accessories—80 (330[30]); trucks (number)—15-19 (33); tractors (number)—6-10 (20); equipment for the light and food industries—30-40 (50). It may be inferred[31] that the number of passenger automobiles to be produced in 1980 has been set at 1.2-1.3 million, at best a modest increase over the 1.2 million that were produced in 1975. Considering the difficulties of absorbing domestically the growing numbers of passenger cars and the high value that now attaches to the petroleum products burned by them, as well as the current intensification of Soviet efforts to export cars, particularly to the West, it seems quite likely that the number of passenger cars retained out of production for domestic uses will not increase significantly over the next five years.

Beyond the restraint evident in the Tenth FYP targets, there are signs of a simultaneous and seemingly long-term shift of emphasis in favor of heavy industry. In Brezhnev's own words at the Congress: "The main thrust [*sterzhen'*] of the Party's economic strategy that runs through both [!] the Tenth FYP and the long-term [*i.e.*, 15-year] program is further augmentation of the economic might of the country, expansion and radical modernization of production capacity, and ensuring of stable and balanced growth for heavy industry, the foundation of our economy." These words are printed in bold face. Missing from them is any explicit reference—standard in such contexts in recent years—to raising consumer welfare (though the theme is stressed in relation to just the long-term program in a separate context). Concretely, this restored priority of heavy industry is reflected in the return in the Tenth FYP to the traditional policy of setting higher overall targets for producer-good industry (Group "A") as against consumer-good industry (Group "B")—see Table 1.

However, even the restored priority of heavy industry apparently cannot forestall a sharp drop in the rate of increase of gross fixed investment[32] (a 24-26 percent increase in the Tenth FYP against 42-45 percent increases claimed in the three preceding quinquennia, though these claims may be overstated due to cost inflation). This is very significant. It means that, after allowance for depreciation, the real annual additions to total fixed capital stock may now be, in relation to the capital stock itself, only (very roughly) half as large as they were in the recent past, and this at a time when demands on capital are expanding rapidly, as discussed at the beginning of this article. The Soviet economy is thus clearly entering into a new historical phase when retardation in the expansion of the capital stock interacts with the slowing in the growth of total output to force adjustment to a considerably more modest pace of development. The reader will recall the "new Soviet growth model" that was vividly depicted and predicted by Professor Abram Bergson in the pages of this journal just three years ago.[33] It will be interesting to watch how consumption and defense fare in the squeeze.

Slower Improvement for Consumers

It is clear that the Tenth FYP will be no "consumers' plan," and not much claim is made that it is. By Soviet standards, the promises held out to consumers are rather modest in relation not only to

[29] It should be noted that except where the unit of measure was physical numbers (noted in parentheses), the data represent ruble values. Fulfillment data in terms of ruble value, including our own estimates, are often subject to serious inflation.

[30] The official claim in the "Basic Directions" is one of a "4.3-fold" increase during 1971-75; the planned target was a threefold increase. Thus, there would seem to be very large overfulfillment of the Ninth FYP in this respect. However, the index of output of computer equipment and accessories is complicated by likely price inflation and by the collaboration of a number of other Comecon countries in the development and production of the "ES" ("ryad") computer series.

[31] From targets for all motor vehicles and for trucks only.

[32] The sharper drop in investment than in producer-good output may be occasioned by the high priority enjoyed by defense.

[33] Abram Bergson, "Soviet Economic Perspectives: Toward a New Growth Model," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1973, pp. 1-9.

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earlier plans but even to past achievements, especially those in the first half of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership's tenure of office. For instance, real income per capita is to increase some 20-22 percent by 1980, compared with claimed growth of 24 percent during 1971-75 and 33 percent during 1966-70. The average money wage/salary is to go up 16-18 percent, compared with 20 and 26 percent, respectively, in the earlier quinquennia. For collective farmers the outlook might appear somewhat better—a 24-27 percent gain in income from the socialist sector—until one recalls that this is based on the disastrous agricultural year of 1975.

Turning to goods and services for the consumer, we also discover a moderating trend in growth. The Tenth FYP promises an increase of 27-29 percent in the level of retail sales, compared with 36 percent in 1971-75. The figures on the production side are quite consistent with this target. Thus, output of light industry (mainly textiles, clothing, and footwear) is planned to rise by 26-28 percent; of the food-processing industry—by 23-25 percent; of meat and dairy products—by 20-22 percent; and of fish and fish products for human consumption—by 30-32 percent.[34] Everyday services to the public (still a neglected area) are to increase in sales volume by 50 percent, compared with a claimed 60 percent during the Ninth FYP.

Of particular importance to consumption is the expectable lowering of sights in the Tenth FYP for agriculture, where the gross value of average annual output during 1976-80 is planned to increase 14-17 percent, compared with a 23-percent planned increase—and a 13-percent achieved increase—for 1971-75. Annual grain output, again as a five-year average, is targeted at 215-220 million tons, compared with an average of 191.9 million tons per year for 1971 through *1974—i.e.,* excluding the 1975 crop failure. How do these production targets translate into expected government procurements (which roughly approximate the food and technical-crop resources which are expected to be at the authorities' disposal)? Examining the procurement data in Table 4 (where the targets for 1980 are again presented as annual averages for 1976-80), we discern a fairly clear pattern. The Tenth FYP envisages essentially the same absolute amounts of procurement of most chief field crops and animal products as did the Ninth FYP for *1975—i.e.,* for

[34] The base for these increases is 1975, but these industries apparently have not yet felt much of the effects of last year's natural conditions.

A scene at Dnepropetrovsk's central meat market. Meat is of increasing importance in the Soviet diet.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

the terminal year of the 1971-75 quinquennium.[35] Assuming that the planned average annual level of procurements will be reached somewhere near the mid-point of the 1976-80 period (*i.e.,* sometime around 1978), we see that the date for achieving the levels of procurement originally targeted for 1975 has been postponed some three years. These trends in procurement should be compared with a projected growth of total population of almost 1 percent per year, and of urban population—which may be the more relevant category here—of nearly 2.5 percent per year.[36]

The target for procurement of livestock (including poultry) is of particular interest because of the high political importance that attaches to the satisfaction of demand for meat. According to the "Basic Directions," the average annual procurement of meat during 1976-80 is set at 17.4 million tons, or 13 percent above the average during 1971-75. This compares with an increase of 33 percent in the preceding quinquennium (1971-75 in relation to 1966-70), and 35 percent in the one before (1966-70 in relation to 1961-65). The average annual

[35] Only procurement of eggs and cotton is projected at significantly higher levels. Egg production has shot up lately, in part thanks to the setting-up of large, American-style chicken farms. Cotton was the bright exception in the dismal agricultural picture of 1975.

[36] This was the rate of increase of the urban population between January 1, 1970, and January 1, 1976; it is likely to persist for the rest of the decade.

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growth of livestock procurement was therefore 6.0 percent over the three quinquennia.[37] Over the same period, total money incomes are said to have increased by 113 percent,[38] or 7.9 percent per year on the average. The economist's income elasticity of demand for meat thus roughly works out to as much as 0.76 (6.0 ÷ 7.9), despite the sharp increase in official meat prices in 1962. Therefore, a 13-percent increase in livestock procurement during the Tenth FYP would seem to suffice to meet only a 17-percent (13 ÷ 0.76) increase in total money incomes. Yet, an increase in money incomes of no less than 30 percent appears to be expected.[39] (At the same time, there is of course no assurance that the planned increase in livestock procurement will actually materialize.) One wonders whether there will not be a serious aggravation of meat shortages in official stores, a substantial increase in official meat prices at retail (now heavily subsidized, as we have seen), considerable importation of meat, or some combination of the three.

In this connection, one should take note of a passing hint in the "Basic Directions" that some retail prices may be officially raised. In recent years

Table 4: Annual Agricultural Production and Procurements, 1971-80

(millions of metric tons, except as noted)

	Ninth FYP		1975 only		Tenth FYP
	1971-75 plan [a]	1971-75 actual [a]	plan [b]	actual	1976-80 plan [a]
Production					
Grain	195	181.5	214	140	215-20
Potatoes	105.7	89.7	111.2	88.5	n.a.
Sunflower seed	7.0	6.0	7.4	5	7.6
Sugar beets	87.4	(78.0) [c]	92.4	n.a.	95-98
Raw cotton	6.75	7.7	7.2	7.9	8.5
Flax fiber, 1000 tons	n.a.	454	556	478	n.a.
Vegetables	24.7	22	27.2	22 [d]	n.a.
Meat (slaughter weight)	14.3	14	16.0	15.2	15-15.6
Milk	92.3	87.4	100.2	90.8	94-96
Eggs, billions	46.7	49.8	52.7	57.7	58-61
Wool (greasy), 1000 tons	464	436	500	463	n.a.
Procurements					
Grain	81	(72)	87	n.a.	90
Potatoes	n.a.	(12.3)	16	n.a.	16.8
Sunflowerseed	5.7	(4.7)	5.9	n.a.	6
Sugar beets	82	(69.2)	87	n.a.	89.5
Raw cotton	6.8	(7.6)	7.2	n.a.	8.5
Flax fiber, 1000 tons	n.a.	(414.5)	540	n.a.	511
Vegetables	13.5	(12.9)	16	n.a.	17
Fruit and berries	4.2	(3.6)	5.5	n.a.	5.6
Grapes	4.6	(3.2)	5.4	n.a.	5.4
Tea (leaves), 1000 tons	n.a.	(301.5)	303	n.a.	n.a.
Livestock (including fowl), live wt.	15.4	(15)	17.7	16.7	17.4
Milk	53.8	(51.1)	60.1	56.3	60.5
Eggs, billions	23.9	(26.1)	28.7	33.1	34.3
Wool (recorded wt.), 1000 tons [e]	481	n.a.	520.6	n.a.	511

n.a.—not available.

[a] Average amount per year.

[b] As targeted in the Ninth Five-Year Plan. The 1975 annual plan set revised production targets, in most cases differing only slightly from the Ninth FYP targets for the year. However, some of the revised targets should be mentioned: grain—215.7 million tons; cotton—7.7 million tons; meat—15.3 million tons; milk—94.8 million tons; eggs—55.8 billion; and wool—472 million tons.

[c] Production and procurement figures in parentheses are average annual data for 1971-74 only.

[d] 1975 output of vegetables was "approximately on the average yearly level of the Ninth FYP."

[e] These figures should not be compared with the wool production figures above.

SOURCES: For 1971-74 data, see *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1974 g.*, cited; for 1975 data, *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1976; for 1971-75 and 1975 planned data, *1971-75 Plan* (see footnote 10 to the text); for 1976-80 planned data, footnote 1 to the text.

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there have been official price increases for a number of significant commodities, in addition to which there has been a constant, unpublicized upward drift of prices in general. Now, the policy is formulated as "ensuring the stability of state retail prices of *basic* food and nonfood commodities" (emphasis added) while reducing prices of some commodities "as supplies permit." [40] The implication here is that state retail prices may be allowed to rise on *nonbasic* commodities— but we have just seen that meat prices may also rise. A greater degree of flexibility of official retail prices would be of considerable benefit to the planners in bringing about a more orderly distribution of commodities and more efficient use of resources, especially at times of significant structural readjustment, such as the present. But in this regard Soviet planners have been severely constrained by the potential internal political risks which might stem from raising prices charged to a public long assured that inflation has no place under socialism.

Overhanging the official retail market and greatly complicating the task of the planners are the very large liquid savings in the hands of the public, mostly held in currency or in deposits at state savings banks. If currency holdings have been increasing at a rate close to that experienced by savings-banks deposits, which does not seem implausible, then the total liquid savings of the public have been rising over the past 15 years at a fairly steady annual rate of 15 percent. This is to be contrasted with an average annual rate of growth of money incomes (legal only) of 7-7.5 percent.[41] The resulting high order of public liquidity constitutes a growing threat of disruption to official markets in the event of some shock. The same high liquidity may also be at once a cause and a consequence of the seemingly growing volume of illegal and semi-legal activities of all kinds, the so-called second economy of the USSR, which often is a boon to the consumer and the harried manager but is doubtless also a legal and political problem of the first magnitude for the authorities.

No Prospect of Economic Reform

The Tenth FYP, while less ambitious than its predecessor, must still contend with a continued deceleration in the rate of growth of resources. As a result, it stresses improvements in labor productivity and management efficiency perhaps to a greater degree than even the Ninth FYP. Yet, one may be somewhat skeptical of planner optimism in this regard, particularly because there seem to be no signs of major economic reform forthcoming.

Looking at resources, we have already noted the further retardation in the rate of growth of industrial employment (less than 1 percent per year for 1976-80, compared with 1.3 percent per year in 1971-75), and there is a clear suggestion of an absolute decline in rural manpower.[42] The pace of fixed-capital accumulation will probably slow even more substantially, given the already-mentioned reduction in the rates of increase of fixed investment and of the output of investment goods. That fixed capital stock in industry is to increase by as much as 40 percent (compared with an estimated 47 percent in 1971-75) is probably due to a renewed determination to channel investment funds on a priority basis to projects nearest completion. In the past, attempts to pursue such a policy did not stick. Moreover, even if the latest attempt does stick, it will be borrowing from the future to meet shorter-term targets.

Insofar as the operating methods by which the Soviet leadership hopes to achieve such striking gains in efficiency are concerned, it is clear that the economy is to stay firmly on essentially the same institutional course and to continue the trends of the past five years. No significant economic reform—in the sense of liberalization or decentralization—is suggested. The 1965 reform is not even recalled in either the "Basic Directions" or in the two leading addresses before the Congress, those of Brezhnev and Kosygin. Indeed, the majority of measures spelled out in these sources will, if anything, ensure continued retreat from the reform. Among such measures are: further emphasis on the creation of large-scale production units ("associations," "terri-

[37] See *SSSR v tsifrakh v 1974 g.*, p. 113, and *Pravda*, Feb. 1, 1976. This growth rate is closely corroborated by figures on the retail sale of meat and meat products in the official statistical yearbooks for various years.

[38] Kosygin in *Pravda*, March 2, 1976.

[39] The claimed increase during the preceding quinquennium was 42 percent (*ibid.*); the impression of what is expected in 1976-80 is obtained by comparing this figure with the figures for retail sales, incomes, and employment in our Table 1.

[40] "Basic Directions."

[41] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1973 g.*, p. 603; Kosygin in *Pravda*, March 2, 1976.

[42] Thus, while total agricultural output is to grow by only 14-17 percent, labor productivity in the socialist sector is expected to increase by 27-30 percent. Keeping in mind the private sector, one may guess that a 10-percent reduction of the work force on collective and state farms is foreseen in the Plan.

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

Ministers, deputy ministers, and other leading administrators of Soviet industry attend the Institute for the Management of the National Economy, opened in February 1971 in Moscow. Special emphasis is placed on scientific and technological advances in the USSR and abroad and the use of econometrics and computers in industrial management.

—Novosti via Sovfoto.

torial complexes") not only in industry but also in construction and in agriculture (including some vertical integration between industry and agriculture); tighter planning of the use and distribution of producer goods; firmer application of labor-productivity standards; a continued search for better methods of central planning and other means of improving the existing system;[43] and more rigid delivery quotas for agriculture. Great emphasis is placed on the computerization of planning and management.

In view of all this, Brezhnev's call for greater attention to prices and profits in business decisions does not have the ring that it might convey if taken by itself. The greater leeway of managerial action it seems to imply will quickly run up against the strengthened administrative controls.

Of some interest is the proposal—particularly emphasized by Kosygin—to improve planning by means of "integral programs" (*kompleksnyye programmy*) for the solution of key problems that cut across administrative boundaries. The formation of an industrial base for the development of atomic power was mentioned by him in this connection. The idea is not new: the Soviet nuclear-weapons and space programs must have been managed in this fashion. Their strength and weakness at once lie in the fact that they cut across the administrative grain of the economy. They are thus free of the fetters and vested interests of existing bureaucratic structures, but at the same time interfere with the routine functioning of the system as a whole. It will be interesting to see whether new "integral programs" are launched in the near future, and what their success will be.

Quite consistently, in light of the pressure on resources and the unfavorable prospects for the growth of consumer goods and services, the "Basic Directions" also contain repeated reaffirmations of the principle of material incentives, *i.e.*, reliance on the pay envelope to bring out better performance by all and sundry in the economy. "Rubles for work" has been the dominant approach in recent years, despite lip service to moral incentives and socialist competition. The implications of this emphasis, of course, spill over beyond the production sphere into various social and ideological realms which need not concern us here.

The Tenth FYP is being publicized as the "Five-Year Plan of Quality," meaning that the quality and technical modernity of manufactured articles are to receive much greater attention than heretofore. Mandatory industrial standards are being tightened, while at the same time a larger carrot is proffered through more flexible pricing of new products and the offer of monetary incentives to individuals who develop and produce improved products and raise quality.[44] Yet it is difficult to see how a major jump in terms of product quality and modernity can take place while the established economic institutions and policies that have had so much to do with unsatisfactory past performance are being reaffirmed and reinforced.

[43] In regard to such measures, see also the authoritative article by N. Drogichinskiy, head of the Department of New Methods of Planning and Economic Stimulation of the USSR Gosplan, in *Sotsialisticheskaya industriya* (Moscow), Dec. 21, 1975. Nearly all measures advanced in this article—and presumably in the economy—are nothing new in principle, but instead emphasize such traditional themes as centralism, amalgamation of production units into larger units, and "iron discipline" in the execution of plans.

[44] On Soviet policy toward pricing with regard to innovation, see Joseph S. Berliner, "Flexible Pricing and New Products in the USSR," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1975, pp. 525-44, and my "Price Control, Incentives, and Innovation in the Soviet Union," in Alan A. Abouchar, Ed., *The Price Mechanism in the Socialist Economy*, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, forthcoming in 1976.

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The "Basic Directions" for the Tenth FYP call for measures to "increase the role of foreign economic relations in solving economic problems and accelerating scientific and technical progress" during 1976-80. Both Brezhnev and Kosygin elaborated on this general theme. Brezhnev especially emphasized at considerable length the policy of ever-closer economic integration with the other members of Comecon—interestingly, doing so within the context of his discussion of political relations with the other socialist countries rather than in the section of his address dealing with foreign trade. Both he and Kosygin looked forward to a greater variety of forms of business relations with Western firms, and both stressed barter ("product-payback") arrangements, hoping that such arrangements will encompass more than just the traditional Soviet export commodities. Kosygin particularly emphasized the need for more effective organization of the Soviet export industries.

These policies in the realm of foreign economic relations are of course quite consistent with the outlook for the Soviet economy generally. The overall retardation of the economy, together with persistent lags in the mastering of modern technology (a problem that also received attention at the Congress), combined with continued heavy claims against the country's resources, argue for seeking external help "in solving economic problems" (in the just-cited words of the "Basic Directions"). But the rising role of debt service in the Soviet hard-currency account prompts caution—hence the stress on product-payback arrangements with Western firms. These can lighten the balance-of-payments problems of the future (and, incidentally, can be later turned into levers of political pressure on Western firms and their governments, as well).[45]

Summing Up

At this point, midway through the 1970's, the Soviet economy is showing distinct signs of aging. Economic growth slowed significantly during the Ninth FYP period, and that plan's ambitious targets were generally missed—sometimes widely—as a result of the decline in labor reserves and other retardatory forces and the impact of two major crop failures. Agricultural production was particularly hard hit; consumer-goods output and consumption levels rose much less than planned; and civilian equipment production and capital formation also fell short of expectations. Nonetheless, Soviet heavy industrial output expanded at high rates, and (presumably) military production did well too. Moreover, the recession in the West made the modest Soviet industrial performance look particularly good.

The "Basic Directions" for the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80) which have just been approved envisage further retardation in growth throughout the economy. The advance in consumption levels is expected to slow down even further, as are fixed investment and capital formation. Labor productivity, although relied on heavily to promote growth, will also rise more slowly. Despite the relative moderation of the plan's goals, they may still turn out to be rather ambitious in relation to resources. No liberalizing reforms seem to be in the offing; rather, there is strong emphasis on centralism in planning and management, with considerable hopes placed in mergers of enterprises into rather large units and in computerization. Still, the industrial basis of Soviet power—including military might—will certainly continue to grow at a pace that would be creditable for any advanced industrial power.

The longer-term slowing down of overall growth, and especially of consumption, together with mounting pressures on resources from a variety of domestic quarters and the refractory problems of bridging the "technology gap," nevetheless ensure that the Soviet leadership will be faced with many difficult choices of both a political and an economic nature. Hence, to this observer, it seems most likely that the middle-aged USSR economy will continue to seek a "boost" from the West in the form of credits, goods, and technology—which could work to the West's diplomatic advantage.

[45] Trade with the United States as such is mentioned nowhere in the "Basic Directions." However, the report on the 1976 annual plan did mention the US as one of the seven leading trade partners among developed capitalist countries from whom the Soviet Union will continue to purchase goods, primarily equipment, on a barter or other basis. See N. K. Baybakov, "1976 Plan," *loc. cit.*

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Communist Agricultural Organization

EDITORS' NOTE—The great majority of ruling Communist parties have come to power in states with fundamentally agrarian economies and large rural populations; hence, the organization of agricultural production within a socialist framework has constituted a key concern for them. Over the years, the regimes in various countries not only have differed among themselves over the optimal system of organization but also have altered their own positions on the subject. The USSR and China are prime examples. Since the late 1920's, the Soviet government has maintained a mixture of collective farms (kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes), but in recent years it has been experimenting with a variety of new organizational forms that seem to foreshadow eventual integration of the two sectors. After collectivizing the countryside in the mid-1950's, the Chinese government attempted to shift responsibility for agricultural production from the cooperative to the much larger commune during the Great Leap Forward of 1958-59; however, a combination of factors forced Peking to abandon this effort. Nonetheless, important elements within the leadership have retained a strong commitment to the organization of the countryside into larger-scale units. The following articles explore some significant aspects of the contemporary organizational picture in the two countries. Mr. Miller describes the Soviet experiments of the last few years and examines their implications for the future agricultural structure. Mr. Parish analyzes the social and economic underpinnings of the current agricultural organization in China and the difficulties that would attend any renewed attempt to modify it in the direction of the Great Leap Forward reforms.

The Future of the Soviet Kolkhoz

By Robert F. Miller

Although it was perhaps not fully recognized as such in the West at the time, Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev's proclamation of a firm commitment to the "scientific and technical revolution" may well have been one of the most important policy statements contained in his Central Committee report to the 24th CPSU Congress on March 30, 1971. "Before us, comrades," Brezhnev declared, "is a task of historic importance: organically to combine the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution with the superiorities of the socialist system of economy. . . ." [1]

This commitment, which has been restated on many occasions and in many contexts, most recently at the just-concluded 25th Party Congress, has

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[1] "Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1971, p. 46.

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turned out to have major implications for both the foreign and domestic policies of the Soviet Union. Behind the sonorous rhetoric of the formulation lie, above all, far-reaching decisions on the organization of the Soviet economy. Among other things, it represents a decision to abandon the efforts at decentralization of economic management which were begun in 1965 and to turn to a new variant of the centralized model with which Soviet party and state officials have always felt more comfortable. If, by the mid-1960's, the increasing complexity of the Soviet economy had made centralized management seem increasingly unfeasible, the subsequent emergence of a new appreciation and acceptance of previously suspect areas of modern scientific thought—particularly in the areas of the information sciences and integrated systems theory—has made a turn back toward centralization seem possible once again.

In both industry and agriculture, the new message of economic reform is to think systematically.[2] Previous attempts to introduce scientific and technological innovations on a piecemeal basis have been rejected as ineffective, and innovation is henceforth to be undertaken on a systems basis, with comprehensive programs for bringing modular components "on line." As a starter, considerable work has had to be undertaken in conceptualizing and creating the modules themselves. But while this process has already made some initial progress in industry[3] and seems to have some conceivable prospects of success in that sector, the application of the new approach to agriculture appears a great deal more problematical. Soviet spokesmen implicitly refuse to acknowledge any essential differences in principle between the two sectors; nevertheless, there does appear to be an increasingly widespread view that the full accommodation of agriculture to the systems approach will require a fundamental restructuring of basic Soviet agricultural institutions.[4] The present article will therefore focus on recent developments in agricultural organization under the new approach, concentrating on what has heretofore been the main pillar of the Soviet agricultural system—the kolkhoz (collective farm)—and the implications for it of the new structural and administrative developments. Questions have been raised whether the kolkhoz, as it has evolved up to the present, is really compatible with the new way of thinking. A brief excursion into the history of its evolution may be helpful for interpreting some of the recent arguments and practices.

The Kolkhoz as Cooperative

For many years the quasi-cooperative nature of the kolkhoz seemed to offer certain political and economic advantages from the standpoint of Soviet policymakers. However, the type of cooperative format that was chosen as the standard in the 1935 Model Kolkhoz Charter—the *artel'*—was actually something of a compromise. For several years after the Bolshevik seizure of power, debate had gone on in higher party echelons as to whether the commune or the sovkhoz (state farm) was the more appropriate form of agricultural organization for the future socialist economy, and by the latter 1920's general agreement had been reached that, from the standpoint of underlying property relationships, the sovkhoz was the more suitable form. The commune was disqualified on theoretical (as well as practical) grounds as representing group property, a category inherently inferior to state property.

Practical experimentation with both these initial forms had been disappointing throughout the 1920's. Economically, neither had been able to prove the superiority of large-scale collective farming. Politically and socially, they had proven far from attractive to the peasants, who had remained suspicious of Bolshevik intentions after the excesses of War Communism. The so-called Lenin Cooperative Plan [5]

[2] For an official statement on the ambitious program of computerization of administration at all levels, see the interview with S. I. Kozlov, "Electronics [and] Management," *Pravda* (Moscow), July 11, 1973, p. 4. Regarding past Soviet debates on administrative models, see the author's "The New Science of Administration in the USSR," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (Ithaca, N.Y.), September 1971, pp. 247-57.

[3] The process involved decisions taken by the April 1973 Central Committee Plenum to accelerate integration of geographically and functionally related enterprises in "production associations" and to create larger production and research-and-development complexes ("industrial associations") in place of the earlier *glavki* (main administrations). Reform plans envisage linking these structures and the technological subsystems within them together by appropriate information and control mechanisms, with all these elements to be tied eventually into a nationwide data processing system, thereby integrating the various components into an optimally functioning national industrial system.

[4] See, e.g., N. Smetanin, "Agro-Industrial Integration in the USSR," *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Moscow), March 1974, esp. pp. 60-61.

[5] On this plan, see Lenin's two articles on cooperation originally published in *Pravda*, May 26 and 27, 1923 (available in V. I. Lenin, *On Cooperation*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1951). For a good, brief analysis, see E. H. Carr and R. W. Davies, *Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926-1929*, New York, Macmillan, 1969, Vol. 1, Part 2, pp. 920-21.

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was devised to allay these fears and at the same time to prepare the peasants for the ultimate industrialization of agricultural production. It sought to achieve the latter objective by enrolling the peasants in a sequence of progressively more collectivist forms of cooperative endeavor, beginning with simple consumer cooperation and culminating in joint cultivation with collectively-owned means of production.

Forced collectivization, which began in 1929, represented a drastic acceleration of this program, tantamount in fact to abandonment of the entire strategy of gradualness and persuasion, although for the sake of legitimacy the fiction of adherence to Lenin's Plan was maintained. The *artel'* form of kolkhoz, by permitting the peasants to retain vestigial property rights in the collective enterprise and to preserve minor elements of private farming (the household plot with associated small implements and a few animals), avoided some of the extremes of both the commune and the sovkhoz, but it was clearly intended only as a transitional form—in Lenin's phrase, a "school of communism for the peasants."

Viewed objectively, the kolkhoz was (and still is) a cooperative in name only. The kolkhoz members had little or no say in its operations and received next to nothing for their collective efforts, depending on their private plots to keep themselves alive. Although formally self-managing, the kolkhoz was for all practical purposes as fully subordinate to the machinery of governmental controls as was the sovkhoz. Nevertheless, there were differences. From the standpoint of the regime, the distinctions were of substantial theoretical as well as practical importance. For over a quarter of a century, they afforded the primary ideological justification for the wholesale exploitation of the kolkhozes.

As an institution nominally based on group property, the kolkhoz was classified as an "inconsistently socialist enterprise." This formula served to justify the denial to the kolkhoz of large-scale farm machines, including tractors, which were kept in the hands of the state-owned Machine-Tractor Stations (MTS), and this in turn legitimized the levying of exorbitant charges on the kolkhozes for MTS services. Embodied most concretely at the local level in the structure of MTS dominance over the kolkhoz, the formula thus accentuated the relegation of the kolkhozes and their members to a kind of second-class citizenship in the larger socioeconomic system. By the latter part of the 1930's, this relationship had crystallized into a pattern of apathetic compliance and economic stagnation which, while basically satisfying the essential food and fiber requirements of the economy at minimal apparent cost, offered little prospect of material progress and

Nikita Khrushchev surveys a sea of wheat on a sovkhoz in the "Virgin Lands" of Kazakhstan in August 1964, two months before his ouster as First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party.

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genuine social integration in the Soviet countryside.

By the end of the Stalin era, it was evident to many in the Soviet Union that the kolkhoz "cow" had been milked nearly dry. Without major infusions of state capital, agriculture threatened to remain an increasing obstacle to the development of the rest of the economy. Moreover, the waning of the Stalinist system of terror made the political costs of disaffection in the village a more prominent issue as well. The sequence of major initiatives introduced by Khrushchev in the 1950's—beginning with the kolkhoz merger campaign and increases in the prices paid to the collective farms for their produce and culminating in the abolition of the MTS—were designed to confront these problems and to inject new vitality into the neglected agricultural sector.

The results of the new measures were initially very encouraging. For the first time since collectivization, the kolkhoz was given a chance to prove its mettle as an integral producing unit. Many kolkhozes met the challenge with considerable success and actually began to accumulate substantial cash reserves. Looking back at Khrushchev's policies in the light of current Soviet preoccupations, however, one is struck by their piecemeal, nonsystemic character. This feature was underlined by the ease with which the Soviet leader himself tacitly jettisoned some of his agricultural policies after 1958 and returned to traditional practices of exploiting the kolkhozes in favor of high-priority sectors.

One of the ironies of Khrushchev's revival of the kolkhoz was that under his aegis there occurred a simultaneous expansion of the sovkhoz system, largely at the expense of the kolkhozes. Significantly, he placed his main reliance on the sovkhoz system for carrying out his "virgin lands" campaign, apparently acting on the practical conviction that large-scale, mechanized, single-crop farming could be better performed by sovkhozes than by the MTS-kolkhoz combination.[6] Similar thinking probably inspired his decision to establish belts of vegetable-growing sovkhozes around major cities in place of the existing multipurpose kolkhozes. By contrast, his ill-considered campaign to crowd out the kolkhoz members' private plots must be explained primarily in ideological terms.

Although the process of "sovkhozization" continued at about the same pace under Khrushchev's successors, they made serious efforts to repair the damage done to the kolkhozes by his erratic post-1958 policies. Indeed, the first five years of the Brezhnev era may well turn out to have been the zenith of the historical fortunes of the kolkhoz. During this period, kolkhoz finances were placed on a sounder long-term economic foundation; restrictions were eased on the household plots, and kolkhoz members were encouraged to increase their privately marketable output; social security benefits and guaranteed wages were extended to all collective farmers; and easier credit was made available to the farms.

While progress was not spectacular, there can be no denying that these measures brought about an improvement. Nevertheless, only in contrast with the Stalinist past could they be considered at all revolutionary; in fact, they amounted essentially to merely a more systematic application of principles already considered or tried by Khrushchev. And they still proceeded from a conception of the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz as the basic organizational units of agricultural production.

New Combinations and Permutations

The Third All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers, convened at Moscow in November 1969, marked the culmination of Brezhnev's campaign to revitalize the kolkhoz. The fact that the Congress had been postponed several times in the three preceding years suggests at least a certain amount of resistance to some of his initiatives to strengthen the kolkhoz as an institution. The new Model Kolkhoz Charter, which was ratified by the Congress, codified a number of liberalizing measures which, as will be detailed later, had been introduced experimentally and in piecemeal fashion in the years since the middle 1960's.[7]

Although the six years that have elapsed since the Congress have witnessed a noticeable waning of interest in the kolkhoz as such, one issue which was prominent in the debates on the Charter and which has subsequently remained at the center of attention is the matter of higher-level production and service linkages involving the kolkhozes. From

[6] See N. S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, trans. and edited by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1974, pp. 125-26.

[7] The final version of the Charter and a record of the Congress discussions may be found in *Tretiy Vsesoyuznyy s"yezd kolkhoznikov, 25-27 noyabrya 1969 goda: stenograficheskiy otchët* (Third All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers, November 25-27, 1969: Stenographic Record), Moscow, "Kolos," 1970.

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Graph 1: Memberships in Interkolkhoz Associations (MO's) per



a The ordering of republics is by population size in 1973, reading from left to right across both pages and then from top line to bottom. Data derived by dividing the number of kolkhoz-shareholdings in interkolkhoz associations of a given area for the indicated years by total kolkhozes in the area for the respective years.

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Kolkhoz—Averages for USSR and by Union Republics, 1961-73[a]



SOURCES: *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR* (The USSR National Economy), Moscow, Statistika, for the years 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1973; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR, 1922-1972: yubileynyy yezhegodnik* (The USSR National Economy, 1922-1972: Jubilee Yearbook), Moscow, Statistika, 1972.

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their origin as offspring of a more or less spontaneous grass-roots movement in the late 1950's, interkolkhoz enterprises have developed into important large-scale production and service complexes. In some quarters, they are now envisaged as basic modules of the projected national agricultural system of the future.

The formation of cooperative interkolkhoz functional associations in the late 1950's was a response to specific local needs which the individual kolkhozes were incapable of satisfying. Their appearance was symbolic of the changed thinking about the kolkhoz in the post-MTS period. Old issues concerning the economic utility of pooling resources on a cooperative basis and the ideological correctness of cooperative property relationships could now be viewed from a pragmatic standpoint. However, there was still considerable conservative opposition among party leaders to any substantial expansion of economic or managerial autonomy in the kolkhoz sector, and in the absence of a definitive stand by the party leadership on this issue, the development of interkolkhoz associations (MO's) remained for some time a matter of local option. The markedly different regional levels of MO development during the 1961-73 period shown in Graph 1 demonstrate this quite strikingly. Party leaders in some regions such as the Ukraine, Moldavia, and Estonia have given the MO movement enthusastic support, while in others such as Armenia and Tadzhikistan they have virtually ignored it, or worse.

As Graph 1 demonstrates, MO development has been particularly strong in Moldavia, especially following the replacement in 1961 of Khrushchev's protégé, Z. T. Serdyuk, by I. I. Bodyul, who has come to be known as the leading exponent of agricultural integration; and the Ukraine has followed suit. Brezhnev has been closely associated with both republics at earlier stages in his career, and one could argue a connection between the especially vigorous development of these structures in the two republics and the Soviet leader's personal endorsement of the interkolkhoz movement.

As for the structure of interkolkhoz enterprises, the data show that specialized, single-purpose cooperatives have predominated, except in the Ukraine and Georgia. This pattern has become increasingly the rule in recent years, even in these two republics (see Graph 2). It conforms to the new emphasis on specialization of agricultural production and service functions that was evident in the decisions of the 24th CPSU Congress and in subsequent pronouncements by Brezhnev and others. It is also consistent with general tendencies in world cooperative practice.[8]

By far the most widespread type of MO activity has been in rural construction. Not only have the kolkhozes always fared badly in the allocation of scarce building materials, but in addition the regular state construction agencies have traditionally concentrated their efforts on the sovkhozes at the expense of the collective farms. In general, the latter have had to fend for themselves in meeting their construction needs. Even in the relatively more affluent days of the mid-Khrushchev era, capital construction remained a serious brake on the expansion of kolkhoz productive capacity. Thus, interkolkhoz construction associations (MSO's) and building material plants (brick works, sawmills, etc.) filled an important gap, and by the mid-1960's, MSO's were already accounting for 25 percent of all rural construction work in Kazakhstan and about

Graph 2: Single- and Multi-purpose MO's, 1961-74



SOURCES: Same as for Graph 1, plus Central Statistical Board, USSR Council of Ministers, *The USSR in Figures for 1974, Statistical Handbook,* Moscow, Statistika, 1975.

[8] See, e.g., Lewis P. F. Smith, *The Evolution of Agricultural Cooperation,* London, Oxford University Press, 1961, pp. 50-53.

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Graph 3: Major Types of MO Activities, 1961-73



SOURCES: Same as for Graph 1.

50 percent of kolkhoz construction work in Belorussia.[9] At the end of 1974, their share of capital construction in the kolkhoz sector was almost 54 percent nationwide [10] and between 60 and 70 percent in nine republics. At present, virtually all productive, cultural, and housing construction in Ukrainian kolkhozes is carried out by MSO's.[11]

As Graphs 3 and 4 illustrate, MSO's have retained their prominence among interkolkhoz functional activities, although after 1972 a multiplicity of other types of cooperative ventures began to appear. Among the latter, joint livestock-feeding ventures have been particularly popular. At the beginning of 1973, there were some 320 interkolkhoz feedlots for swine and large cattle in the USSR as a whole—84 in the RSFSR, 73 in Uzbekistan, 45 in Moldavia, 40 in Azerbaydzhan, about 50 in the Ukraine, and the remainder in other republics.[12] Other types of MO activities that have sprung up in recent years include interkolkhoz poultry complexes; orchards, vineyards, and wineries; livestock feed mills; transportation pools, sanatoria, and rest homes.

The internal structure of the MO's varies with their functional orientation; however, there are certain basic similarities. Given their prominence, the MSO's may perhaps be taken as a representative model. In these associations, participating kolkhozes are required to subscribe capital shares on some basis related to size. Commonly, the share basis is a fixed sum per hectare of arable land or plowland (*e.g.*, 10-15 rubles in Moscow oblast),[13] a certain percentage of the farm's cash income or its "indivisible fund" (*nedelimyy fond*), or a proportion of the

Graph 4: Percent Distribution of Single-Purpose MO's by Major Types of Activity, 1961-73



SOURCES: Same as for Graph 1.

[9] M. S. Li, *Nekotoryye voprosy razvitiya mezhkolhoznykh stroitel'nykh ob"yedineniy v Kazahkstane* (Some Problems of the Development of Interkolkhoz Construction Associations in Kazakhstan), abstract of dissertation, Alma Ata, 1965, p. 5; D. Valovoy, "Organization and Activity of Interkolkhoz Associations," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva* (Moscow), January 1966, p. 42.

[10] F. Bogomolov and D. Valovoy, "On the Basis of Interfarm Cooperation," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 32, August 1975, p. 19.

[11] M. Gorshkov, "Development of Interkolkhoz Cooperation," *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva*, February 1974, pp. 45-46.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[13] A. Baryshev and I. Polonskiy, *Mezhkolkoznyye stroitel'nyye organizatsii* (Interkolkhoz Construction Organizations), Moscow, "Moskovskiy rabochiy," 1960, pp. 8-9.

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A modern poultry factory on the Ukraina Collective Farm in the Khmelnistkaya Oblast of the Ukrainian Republic, similar to facilities constructed by interkolkhoz associations in that and other republics.

—A July 1974 photo by B. Krishtul/Novosti via Sovfoto.

cost of capital construction anticipated during a given planning period.[14] Profits are distributed in the same proportions.

The highest organ of authority for an MO is a Representative Assembly (*sobraniye upolnomochennykh*), to which the participating kolkhozes elect two or three representatives each. The Assembly in turn elects a Council with a chairman and 6-10 members serving a two-year term and authorized to handle current business, and it also elects an Auditing Commission. The Assembly decides on the size and type of share assessments to be borne, as well as the volume of work to be done, by each participating kolkhoz. It also ratifies the annual work plan and budget for the MO and determines the allocation of profits or losses.[15]

Formal state access to internal MO affairs is provided by the requirement of registration with the raion soviet, but there are other channels of official influence as well. Chairmen of MO's are increasingly being drawn from among outside professionals (MSO chairmen, for example, are often professional engineers), and there is circumstantial evidence that such posts are on the *nomenklatura* of the oblast (or republic) Party (Central) Committee.[16] Further avenues of party and governmental influence have been established with the creation of oblast and republic associations of interkolkhoz construction. By 1970 there were already 216 of these coordinating bodies, which also directed the work of more than a thousand special construction, design, materials-fabrication, supply, and forestry enterprises.[17] Significantly missing in the MSO system, however, was a formal tie-in to the state planning system, a situation which some Soviet writers have considered an anomaly.[18]

By the end of the 1960's, then, the MO system had evolved an elaborate complex of formal organizations with its own bureaucracy and with numerous linkages to the machinery of party and state authority. Although the MO's operated under most of the limitations and controls of state enterprises, they did not enjoy all of the benefits, particularly in the areas of material assistance and social security for their work force. Their cooperative parentage evidently continued to be invoked against them to justify a parsimonious treatment by the state, with predictable consequences for the quality of their work.

Before turning to the issues raised by the MO movement and their implications, we should look briefly at concurrent developments in the competing state sector. Most of the large-scale, vertically-integrated agricultural production and processing complexes have so far been concentrated in that sector. Whereas previous mergers in agriculture tended to be of the horizontal type (the kolkhoz amalgamations of the 1950's and 1960's, as well as most existing MO's, have been of this type), the current emphasis is on vertical integration, in which units of successive phases of a production-processing-distribution cycle are combined under some

[14] A. I. Volkov, *O mezhkolkhoznykh organizatsiyakh—v voprosakh i otvetakh* (On Interkolkhoz Organizations—Questions and Answers), Moscow, Gos. izd. yuridicheskoy literatury, 1963, pp. 38-39.

[15] Baryshev and Polonskiy, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-8. A model charter for MO's in the RSFSR is described by Valovoy (*loc. cit.*, p. 39) and closely follows the pattern for MSO's described above.

[16] See G. Vorob'yev and V. Loskutov, "The Agricultural Section of an Oblast Party Committee," *Partiynaya zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 15, August 1974, p. 38. The *nomenklatura* is the official, semi-secret list of positions in a given jurisdiction personnel appointments to which are the responsibility of the party committee for that jurisdiction.

[17] Central Statistical Administration, *Sel'skoye khozyaystvo SSSR: statisticheskiy sbornik* (USSR Agriculture: Statistical Collection), Moscow, 1971, pp. 576-77.

[18] *E.g.*, Gorshkov, *op. cit.*, p. 48. The lead article in *Sel'skaya zhizn'* for January 24, 1976, suggests that this is still an important problem.

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form of joint management.[19] The ideal of this type of integration is the agro-industrial enterprise, or combine, organized around a single main product: most commonly, wine, beet sugar, processed fruit and vegetables, vegetable oils, and animal products.

The two main forms of this kind of integration are the unified enterprise and the association. In the former case, the constituent enterprises surrender their juridical independence to a unified management body, usually the directorate of the processing plant. In the latter, the constituent units retain their independence and participate through their representatives on a joint management body entrusted to deal with matters of common concern. Of the two types, the unified enterprise is considered more progressive and more consistent with the systems approach. Indeed, there is a movement to increase the authority of the joint management bodies of the associations in the areas of planning and operational control so as to bring them closer to the unified enterprises in their *modus operandi*.[20] On the other hand, there is some recognition that the form of organization is to a great extent determined by product and geographical dispersal. In general, one is favorably impressed by the nondogmatic character of the discussions on integration.

Perhaps the best example of the unified-enterprise format is the sovkhoz-factory (*sovkhoz-zavod*). At the beginning of 1974, there were already some 600 of these in the USSR. Particularly noteworthy as pioneers in the field are the sovkhoz-factory wineries in Moldavia, which were formed by merging and transforming the grape-growing kolkhozes of entire districts into large sovkhoz-type complexes, with the management of each complex concentrated in a large, centrally-located winery.[21] Similar transformations were involved in the creation of vegetable-oil sovkhoz-factories in Moldavia, where 11 specialized agro-industrial enterprises have replaced the 88 scattered kolkhozes previously engaged in oilseed cultivation.[22]

As for the second type of integration, there are at present about 70 agro-industrial associations exclusively in the state sector. In most cases, these have resulted from agreements between sovkhozes and processing plants, under which the component enterprises retain their independence and operate jointly under long-term contracts. Such arrangements seem to be concentrated primarily in the fruit- and vegetable-canning industry.

[19] For a useful discussion of integrated agro-industrial enterprises in Eastern Europe and the USSR, see Jozef Wilczynski, "Agro-industrial Integration Under Socialist Economic Planning," *Malayan Economic Review* (Kuala Lumpur), April 1974. See also M. Bronshteyn, "Improving the Territorial Management of Agriculture," *Voprosy ekonomiki*, October 1973, pp. 14-22; and a useful summary of recent Soviet articles on integration published in *Ekonomika sel'skogo khozyaystva*, March 1973, pp. 98-102.

[20] Smetanin, *loc. cit.*, p. 65.

[21] B. Boyko, V. Cheshkov, and Ye. Shalimov, "The Purkarskaya Brand," *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinëv), March 7 and 10, 1973, p. 2. On early problems of the sovhkoz-factories, see V. Cheshkov, "Specialization Regardless . . . ," *ibid.*, April 8, 1972, p. 2.

[22] Smetanin, *loc. cit.*, p. 65.



Scenes from the "Viktoriya" sovkhoz-factory in Moldavia: on the left, gathering of the harvest; on the right, barrel storage area at the winery.

—V. Akimov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

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In addition to these types of integration in the state sector, there have been numerous experiments with mixed kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations. For example, there have been instances in which individual sovkhozes in a given region have joined an MO in the same region on a shareholding basis. Sovkhozes have been particularly attracted to MSO's in areas where there are inadequate state construction facilities. This intermingling of property forms poses certain theoretical and legal problems. These are often dismissed with the rationale that the entry of sovkhoz partners into such arrangements accelerates the "elevation" of the kolkhoz cohort to the higher stage of fully socialist property and *ipso facto* raises the operational efficiency of the joint enterprise.[23] Indeed, there is the possibility that sovkhoz participation is a Trojan horse which will facilitate the ultimate takeover of the hybrid cooperative ventures by the state; however, the Soviet government has never needed much of a pretext when it has decided to "elevate" kolkhoz property in the past. In any case, the experiment demonstrates the increasing tendency to erode still further the distinctions between the two forms of property.

Administering the New System

So far, our discussion has been concerned mainly with functional aspects of agricultural integration. By and large these aspects have been the least controversial inasmuch as few Soviet commentators seem inclined to dispute the utility of the new combinations, especially in view of the enthusiastic endorsements given them from on high. There has been substantially less agreement, however, on forms and methods of administering the new system—an area that appears to be of greater political and ideological sensitivity.

Simultaneously with the emergence of the MO's in the late 1950's, a movement arose in favor of higher-level coordination and direction from within the kolkhoz system—that is, for a system of elective kolkhoz policymaking and administrative bodies designed to overcome the glaring isolation and vulnerability of the individual kolkhoz. Some advocates of the movement demanded the creation of a nationwide structure of kolkhoz unions (*kolkhozsoyuzy*) extending from the raion to the center and presided over by a *Kolkhoztsentr,* reminiscent of the cooperative network of the late 1920's. Khrushchev mentioned this demand with mild approval, first in a note to the Central Committee concerning the liquidation of the MTS in 1958 and again at the December 1959 Plenum of the Central Committee. Also on record as favoring the idea at the time were RSFSR Premier D. S. Polyanskiy, Ukrainian Party First Secretary N. V. Podgornyy, and Lithuanian First Secretary A. Y. Snechkus.[24] According to Werner G. Hahn, raion kolkhoz unions were actually set up in Lithuania and Moscow Oblast in 1959 and 1960.[25]

However, the proposal also evoked considerable opposition at the December 1959 Plenum, particularly from officials of the Ministry of Agriculture led by Minister V. V. Matskevich, as well as from G. I. Voronov, then First Deputy Chief of the RSFSR Buro of the CPSU Central Committee, and Belorussian First Secretary K. T. Mazurov.[26] Khrushchev then backed down and conceded that the creation of a *Kolkhoztsentr* at that time was "evidently" inexpedient.[27] Official endorsement was given to the idea of functional cooperation of the MO type, but an integrated kolkhoz administrative system was clearly ruled out. The agricultural bureaucracy obviously considered such a system, outside the formal administrative hierarchy, a threat to its institutional interests.

After Khrushchev's removal, the proposal was revived with Brezhnev's support. The occasion was the call for a new Model Kolkhoz Charter at the March 1965 Plenum of the Central Committee, where Brezhnev presented his new program of agricultural planning and pricing reforms.[28] However, the reappointment of Matskevich to head the newly revitalized Ministry of Agriculture meant that there would be little progress on the scheme. Throughout the first half of 1966, there were numerous expres-

[23] *E.g.,* see Bronshteyn, *loc. cit.*, p. 19; V. Golikov and G. Dolgoshey, "Interfarm Cooperation: Problems and Perspectives," *Kommunist,* No. 18, December 1973, pp. 63-64.

[24] *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 22-25 dekabrya 1959 goda: stenograficheskiy otchët* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, December 22-25, 1959: Stenographic Record), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1960, pp. 32-33, 61, 303.

[25] *The Politics of Soviet Agriculture, 1960-1970,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972, p. 183.

[26] *Plenum TsK . . . 22-25 dekabrya 1959 g., op. cit.,* pp. 322-29; also, see Hahn, *op. cit.,* p. 154.

[27] *Plenum TsK . . . 22-25 dekabrya 1959 g.,* op. cit., p. 409.

[28] *Plenum Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, 24-26 marta 1965 goda: stenograficheskiy otchët* (Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, March 24-26, 1965: Stenographic Record), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1965, p. 28.

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sions of support for the idea in the central and local press.[29] Ukrainian and Moldavian officials were conspicuous among those in favor. In the latter half of the year, however, opposition vigorously reasserted itself, and public support for kolkhoz unions virtually disappeared. It is doubtless significant that the Third All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers, at which the new Model Charter was to be ratified, had to be postponed indefinitely. While the kolkhoz union question was probably not the only reason for the postponement, it was undoubtedly a source of major controversy which the Congress would have found difficult to paper over.

The renewed call for the Congress in 1969 and the nationwide discussion campaign concerning the draft of the proposed new Charter provided the occasion for a resumption of debate on kolkhoz unions. Elsewhere the author has compiled a detailed survey of the suggestions of over 450 individuals whose comments on aspects of the draft were published in the central and provincial press during the seven-month discussion period.[30] Support for MO's was extremely widespread, and only slightly less so for kolkhoz unions and other forms of kolkhoz-system autonomy. Of particular interest were institutional and regional differences in support. *Izvestiya,* the main government newspaper, carried not a single comment on the unions—a clear expression of disapproval—while *Pravda,* the central party daily, and *Sel'skaya zhizn'* were largely favorable to the idea. Regionally, *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* was consistently favorable, while *Sovetskaya Estoniya,* perhaps reflecting Estonian Party First Secretary Kebin's opposition to creating a separate kolkhoz administrative hierarchy, published no comments on the issue. Thus, important regional and institutional differences clearly remained.

V. V. Matskevich, removed as Soviet Minister of Agriculture in 1973, pictured during a 1971 visit to the United States.

—UPI.

When the Third All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers finally met in November 1969, its last-minute decision to set up a national system of advisory kolkhoz councils seemed to indicate that pressures for some movement on the issue could no longer be ignored, and that Brezhnev himself was still among the supporters. On the other hand, the purely consultative status of the councils in their initial conception, plus the fact that Matskevich, an avowed opponent of an autonomous kolkhoz structure, was named chairman of the All-Union Kolkhoz Council, suggests that the outcome was something of a weak compromise.[31]

For the next three years, there was very little progress toward operationalizing the kolkhoz union concept. Although the kolkhoz councils met with some regularity, they limited their activity to advising on legislation and general farm policy questions.[32] Then, suddenly, in 1973, the kolkhoz union idea received a new lease on life. Not surprisingly,

[29] Hahn lists 15 articles in support which appeared in major Soviet periodicals from March through July 1966. *Op. cit.,* pp. 186-87.

[30] "Attitudes Toward Changes in the Soviet Collective Farm Charter: A Survey of Published Commentary in the Soviet Press by Systematic Content Analysis and Data Processing Techniques," unpublished paper, Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University (Canberra), September 1973, Parts I and II.

[31] Hahn (*op. cit.,* p. 207) believes that Matskevich's appointment represented a clear-cut victory for the opponents of kolkhoz unions, although the author does not share this view.

[32] *E.g.,* see A. Panchenko, "Developing Kolkhoz Democracy," *Pravda,* March 13, 1971, p. 2, for a list of recent statutory proposals by the All-Union Kolkhoz Council; also, N. Voronin, "The Kolkhoz Councils and Farm Economy," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 52, December 1973, p. 18, on current affairs of the RSFSR Kolkhoz Council.

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A weekly meeting of the Presiding Committee of the Moldavian Kolkhoz Council in 1973 discusses construction of interkolkhoz cattle-breeding complexes in the republic.

—I. Vinogradov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

the source of the new initiative was the Moldavian SSR, whose party leader, I. I. Bodyul, had long been a champion of the idea. The introduction of the Moldavian scheme, just as unsurprisingly, had to await the sacking of Matskevich after the disastrous crop failure of 1972 and his replacement by D. S. Polyanskiy, a past supporter of kolkhoz unions. In announcing the new measures at the Second Moldavian Congress of Collective Farmers on March 9, 1973, Bodyul reported that special permission had been granted by the Central Committee (read: Brezhnev) for a comprehensive trial of an experiment in higher-level kolkhoz operational management. The new system was to have two levels of elective kolkhoz management, district and republican. Each kolkhoz was to elect representatives to a raion kolkhoz council, which would in turn elect delegates to a Moldavian Council of Kolkhozes.[33]

What was most radical in the experiment was the transfer of policymaking responsibility in production planning and operational management, as well as in the allocation of financial resources for investment and other purposes, from the kolkhozes and MO's to the raion councils. The complete list of functions of the raion councils presented by Bodyul included: (1) receipt and implementation of state procurement orders; (2) planning and direct guidance of production activities, stimulation of technical innovation, distribution of material and technical resources to insure their rational utilization; (3) securing the correct proportion between investment and consumption in the disposition of kolkhoz and MO income to foster increased production capacity; (4) stimulation of MO development; (5) settling questions of labor and wage norms, training of skilled and semi-skilled workers, and solving rural social problems.[34]

Under this arrangement, the individual kolkhoz clearly stood to lose a major part of its operational autonomy. That it would not gain much in return by way of participation in decision-making was indicated by Bodyul's suggestion that raion council chairmen be "the best cadres of the raion" chosen from among "*raykom* secretaries, chiefs of agricultural departments of the *rayispolkom,* and managers of large farms with the necessary work experience and organizational talents."[35] Chairmen are thus presumably on the *nomenklatura* of the republic

[33] I. I. Bodyul, "Perfecting the Leadership of Kolkhoz-Cooperative Production," *Sovetskaya Moldaviya,* March 10, 1973, pp. 1-3.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

[35] *Ibid.*

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party Central Committee. The designation of the republic Minister of Agriculture, I. N. Berezhnoy, as Chairman of the republic Council of Kolkhozes merely followed the earlier precedent of Matskevich's appointment to head the All-Union Council, but in Moldavia the position was evidently to encompass substantial operational responsibilities.

The Moldavian version of the kolkhoz union scheme thus seems to afford only marginal leeway for the development of a genuinely autonomous kolkhoz-cooperative system. Membership is compulsory for each kolkhoz. In return for giving up its vestigial operational autonomy, the kolkhoz gains a few votes on the raion council, which ranges in size from 75 to 125 members. While it is true that the council structure stands outside the formal agricultural bureaucracy, the selection process for council officials guarantees against unwelcome surprises. Perhaps the stringency of the control procedures is the price Bodyul has had to pay for permission to undertake this major effort to make the kolkhoz relevant to the new systems approach.

In the nearly three years since the launching of the Moldavian experiment, there have been several further developments not only in Moldavia but in other republics as well, although the Moldavian version remains unique in a number of respects. There has been a virtual explosion of types of MO's in Moldavia under the raion councils. Among them are interkolkhoz truck pools for the coordination of farm transportation activities. A particularly interesting development is the appearance in a few raions of mechanization and electrification associations, which function somewhat like the old MTS's in coordinating the use of farm machinery and equipment during the major agricultural campaign periods.[36] Territorial coordination of the operations of the increasing variety of functional MO's appears to be the most promising field for local kolkhoz council activity. Another facet of this activity that has been highlighted in the Moldavian press is the monitoring of kolkhoz affairs. The councils appear to be substantially more involved in the internal social and economic aspects of kolkhoz life than was the old agricultural bureaucracy, which tended to concentrate on production and procurement matters. Moreover, albeit under firm official control, the councils, as representatives of the kolkhozes, are in a good position to standardize intrakolkhoz practices—something that the local party and government organs were unable, or unwilling, to accomplish. The councils have taken special interest in problems of income distribution, work norms, and wage scales in the kolkhozes,[37] and they appear to enjoy the power to impose sanctions against kolkhoz officials for violations in these areas.[38]

One of the most striking things about the Moldavian experiment is the lack of publicity it receives outside the republic. Other Moldavian innovations in integrated farm management have been widely publicized and held up for emulation, but (with few exceptions) not the kolkhoz councils.[39] In his major speech on agriculture in Alma Ata in March 1974, in which he gave detailed praise and support for organizational innovations in agriculture, Brezhnev said not a word about kolkhoz councils.[40] Not even Bodyul has mentioned them in his articles and speeches on the Moldavian experiment for audiences outside his republic.[41] This secretiveness evidently does not portend the disappearance of the scheme, at least within the confines of Moldavia. In the latter half of 1973, N. M. Zaychenko, the Deputy Chairman of the Moldavian Council of Ministers in charge of agriculture, was transferred to the post of full-time chairman of the Moldavian Kolkhoz Council in place of Berezhnoy. That this was not a serious demotion can be inferred from the fact that Zaychenko was subsequently elected a candidate member of the Buro of the Moldavian Party Central Committee.[42]

Nevertheless, the strange silence on the Moldavian councils does suggest that the matter is sensitive and that the system is far from universally accepted. One can only speculate on the reasons. Perhaps the scheme is considered too radical in the way it manipulates the kolkhozes. Perhaps it is considered too much of a threat to the entrenched interests of the regular agricultural bureaucracy.

[36] See., e.g., G. Protsenyuk, "Concentration of Efforts," *ibid.*, Jan. 12, 1974, p. 22; also, speech by Deputy G. I. Vasalatiy at *Moldavian Supreme Soviet session*, *ibid.*, Dec. 23, 1973, p. 2; and "First Results," *ibid.*, Oct. 20, 1973, p. 2.

[37] "The Kolkhoz Councils," *ibid.*, Oct. 4, 1973, p. 2.

[38] *Ibid.* See also V. Run'kovskiy, "Style—Efficiency," *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1974.

[39] Notable exceptions have been the speech by A. Ya. Pel'she in Kishinëv in January 1974 (*Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Jan. 10, 1974, p. 2) and a speech by Brezhnev, also in Kishinëv, in October 1974 (*Sel'skaya zhizn'*, Oct. 12, 1974, p. 2). On both occasions Moldavia received national commendation, and its achievements were being celebrated before "home" audiences. The kolkhoz council experiment was mentioned briefly by Golikov and Dolgoshey in their earlier-cited article (*loc. cit.*, pp. 63-64).

[40] *Pravda*, March 16, 1974.

[41] See, *e.g.*, his "The Main Administration," *ibid.*, April 16, 1974.

[42] *Sovetskaya Moldaviya*, Dec. 20, 1973, p. 1.

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Or perhaps it clashes with a dominant ideological perspective on the diminishing long-term role of the kolkhoz-cooperative sector, which it may appear to institutionalize. In this connection, it is interesting to note the greater publicity that has been accorded to a so-called "Ukrainian experiment," which made its appearance a year later. Under this plan, the existing raion kolkhoz councils are given direction of the MO's in a given raion, but not of the kolkhozes themselves.[43] Wider publicity has also been given to a scheme proposed by Estonian Party leader Kebin, long a foe of kolkhoz unions, who advocated the creation of territorial agricultural administrative organs, based on *khozraschët,* to manage the operations of both sovkhozes and kolkhozes and their various associated enterprises. These organs would be strictly limited to the raion level to assure continued local supervision by party and governmental agencies.[44] Perhaps what is most significant about this variety of proposals is that they are all apparently being allowed to coexist. At least, the days of universal campaigns and straitjacketed organizational forms, which have been so detrimental to Soviet agriculture in the past, seem to be over.



The Zelenokum elevator in Stavropol Territory receives grain from the fields of Gorkaya Balka Kolkhoz and other farms in August 1974 on trucks operated by drivers from the Kalinin and Vladimir regions of central Russia.

—V. Chernov/Novosti via Sovfoto.

Problems and Prospects

All this leaves us with the question of where the kolkhoz fits into the regime's new plans for reshaping Soviet agriculture. It is perhaps significant in this regard that the main report delivered at a conference on the place of the kolkhozes in the socialist economic system, held at the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee in April 1973, found it necessary to scotch an apparently widespread rumor that the kolkhoz was scheduled to be abolished in 1990.[45]

In the past the kolkhoz has been an extremely useful institution for Soviet economic development. The kolkhozes bore a major share of the burden of industrialization, not only by providing the essential food and fiber at extortionately low return to themselves, but also by serving as the main "reserve army of the underemployed" from which came a seemingly inexhaustible supply of labor for industry. Now this situation has changed. Soviet agriculture has become one of the most heavily subsidized in the world, although the vagaries of the pricing system make an accurate assessment of the level of subsidies difficult to ascertain. The sharp quantitative and qualitative decline in the kolkhoz labor force now requires that huge, wasteful infusions of civilian and military labor must be supplied to agriculture at harvest time each year. In short, kolkhoz agriculture has ceased to be the main buffer sector in the Soviet economy.

These changes have evoked a general reassessment of the structure of Soviet agriculture. Efficiency in the use of labor and capital has become a prime

[43] "Session of the All-Union Kolkhoz Council," *Sel'skaya zhizn'*, March 21, 1974, p. 2.

[44] I. Kebin, "From Experiment to Wide Practice," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), May 22, 1974, pp. 2-3.

[45] The report, delivered by V. Yatskov and entitled "The Kolkhozes in the Economic Systems of Socialism," appeared in *Ekonomicheskiye nauki* (Moscow), September 1973, p. 125.

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necessity. The key concepts for the future agricultural system that is now being designed are specialization and concentration of production and the reorganization of agriculture along industrial lines. Brezhnev emphasized these concepts in his Alma Ata speech in March 1974, when he announced a grandiose new program to upgrade agricultural production in the non-black-earth region of the RSFSR. He called upon specialized kolkhozes and sovkhozes and their various horizontal and vertical combinations to play a dominant role in this program. Warning against haste and wasteful competition in the elaboration of suitable production and administrative forms, he outlined a process of carefully phased and staged transformation fully in conformity with the new systems approach.[46] Other Soviet leaders have been equally careful to relate their innovative schemes to this approach.[47]

The role of kolkhoz-based cooperation in the emerging national economic system would appear to be of declining long-term importance on at least two counts. First of all, the poverty-stricken economic legacy of the kolkhoz and continuing discrimination in the allocation of resources [48] have kept most MO's from attaining the stature of first-class enterprises suitable for modular inclusion in the future system. The aura of amateurishness surrounding most kolkhoz enterprises makes it difficult for them to attract the most capable specialists and managers.[49] Second, and perhaps more crucial in the long run, the nominally democratic decision-making foundation of the kolkhoz-cooperative format, however emasculated under Soviet conditions, is basically incompatible with the projected model of integration. Producing subunits will often be required to accept specializations and operational directives that are advantageous to the larger system but which may be detrimental to their own sectional interests. Problems of specialization and distribution of income have already caused difficulties in a number of MO's and mixed kolkhoz-sovkhoz associations. Some local authorities have consequently been prompted to avoid the inclusion of kolkhozes in certain schemes of integration.[50] Pure state enterprises, in which management is not accountable to the labor force, are considered potentially much less troublesome components for systemic manipulation. The weight of recently published commentary suggests, however, that mixed kolkoz-sovkhoz associations are gaining favor to an increasing extent, particularly in conjunction with state processing enterprises such as meat-packing plants. Still, there remains a realization that serious legal and administrative problems are posed by the two different forms of property involved.[51]

For these and other reasons, the current tendencies toward the "convergence" of kolkhoz and sovkhoz forms can be expected to lead in a growing number of cases to "fusion"—*i.e.*, to the conversion of joint kolkhoz-sovkhoz enterprises to purely state enterprises—as the process of integration continues. This process, however, can be expected to extend over an indefinite period. In the meantime, the kolkhoz will continue to be relied upon to help finance the various programs for the reconstruction of Soviet agriculture. As long as the regime considers this financial assistance important, the kolkhoz will still have a part to play.

* * *

POSTSCRIPT: The proceedings of the 25th Party Congress seem to support these conclusions, although the desired rate of change now appears somewhat faster than this writer had previously thought. The exclusion from the new Politburo of Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy, one of the last top-level champions of an upgraded kolkhoz and inter-kolkhoz system, may portend significant changes in the structure of Soviet agriculture. (Since the Congress, Polyanskiy has also been removed as Minister of Agriculture.)

In any case, the principle of "interfarm" (if not "interkolkhoz") combinations now evidently enjoys virtually unanimous support in high party circles. Brezhnev's solid, though not very specific, endorsement of "interfarm cooperation and agro-industrial integration" as exemplified by "the experience of

[46] *Pravda*, March 16, 1974, p. 2.

[47] For example, Bodyul in his report to the Second Moldavian Congress of Collective Farmers, *loc. cit.*

[48] The chief administrator of the Poltava Oblast recently complained that his organization customarily receives only 15-20 percent of its requirements for key construction materials, seriously impeding the fulfillment of construction schedules. See I. Korolev, "Interkolkhoz Construction [Associations]," *Sel'skaya zhizn'*, Jan. 9, 1976, p. 2.

[49] A. A. Khomyakov, "Experience and Problems of Agro-industrial Cooperation," *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 52, December 1973, p. 5; also, A. E. Buravskiy, *Mezhkolkhoznyye ob"yedineniya* (Interkolkhoz Associations), Minsk, "Urozhay," 1966, p. 65.

[50] Bronshteyn, *loc. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

[51] See, *e.g.*, the complaints of the Minister of Agriculture of the Mariy ASSR, Yu. Goryanskiy, in "Perfecting Interfarm Ties," *Sel'skaya zhizn'*, Jan. 23, 1976, p. 2. Indirect confirmation of the trend toward mixed associations may be seen in the change of terminology from "interkolkhoz" (*mezhkolkhoznyye*) to "interfarm" (*mezhkhozyaystvennyye*) organizations in statistical handbooks after 1974.

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

I. I. Bodyul, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldavia, a leading advocate of a strengthened kolkhoz sector.

—Photo from *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet), Moscow, Izvestiya sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya SSSR, 1974, p. 71.

Moldavia, a number of oblasts of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and some other republics" [52] guaranteed that other leaders would follow suit. Most did so in rather perfunctory fashion, merely repeating or paraphrasing Brezhnev's general endorsement.

But a few speakers were much more specific, foremost among them I. I. Bodyul. The Moldavian leader proudly revealed that there are now 256 MO's and other interfarm organizations serving the 466 kolkhozes of the republic. Although he used the now obligatory "interfarm" (rather than "interkolkhoz") formulation, Bodyul deviated from the pattern of other speakers in clearly distinguishing these developments in the kolkhoz sector from parallel moves in the state sector. Moreover, he quite pointedly noted that his republic's experiment with administering kolkhozes and MO's through kolkhoz councils "has fully justified itself." [53] Indeed, Bodyul was perhaps the only speaker to suggest that the kolkhoz sector, as such, still possesses a good deal of developmental potential.

Other speakers who went into any detail on interfarm combinations, such as Party First Secretaries Kebin of Estonia and A. V. Kovalenko of Orenburg Oblast, tended to emphasize the mixing of state and kolkhoz participation, not to say the elimination of distinctions between the two.[54] S. F. Medunov, Party First Secretary of Krasnodar Krai, spoke of the task of "deepening the process of integration on the basis of cooperation of state and kolkhoz enterprises." [55]

Thus, Bodyul's continuing attention to the kolkhoz sector as a discrete component of the developing Soviet agro-industrial system appears strangely out of step with the latest thinking on the subject, which—at least at the level of official policy pronouncements—clearly points to the progressive absorption of the kolkhoz component by the growing state agri-business structure. To be sure, experience shows only too well that such policy declarations do not guarantee rapid substantive changes. The tone of speeches at the Congress suggests that many provincial party leaders are still merely paying lip service to the now obligatory principles of "specialization," "concentration," "interfarm cooperation," and "agro-industrial integration."

Still, it is clear that the MO movement is already well on the way to being swallowed up by the regular state agriculture control machinery in some areas.[56] As the interkolkhoz component becomes a significant performer of production and service functions in a given region, the pressures for "fusion" are likely to become irresistible, and the removal of the energetic Polyanskiy from the top leadership may well signify the elimination of an important barrier to this process.

[52] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1976, p. 6.

[53] *Ibid.*, Feb. 28, 1976.

[54] Kebin described with pride the Estonian experiment with raion-wide administration of cooperative ventures by a governmental super-coordinating body designed to overcome the distinction between kolkhoz and sovkhoz participants *(ibid.*, p. 6). For Kovalenko's speech, see *ibid.*, Feb. 29, 1976, p. 5.

[55] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1976, p. 3.

[56] In Georgia, for example, the republic association of interkolkhoz construction associations was totally integrated into the republic's Ministry of Rural Construction in mid-1974. See I. Kharatishvili, "The Fruits of Cooperation," *ibid.*, Feb. 16, 1976, p. 4.

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China—Team, Brigade, or Commune?

By William L. Parish

In the People's Republic of China today, rural organization is in many ways a compromise between the bureaucratic system imposed from above and the prerevolutionary natural system of villages, lineages, and neighborhoods below. With the exception of a small number of state farms, the basic unit of production and of income-sharing—in Chinese jargon, the basic accounting unit—is generally the production team. There are some five million production teams throughout the country. The typical team consists of about 30 households, or 150 people, farming an average of about 20 hectares of land (1 hectare = 2.47 acres). Each team is generally no more than a small village or one neighborhood of a large village, and in some places it is also a lineage (a clan) or a lineage branch. Led by local officers, this somewhat traditional/somewhat modern unit has made collective farming acceptable to the Chinese peasant. The people with whom he or she goes to the fields every day and with whom profits and losses are shared at the end of the year are old neighbors and fellow kinsmen. Old affinities help create new degrees of cooperation.

In spite of the many advantages of the small accounting unit, there are those within the Chinese government who see the eventual goal in rural organization to be one of moving the level of accounting up from the team to larger brigade and commune levels of administration. The brigade, comprising several production teams, is a large village or several small villages, averaging close to 1,000 people. The commune, including several brigades, has an average of about 13,000 people. Altogether there are some 50,000 communes in China.[1]

Moving the basic accounting unit up from the lowly production team to the larger brigade and commune would have a number of alleged advantages. Larger units would have greater reserves for the acquisition of new machinery and other capital goods. Larger units might more rationally divide into specialized units such as repair teams and horticultural groups. Larger units would help equalize some of the gross differences in income which now exist between different production teams. And generally, the units would take on a more socialist character because they would include more people cooperating together. Supposedly, they would hasten the day when peasants would leave the collective sector to join the state sector, where everyone in the society shares and cooperates with everyone else.

Many of the difficulties of moving the unit of accounting up from the small production team to the larger brigade and commune are well-known. When teams of highly disparate income are joined in a single larger unit, the income of some teams is bound to decline. Joining teams from different villages or even different neighborhoods brings together people who are not accustomed to working with one another, and occasionally it brings together people who have historically been in rival kinship groups. The larger units are also more difficult to administer than small units.

These sorts of difficulties helped abort the ill-fated attempt during the 1958-61 Great Leap to make the commune the basic accounting unit. The same sorts of difficulties helped bring to an end

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[1] See Frederick W. Crook, "The Commune System in the People's Republic of China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 409 and *passim.*

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a selective attempt to make the brigade the accounting unit in certain places between 1968 and 1971. Because of these failures, the 1975 Constitution further legitimizes the team as the basic accounting unit (Article 7). In recent statements in the press, even the more radical spokesmen of the government have predicted a very gradual process of change, indicating that it will take a number of years to effect the transfer of the accounting unit first to the brigade and only much later to the commune.[2]

Recent research in which the present writer has collaborated has turned up evidence suggesting that even with a lengthened time-frame, the projected expansion of the rural accounting unit is likely to prove very difficult to bring about. First, there seem to have been shifts in social patterns in the countryside which in some ways make certain types of villages more encysted and closed to outside contact than they were even 20 years ago. Second, many communes have been so enlarged in size that they no longer encompass any intermediate social community which might be used for refocusing rural loyalties. These changes are discernible in contemporary patterns of conflict between production teams and in the contemporary pattern of marriages among teams. Finally, there is some evidence that the growth of brigade and commune enterprises—a growth which is supposed to precede social and political change—is likely to be rather slow. The principal data for these generalizations are the yield of two research undertakings in which the author has participated. The first is a survey based on interviews of refugees from 63 villages in the far southern province of Kwangtung, a project initiated by Martin K. Whyte and this writer in Hong Kong in 1973-74 (the full results of which will be published in a forthcoming volume entitled *Village and Family in Contemporary China*).[3] The second is a study of rural small industries made by an American delegation to China in the summer of 1975 under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences (the results of which are to be presented in a volume edited by Dwight Perkins of Harvard University).

Policy Decisions and Social Interaction

Traditionally, Chinese villages were rather open to outside contact, particularly in comparison to some peasant societies. Under a system of corporate ownership such as the *mir* in pre-Soviet Russia, or under collectively-imposed taxes as in Central America after the conquest by the Spanish, peasants developed defensive, closed communities. These closed, corporate communities restricted membership to people born and raised within their confines, and they occasionally reinforced this restriction by making members marry within the boundaries of the community.[4] In prerevolutionary China, though there was variation between more open periods at the height of imperial dynasties and more closed periods during the decline of dynasties, the villages tended to be accessible. Outsiders were permitted in, marriage bridged villages, and peasants were deeply involved in a wider market community which brought together tens of villages.[5]

During the 1950's and 1960's villages were in some ways opened up even more to the outside world. Government intruded on the village to an extent it had never done before. Radio broadcasts and rebroadcasts, film teams, and study groups exposed villagers more to messages from outside, as did improved roads and the growing prevalence

[2] See, *e.g.*, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie," *Peking Review*, April 4, 1975, p. 6.

[3] A word should be said about this survey to clarify data in the text and in Tables 1 through 5. A total of 63 émigrés were interviewed, each from a different village in Kwangtung Province. Because the interview questions were openended and varied somewhat over time, not all informants responded to exactly the same set of queries. Moreover, some informants had not lived in their villages long enough to answer all of the questions put to them. As a result, the number of respondents on whom tabular data are based varies from table to table. While the samples used here are small as compared to those in many Western social surveys, they are quite large as compared to the typical anthropological study of a single village. In any event, the significance of the results comes not from the size of the reported samples, but from the confluences of theoretical speculation with anecdotal as well as statistical evidence.

The problem of potential bias among the émigrés has been dealt with in two ways. First, the informants were asked not about their own attitudes but about concrete situations. Second, the research team's conclusions have not been based on émigré descriptions of the absolute level of—say—conflict or birth control in the village but rather on the correlations between such factors and other characteristics of the village. Bias could greatly affect the first type of conclusion; it is largely irrelevant to the second. For a further discussion of the sorts of procedures used, see Martin K. Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974, Appendix 1; and William L. Parish, "Socialism and the Chinese Peasant Family," *Journal of Asian Studies* (Ann Arbor, Mich.), May 1975, p. 614.

[4] Eric R. Wolf, *Peasants*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, 1966, pp. 78, 86; "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," *American Anthropologist* (Washington, DC), No. 3, 1955, pp. 452-71; and "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* (Albuquerque), No. 1, 1957, pp. 1-18.

[5] G. William Skinner, "Chinese Peasants and the Closed Community: An Open and Shut Case," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (New York), No. 3, 1971, pp. 270-81.

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of bicycles in the village. These all increased vertical integration between the villages at the periphery of the society and the national center in Peking.

At the same time a number of policy decisions by the government had the unintended consequence of restricting horizontal integration among villages in the same locale. National horizons were expanded, while local community was restricted. Four decisions should be singled out.

(1) *The process of collectivization.* One decision which restricted horizontal integration among villages was simply the manner in which villages were formed into collectives. Prior to 1949, it was primarily the villages with powerful lineages holding claim to large expanses of corporate land which remained closed to outsiders. The corporate interests of these powerful lineages were weakened in the early 1950's, as they were deprived of landlord leadership, guns, and their corporately held land. However, in the mid-1950's collectivization again gave natural villages and old lineages a corporate interest in land. Partly out of haste and partly out of a conscious effort to adapt to the natural patterns of cooperation and social organization in the countryside, the new collectives and the subsequent brigade and team units tended simply to enclose old villages and surname groups. In places such as Kwangtung in the south, where lineages had been strong before, lineage loyalties were given a new lease on life.

More important, multi-surname units and small single-surname units which previously had no collective economic interests in land or water rights were suddenly given new corporate interests in the protection of land, water, and other economic assets from outside intruders. Instead of individual families alone having opposing economic interests, whole villages or neighborhoods could have sharply opposed economic interests, leading to new patterns of intervillage and interneighborhood conflict. When a neighboring village plowed too far across the boundary line, it was no longer just some individual such as Old Wang whose livelihood was threatened but the livelihood of the whole village.

While creating new patterns of opposition and conflict, collectivization also led to new patterns of



Peasants at their leisure in a commune village of Kwangchow Province.

—A March 1974 photo by Howard Apter/Keystone.

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A September 1975 photo demonstrates how scattered small plots at the Paotzuhung Production Brigade in Sinkiang have been regrouped into 44 neatly laid-out fields.

—Hsinhua News Agency via Wide World.

cooperation. Traditionally, much of the cooperation among villages was organized along kinship lines, which might violate territorial boundaries. Indeed, it was often advantageous that territorial boundaries be violated through ties of marriage to mother and wife's kin in order that villagers with different soil conditions and different harvest and planting cycles might exchange labor.[6] Though even today there is some cooperation with outside production teams—a result of kinship and friendship ties as much as of administrative direction—by far the greatest amount of cooperation is simply within one's own production team. Today there is less need to mobilize kinsmen outside the village simply because the cooperation of fellow villagers is guaranteed by the collective interest everyone has in the success of the year's harvest. To an extent, then, the narrow administrative circle has replaced the wider network of kinship.

(2) *The pattern of landholdings.* A second decision which has helped to narrow the range of horizontal integration among villages has been the tendency to rationalize the holdings of land among villages. Traditionally, Chinese landholdings were in small plots scattered about the countryside. Peasants in one village might well have their land adjacent to other nearby villages and vice versa. Except in rare instances, there was little concept of property lines between villages. As a result, peasants in one village were forced to cooperate with those in nearby villages in such matters as irrigation, access, and the protection of crops against intruders at harvest time.[7]

Though the evidence on this trend is spotty, it appears that both during land reform in the late 1940's and early 1950's and in the retreat from the Great Leap about 1961, when the ownership of land was returned to the production teams, there was a tendency to aggregate land around the villages. In large, single-village brigades, the constituent teams

[6] On earlier patterns of cooperation in South China, see Feng Rui and Ping-lan Yung, "A General Description Survey of the Honan Island Village Community," *Lingnan Science Journal* (Canton), August 1931, pp. 153-86; Daniel H. Kulp, *Country Life in South China*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1925; and Hugh D. R. Baker, *A Chinese Lineage Village*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1968, Chap. 7.

[7] Baker, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-71; Bernard Gallin, *Hsin Hsing, Taiwan*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966, p. 100; Ramon Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970.

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might have land that was still intermixed. Otherwise, land became clustered about the village that was to manage it, and it became more and more possible to conceive of property lines between villages, or more precisely, of property lines between teams and brigades. Teams and brigades might still be organized in large water-control projects, but gone were many of the opportunities for day-to-day casual contacts with farmers from nearby villages which might help knit the larger rural society together.

(3) *Educational policy.* A third, more recent policy direction which will tend to narrow the range of social contacts to the village is the decision to place more and more schools within the village. In the early 1960's, as more males began to attend lower-middle school, more and more of them had to leave their home villages to attend school at the commune seat or at one of the larger villages in the area. Similarly, other villages without a primary school, or with only four grades out of a possible six in primary school, had to send some of their youth outside the village to attend school. While outside, the young people formed close ties with youths from other villages—ties which were potentially valuable as a bridge to cooperative relationships in adult life. Since the Cultural Revolution, however, there has been less and less opportunity to form these kinds of relationships. Villages—or at least brigades—have been urged by the central government to become self-sufficient in education; they have been assigned the goals of setting up not only a shortened five-year primary school but also a shortened two-year lower-middle school specializing in subjects relevant to agricultural life, keeping youth within the village. Basic education will certainly become more widespread, and youths will continue to form some friendships with outsiders on water-control projects that they join in the agricultural off-season, but the opportunities for regularized, intensive relationships with outsiders will be drastically reduced from what they might otherwise have been.

(4) *Commune and market.* A fourth factor which narrows the range of horizontal integration in the countryside is the difficulty of finding any significant intermediate unit around which to structure the commune level of administration—a difficulty which is exacerbated by the decision in some places to make the commune include very large populations.

Traditionally, there was a very significant intermediate unit of social interaction between the village and the local level of governmental administration (usually the *hsien,* or county). The standard marketing community, centered on a market town which brought together some 7,500 people—or 1,500 households—every three, four, or five days, was the locus of much that went on in the countryside. Knit together in a network of marriage alliances and informal political ties, the market community was on occasion used to organize projects and to mediate public disputes.[8] The post-1949 government was cognizant of the role of the market community, and the commune seat today is almost invariably located in one of the larger market towns. Nevertheless, it appears that the market community is increasingly losing ground as a possible base for bringing social cohesion to the commune.

This diminishing potential of the market is explained only in part by the decline in free marketing activity. While traders are no longer free to roam from place to place, in most locales peasants do regularly market produce from their private garden plots, poultry raised within the home, and mats, hats, and other handicrafts made at home. The market teahouse can still be the place where the prospective bride and groom are first introduced to

Members of the Kianghsin People's Commune in Kiangsu Province buying pork at a rural market in 1963.

—China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

[8] G. William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in China," *Journal of Asian Studies,* November 1964, pp. 3-43; February 1965, pp. 195-228; May 1965, pp. 363-99.

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Table 1: Communes and Markets, Kwangtung Province, 1973

Locale[a]	Average area per commune (sq. km.)	Average population per commune	Average markets per commune
4 suburban counties	120	60,000	4.0
8 central counties	110	35,000	3.2
13 intermediate counties	120	30,000	1.5
10 hill counties	150	15,000	1.1

[a] The four groups of counties are differentiated by proximity to Canton, the provincial capital, and by terrain. See text on this page.

SOURCE: Data from Chinese press and radio reports and from interviews with émigrés from Kwangtung Province conducted in Hong Kong in 1973-74, as reported in William L. Parish and Martin K. Whyte, *Village and Family in Contemporary China*, forthcoming. See footnote 3 to text, p. 52.

each other and where the village carpenter meets his potential customer. However, such traditional functions are ignored in the drawing of some commune boundary lines. This is particularly so in Kwangtung Province, where the quest for large, efficient administrative units seems to take precedence over that for cohesive social units.

Traditionally, the land areas of markets in the major river basins and near cities was much smaller than that of markets in remote hill districts. The greater population density of the basins plus the greater commercialization of places near cities generated enough demand for markets to be rather densely packed about the countryside. A market in the plains near Canton City traditionally served an area of only about 30 square kilometers, while a market in the more remote hills of Kwangtung Province served over 100 square kilometers. In the hills, the cultivable land was so sparse and the population so spread out that it took a wide expanse of territory to support a single market.

In Kwangtung, that traditional difference between suburban and hill areas has been obliterated in recent commune reorganizations. For a time between 1960 and 1963, Kwangtung communes were rather similar to market areas. But at the end of 1963, communes in the central part of the province were reorganized into much more populous units, in general along the lines of districts (*ch'u*) created in the 1930's and again used in the 1950's. As a result, the average area per commune is rather similar from one part of the province to another (see Table 1 for data pertinent to this and the next two paragraphs).

The average commune population, in contrast, varies tremendously from one part of the province to another. The most populous communes are those in counties adjoining the major cities of Canton and Swatow. In these counties, relatively level terrain, better roads, more bicycles, and other means of communication help compensate for the difficulties of managing the affairs of very large populations. Because of better transport, small markets within these counties had begun to disappear in favor of larger markets even before 1949. In other central counties to the south and southeast of Canton, few markets have disappeared, yet administration has still been reorganized into larger communes. In this zone, commercialization created a dense network of traditional markets. In consequence, the place where the peasant goes to sell household goods or buy daily necessities is often different from the place where he or she must go to register a marriage, apply to join the army, or perform other administrative functions.

In the administrative counties in the far southwest and southeast of the province, the disjunction between market and commune is not quite so extreme, but the population in any one commune is still rather great. Similarly, in the hill counties in the north and northeast of the province, though markets and communes tend to correspond, populations are still fairly large. Markets have not proliferated to keep up with population growth since 1950. Instead of the traditional 7,500 people and smaller number of adults who had the chance of at least a nodding acquaintance with one another through repeated contact every few days over the years in a market town, today's hill communes include an average of about 15,000 population.

Communes in Kwangtung may be a bit extreme. While the average commune size in Kwangtung is about 20,000, the average for the nation is only 13,000. In other places, there may be a closer correspondence between communes and old market communities. Most certainly there is great variation from place to place in the degree to which the commune has the potential for becoming a solidary community. Throughout the nation, communes near cities are invariably much larger and more populous than those elsewhere.[9] Even when the population per commune is only moderate, old market boundaries may be pretty much ignored—or so one is told by visitors to North China. Also in North China,

[9] Crook, *loc. cit.*, p. 375.

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there are a number of places where private plots have been abolished or so restricted that there is much less market activity than before. Many markets, unless they are centers for commune government and supply cooperatives, have simply withered away from lack of activity.[10] In these places as well, then, there is little in the way of an intermediate natural social community to help promote loyalty to the commune as a whole.

The only conceivable way that many communes would become basic accounting units is for the form of the commune to be changed from that of the collective into that of the state farm. In ordinary collectives (production teams), the peasant does not know what his or her income will be until after the fall harvest. Without being able to see what other members in a very populous commune were doing toward producing their share of the summer and fall harvest, it is unlikely that many peasants would be willing to risk cooperating in a super-enlarged production unit.[11] In a state farm, there is a guaranteed monthly income, a factor which might make life sufficiently secure for peasants to consent to coordination within accounting units at the commune level. In other words, many of the changes toward more secure income for peasants which occurred in the Soviet Union only in the late 1960's will likely be necessary before Chinese peasants can be aggregated in large communes as single production units. And these communes are likely to be owned by the state, with an organization quite different from that known today.

It should be understood that much of the above discussion is conjectural. Projections are based on reasonable assumptions of what is likely to occur in social behavior, given certain structural changes in rural society, as well as on anecdotal evidence from interviews. There are, however, two additional sorts of more systematic evidence which hint at the increasingly important role of the village community and the decreasingly important potential of the commune as a focus of social interaction.

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[10] Personal communications and "Travel Notes" of the Rural Small Industry Delegation which visited China in summer 1975 under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences. See a forthcoming report to be edited by Dwight Perkins.

[11] The detrimental effect of risk on interpersonal cooperation appears in small group experiments. See Gerald Marwell and David R. Schmitt, *Cooperation: An Experimental Analysis*, New York, Academic Press, 1975, p. 181.

Peasants of Tungkuo Village, Shantung Province, divide wheat after payment of the state grain tax in the harvest season of 1963.

China Pictorial (Peking), No. 9, 1963, p. 19.

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The first sort of supportive evidence emerges from the pattern of rural conflict in China (as discerned from the interviews with refugees from Kwangtung Province).

Rural Conflict

Today, life in the China countryside is infinitely more secure than it was in the immediate prerevolutionary period. Gone are the armed bandit groups which harassed villagers, and gone are the lineage and ethnic feuds which, in the absence of government control, were allowed to escalate into brutal physical fights. Nevertheless, some of the old kinds of disputes over water, land, and animals remain.[12] When a team upstream of another draws too much water at too fast a rate, teams downstream may get into heated arguments with it. Likewise, when one team repeatedly plows into the lands of another team or when one team's water buffalo is allowed to roam uncontrolled into the fields of another team, disputes leading potentially to the intervention of higher authorities may ensue. In extreme cases, young hotheads in the village may pick up rake and hoe in a bloody confrontation which has to be broken up by the commune's armed militia or (more rarely) by a local unit of the People's Liberation Army.

Table 2 shows the pattern of conflict between teams and between brigades in Kwangtung approximately during the years 1967-73. Some former residents report that during these years, their production teams had no conflict at all with neighboring teams. Some report minor disagreements which were usually settled by private discussion between the leaders of the teams involved. A goodly number report loud, angry arguments between teams, involving people other than just the leaders. A small number report arguments which escalated into physical fights between opposing teams.

The responses of those interviewed suggest that arguments are likely to escalate into physical fights only when old kinship enmities are involved. As Table 2 reflects, it is primarily the large, once-proud single-surname brigades who continue to be the most contentious. These brigades tend to have held large expanses of land which were lost to adjoining villages during the land reform of the early 1950's. Some of them have not forgotten their former power or their grudges against neighbors who were opposed to them in prerevolutionary days and who in some cases attacked them during the period of land reform. At the same time, the discernible tie between present disputes over material interests and old lineage loyalties helps support the author's contention that collectivization has sustained the corporate interests of some old lineages.

Perhaps more important, the data in Table 2 suggest that production teams are all very similar in the extent to which they are in conflict with their neighbors. Whether single-surname or multi-surname, they very rarely allow disputes to escalate into physical fights, and a number register no conflicts or have only very minor disagreements with their neighbors. *Within* single-surname brigades, where people are in conflict with neighbors of the same larger lineage but possibly different lineage segment, teams are no more and no less in conflict

[12] For similar themes in other Chinese settings, see Burton Pasternak, *Kinship and Community in Two Chinese Villages*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972; Gallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-86.

Table 2: External Conflict by Type of Production Unit, Kwangtung Province, 1967-73

	Single-surname brigades	Single-surname teams in single-surname brigades	Single-surname teams in multi-surname brigades	Multi-surname teams in multi-surname brigades
Physical fights	5	1	1	1
Arguments	0	7	7	8
Minor disagreements	5	3	4	2
No conflict	1	2	4	6
TOTAL	11	13	16	17

SOURCE: Reports on conflict situations from a total of 46 émigrés. See source note in Table 1 and footnote 3 to text, p. 52.

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than teams outside. Studies of lineage conflict in both Taiwan and Hong Kong suggest that lineage loyalties are strongest when material interests are at stake.[13] The constancy of conflict across teams of different surname composition implies that in the People's Republic of China as well, it is the current economic interests of the production team which determine patterns of cleavage between villages and neighborhoods in the countryside. In other words, the data tend to support the contention that the collectivization of landholding has given all sorts of villages and neighborhoods a new degree of corporate interest in protecting what is theirs. The degree of open physical conflict which results from this pattern of cleavage is much less than in traditional times, but the loyalty and corporate interests thus generated will to a degree hinder the reorganization of the countryside into larger and larger collective units.

Marriage Networks

The second kind of systematic evidence which suggests a strengthening of village units and a weakening of the commune's potential as a social unit is data on marriage patterns, again compiled from the interviews of Kwangtung émigrés. Traditionally in China, there was seldom any marriage within the same village. Parents forced their children to marry outside the village, and as a consequence there tended to be a dense network of marriage ties among villages in a standard marketing community. With the loss of parental authority since 1949, parents have less and less been able to compel their children to marry outside either the village or their own surname group. The data in Table 3 suggest that since 1949, about one-fourth of all marriages have been within the same village. Strangely, the data also show that even before 1949 many marriages already extended beyond what were later to become the commune boundaries. This may be a phenomenon peculiar to southern Kwangtung Province, where commercialization created many ties between the countryside and the cities before 1949. Elsewhere, the figure for marriages within the future commune territory would probably have been larger. As the table shows, from 1949 through 1974, somewhat more than one-third of all marriages involved ties

[13] Baker, *op. cit.*, p. 99; Emily M. Ahern, *The Cult of the Dead in a Chinese Village*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1973, p. 257.

Table 3: Origin/Destination of Brides by Year, Kwangtung Province

	Up to 1949	1950-1967	1968-74
	(rounded to nearest percent)		
Same village	3	26	23
Same commune	47	36	42
Other commune	50	39	35
TOTAL	100	101	100
	(number)		
TOTAL	34	101	158

SOURCE: Reports on village women by a total of 51 émigrés. See source note in Table 1 and footnote 3 to text, p. 52.

across what became the commune boundary lines in 1958. Only about 39-40 percent went beyond the village but stayed within the geographic limits of the commune, as compared to 47 percent before 1949. In other words, the data tend to support the suggestion that the village has become much more important as a nexus for social ties while the commune has become less important. Today, when the wife goes to visit her kinsmen at New Year's and other holidays, she goes less and less to nearby villages and more and more to houses just down the lane. There is less informal understanding and sympathy with families elsewhere, and hence a greater need to rely on administrative techniques and a generalized ideology to bind people together.

(To be sure, these new kinds of bonds are not insignificant. Cooperation on a large water reservoir, which then brings a constant supply of irrigation water to fields which previously depended on the vagaries of the season, gives powerful physical proof to villagers that cooperation in larger units can bring them positive physical benefits. In the schools, youngsters are frequently reminded of the virtues of cooperation. On a visit to a water reservoir construction site, the foreign visitor is greatly impressed by the fast work pace and energy exerted by youth from different villages on the common goal of supplying water for all. The point is simply that the kinds of new bonds formed on cooperative projects are less and less supported by the types of informal bonds which were present in the old society. In most places, large cooperative water projects appear to draw youth from their home villages only a few weeks every year or so. In this situation, the new bonds are unlikely to substitute in full measure for the old informal ties.)

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The effects of changing marriage ties vary somewhat between different types of villages, and this may lead to a differential response to the call to elevate more and more production tasks, accounting, and income-sharing to the brigade level. Table 4 suggests that single-surname teams are the most resistant to marriage within the village; sanctions against both marriage with close kin and marriage within the same village work against change. Thus peasants from single-surname teams continue to marry overwhelmingly outside the village. To the extent that social ties are important, these places should be moderately receptive to calls for aggregating production management and income-sharing to higher levels. Persons from multi-surname teams are the most likely to marry within the village—there is no surname constraint on intravillage marriage. As a result, roughly one-third of all marriages are within the village. When these are small, spatially isolated villages, they are likely to be unreceptive to calls for higher-level integration.

Paradoxically, villages which constitute a large, single-surname brigade seem likely to become rather receptive eventually to calls for integration at the brigade level. In single-surname brigades, though the taboo on marriage to close kinsmen within the same team continues, marriage to more distant kinsmen in a different lineage branch which constitutes another team in the same village is more and more being found acceptable. Bridges across teams within the same village are being formed which should eventually speed the integration of these units.

A young couple, Li Chin-hua (left) and Chen Ming-fu (center), both production team leaders on the Meiyen People's Commune in Wukiang County, Kiangsu Province, say goodbye to their child and its grandmother before going to work.

—An April 1961 photo by Hsieh Li/China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

Table 4: Origin/Destination of Brides by Type of Production Unit, Kwangtung Province

(post-1949 marriages only)

	Single-surname teams in single-surname brigades	Single-surname teams in multi-surname brigades	Multi-surname teams in multi-surname brigades
	(rounded to nearest percent)		
Same village	24	17	31
Same commune	37	45	37
Other commune	39	38	32
TOTAL	100	100	100
	(number)		
TOTAL	84	82	93

SOURCE: Reports on village women by a total of 51 émigrés. See source note in Table 1 and footnote 3 to text, p. 52.

Material on the progress of medical and birth-control programs (Table 5), though based on a very small number of cases, gives some support to the supposition that single-surname brigades could be more rapidly integrated into cooperative units. In Kwangtung, cooperative medical insurance programs, funded by separate family contributions to a brigade-level fund, began to spread rapidly in 1968. By the end of 1970, about half the villages for which we have information had adopted brigade-level medical insurance programs. Though many villages in Kwangtung had doctors of one sort or another even before 1968, in that year the barefoot paramedic program organized at the level of the brigade began to provide even more extensive rudimentary-level medical care. The data amassed from interviews—and also from statements by Kwangtung officials—suggest that by 1973 there were about 11 doctors and paramedics in the countryside for every 10,000 population. It is a logical supposition that single-surname brigades, within which there was already similarity of surname and some intermarriage, would be more likely to adopt cooperative insurance programs and to invest in the training of barefoot doctors than other places. Single-surname teams, with a wider network of mar-

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riage ties, should perhaps be intermediate. Multi-surname teams, with neither surname loyalties nor extensive marriage networks to bind them together, should be more hesitant to cooperate in brigade-level insurance programs or to invest in paramedic training through the brigade. While it is necessary to emphasize the small number of people interviewed and the tentativeness of interpretations of this sort, the data in the first two rows of Table 5 tend to support the suppositions of the research team. Though the differentiation between single-surname teams in single-surname brigades and single-surname teams in multi-surname brigades is somewhat contradictory, a clear contrast emerges between them and the multi-surname teams. Single-surname brigades and teams were the first to adopt cooperative medical insurance programs, and by 1973 they were the ones most likely to have trained several doctors. To the extent that there is indeed more trust among members of single-surname brigades and teams, they could well be the first to form themselves into the more socialist brigade-level production and income-sharing units desired by some in the party.

This does not mean that these same units will be any more easy to integrate at the level of the larger commune. Indeed, single-surname brigades, being internally cohesive, may be more resistant than others to integration into even larger size units. We have already seen how single-surname brigades are more contentious toward outsiders. Further data on village responses to the government's birth-control campaign also suggest an internal cohesion which can lead to resistance to programs which are not desired by the village. Birth control is becoming more widespread in the countryside—in part because mothers in their 30's who must work in the fields all day and take care of the house at night find three or four children a great burden. Nevertheless, government-sponsored birth control is not always popular, particularly among the men, who consider such things a woman's matter or who desire more sons to help support them in old age. Prior to the early 1970's, most male brigade officers shunted such issues off to the women officers, who called the married women in the village together for private meetings. Starting in the 1970's, that pattern began to change. In response to greater administrative pressure from above, male officials had to begin to call meetings of the total membership, where they themselves talked to males and females alike about the necessity of birth control. By 1973, about half the village had active male involvement in birth control propaganda activities within the village. In a smaller number of places, moderately severe sanctions were being applied against families who had more than three children. The usual automatic allotments—of extra private plots, grain, sugar, oil, or whatever—with the birth of each additional child were cut off. Or, to the extent that supplies continued to be allotted, they had to be paid for in cash on the barrelhead rather than simply charged to the family's account for reckoning after the fall harvest.

Since these more extreme measures could evoke resentment, one would suppose that they would be introduced more slowly where surname feelings and intermarriage were high. In China, a local leader presumably would be more easily stung by critical remarks from kinsmen than from non-kinsmen. While the small number of interviews and the tentativeness of interpreting must again be underscored, the re-

Table 5: Medical and Birth-control Programs by Type of Production Unit, Kwangtung Province, 1973

	Single-surname teams in single-surname brigades	Single-surname teams in multi-surname brigades	Multi-surname teams in multi-surname brigades
Had cooperative medical insurance by 1970[a]	100% (of 5[b])	78% (of 9)	36% (of 11)
Had more than 10 doctors per 10,000 population[a]	71% (of 7)	80% (of 5)	27% (of 11)
Had male leaders propagandizing birth control[c]	44% (of 9)	44% (of 9)	82% (of 11)
Imposed birth-control strictures[c]	20% (of 10)	38% (of 8)	40% (of 10)

[a] Programs administered at the brigade level and above.
[b] The numbers in parentheses represent the numbers of respondents who could supply the specified information with respect to their former production teams.
[c] Programs administered at team and brigade level and above.

SOURCE: See source note in Table 1 and footnote 3 to text, p. 52.

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Manufacture of tools for farm machinery at Nanyuan Commune near Peking.

—Audrey Topping/Photo Researchers.

sults in the last two rows of Table 5 tend to support the suppositions of the research team. Single-surname brigades are slow to introduce rigid birth-control programs; multi-surname teams do so much more readily. Single-surname teams are somewhat intermediate, being slow to propagandize but applying sanctions more readily. To the extent that single-surname brigades are indeed as internally cohesive as they seem, one would expect that although single-surname brigades would be responsive to calls for further integration at the brigade level, they are likely to be resistant to calls for integration at a higher level or to any other programs which do not meet their own views of their needs.

Commune and Brigade Enterprises

In juxtaposition to the various social patterns which modulate the rate at which higher and higher levels of cooperation can be introduced is a set of potentially powerful economic forces which may eventually make the discussion of social patterns seem comparatively trivial. In a spring 1975 article describing the future of communes, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, one of the reportedly more leftist members of the Politburo, chose to emphasize these forces. Using as his example communes in the suburbs of Shanghai, he noted the rapidity with which fixed assets controlled by the brigade and commune were increasing relative to those assets held by production teams. He also noted how income generated by the commune was increasing much more rapidly than that generated by the production teams. Around Shanghai, the income at the commune level rose in proportion to total income from 28.1 percent in 1973 to 30.5 in 1974. That of all brigades rose from 14.2 to 17.2 percent, while that of teams dropped from 56.7 to 52.3 percent.[14] In several places visited by the aforementioned US delegation on rural small industry in 1975, there were also reports of commune income growing faster than team income.

Because commune industry legally belongs to the people in the commune, the profits from that industry are not passed up into the state bureaucracy but stay within the commune. Industry thus provides commune administrators with their first significant source of discretionary capital since the retreat from the Great Leap around 1960. At Tachai Commune, seven commune enterprises—a shop for the repair and construction of agricultural implements, a refractory plant, an aluminite plant, a small coalpit, an animal-breeding ground, a commune farm, and a motorized transport team—still provide only 10 percent of total income. But this little income and the potential it represents—particularly with respect to production of new farm implements—reportedly inspired positive feelings among the commune members: "In the past some people were of the opinion that the commune was an empty shell—that economically it was flaccid. Today, they see that only by relying on the commune can one get on the road to prosperity." [15]

In the areas that are industrially most developed, commune administrators are using their newfound capital not only to reinvest in more sophisticated industry but also to stimulate new programs in the units below the commune. This sort of development is particularly stressed in Wuhsi County in the South. There, Yangshih Commune reserves 47 percent of its industrial profits for industrial expansion. Most of the rest is granted to the constituent production teams for their use in water-irrigation and drainage projects, field-leveling, and soil improvement. A small amount is used for health, education and other cultural work in the countryside.[16] To the extent that

[14] Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, *loc. cit.*

[15] *Hsi-yang pien k'ai Ta-chai hua* (Hsiyang [County] Begins All-Round Tachai Transformation), Taiyuan, Shansi People's Press, 1973, p. 151.

[16] Rural Small Industry Delegation, "Travel Notes," *supra.*

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this sort of program of investment in lower-level units is followed elsewhere, the lower-level units cannot help but pay more attention to the commune.

Other program changes also promote the increased importance of intermediate-level units. As noted earlier, since the Cultural Revolution more and more brigades have begun to finance their own schools. In the same period, most brigades have begun to run their own cooperative medical-insurance programs with contributions from members of all their constituent teams. Brigades buy hand tractors and other kinds of expensive equipment which the team cannot afford. Brigade industry does not generate much income; it consists mostly of repair shops, grain mills, and brick kilns, which sell only to the local community at minimal or zero profit. But collective sidelines such as orchards and piggeries, combined with health programs, education, and equipment purchases, give the brigade increased economic significance.

Despite all this, it is necessary to emphasize that the process by which communes and brigades become economically more dominant will take a long time in most places. Since 1972, there has been a renewed emphasis on how commune industry should not be allowed to grow unless it serves agriculture. Rural industry and agriculture can only grow together, and except in special circumstances the output from commune industry must be sold within the limited confines of the commune market.[17] Products for the wider market will be produced by higher-level county and province industries.

As a result, growth in commune industry is slow, and there is great regional variation. Table 6, although heavily weighted toward industrially prospering communes (those which the American delegation was shown), nevertheless indicates that variation. Both the greatest number of workers and the highest incomes are generated in communes near cities and in the rich Yangtze delta region, which includes both Shanghai and Wuhsi. Some factories near cities get subcontracts to make parts for city plants—*e.g.*, Peking's Red Star Commune makes screws, Wuhsi City's Holei Commune makes parts for a table plane, Shanghai's July 1 Commune makes spray paints and electric-storage batteries, and Wuhsi County's Yangshih Commune makes metal bushings and electric transformers.

Away from the cities, the local agricultural market generates far less demand and profit. In Table 6, the

[17] *Ibid.*; also *Shanghai chiao-ch'ü nung-yeh hsüeh Ta-chai* (Shanghai Suburbs Study Tachai), Shanghai, Agricultural Press, 1974, pp. 52-58.

Table 6: Industrial Employment and Income in Selected Administrative Units throughout China, 1973-75

Unit and types of enterprise	Number of enterprises	% of total labor force	% of total income	% of total grain and industrial output value
Communes (factories)				
Hsiyang County (average per commune)	2.5	3%	10%	15%
Lin County (average per commune)	3	2	—	29
Peking City, Red Star Commune	6	11	20	—
Shanghai City (average per commune)	—	—	30	—
Shanghai City, July 1 Commune	6	19	32	—
Wuhsi County, Yangshih Commune	7	6	40	—
Wuhsi City, Holei Commune	8	10	50+	—
Communes and Brigades (factories and sidelines)				
Hunan Province (average per commune)	—	—	12	—
Wuhsi County (average per commune)	42	—	37	—
Shanghai, Malu Commune	63	28	40+	—
Shanghai City (average per commune)	—	—	48	—

SOURCES: Report of the American Small-Industry Delegation to China, summer 1975 (results forthcoming in a volume edited by Dwight Perkins of Harvard University). Except for Hunan Province, all the locales listed in the table were visited by the delegation. Other sources: Shansi Province, Chinchung District Revolutionary Committee, Agricultural Mechanization Management Bureau, *Yung Tachai ching-shen kao nung-yeh chi-hsieh hua* (Use the Tachai Spirit to Carry Out Agricultural Mechanization), Taiyuan, Shansi People's Press, 1974, pp. 2, 11-12. Editing Group, *Shanghai Chi-yi jen-min kung-she shih* (History of Shanghai July 1 People's Commune), Shanghai People's Press, 1974. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship over the Bourgeoisie," *Peking Review*, April 4, 1975, p. 6. Hunan Radio, in British Broadcasting Corporation, *Selected World Broadcasts*, FE/W799/A/6, Oct. 30, 1974.

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Activity on the threshing ground of a production brigade in Shantung Province in late 1975.

—Hsinhua News Agency via UPI.

12-percent figure for Hunan, which represents a province-wide average of income from commune and brigade enterprises, probably comes closest to representing an average for the nation as a whole. As can be seen, this figure is far below the proportion of income for most places listed in the table. Hsiyang County in the north is the only listing with a lesser figure, and even its 10-percent level—representing commune enterprises only—may be a bit high compared to the average county. Both Hsiyang County and the Tachai Brigade within it are national models for agriculture, and the county is blessed with an abundant supply of anthracite coal to fuel small industry. The average county probably has a less developed industrial base and does not have the rich fuel sources of Hsiyang. Moreover, as a 1973 visitor was told, some provinces now restrict the growth of local industry by establishing a ceiling of five percent of the labor force as the maximum which can be engaged in industry at either county or commune level.[18] A county-wide regulation thus imposes a limit of two to three percent of the labor force in the average commune (the county level gets the remainder of the five-percent quota), keeping the commune from diverting its energies away from the primary goal of increasing grain output. It will thus be many years before the average commune can catch up with the economic level or begin to dispense the economic benefits of places such as Yangshih Commune in Wuhsi or the communes in the outskirts of Shanghai. Though not so economically flaccid as before, most of the communes will not have the resources to pay monthly salaries or other munificent benefits which might make them a more acceptable basis for economic production and income-sharing.

Conclusion

The issues involved in this discussion can be framed more broadly. Since the mid-1950's, there has been a continuing debate over agricultural policy between leadership opinion-groups who may be characterized as moderates and radicals. Though there are a host of specific issues on which particular lead-

[18] Jon Sigurdson, "Rural Industrialization in China," in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy*, *supra*, p. 412.

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ers may hold diverse opinions, the moderates have tended to argue that revolution in the countryside must await change in the economic substructure. In the mid-1950's, the moderates—reportedly led by the now-purged Liu Shao-ch'i—argued that collectivization must proceed slowly. Only when agriculture was mechanized and incomes were much higher would the villages be ready for collective agriculture. The radicals, led by Chairman Mao, replied that without collectivization villages could not begin to accumulate the resources necessary for mechanization; one did not need to wait on mechanization to collectivize, for the same mass-mobilization techniques which had been used to mobilize the peasantry first for revolution and then for land reform could be used to mobilize them for collectivization.[19] Through successive mass-mobilization campaigns, the radicals proved that they had an accurate view of the countryside. In three short years, from the first of 1955 through 1957, peasants were joined first into cooperatives and then into collectives, with a payment system and administrative structure very similar to the teams and brigades of today.

It is the argument of this paper that one of the reasons why agricultural transformation was comparatively easy and rapid in the mid-1950's was that collectivization relied heavily on natural communities. Using local political activists and shaping new collectives around prerevolutionary villages and village neighborhoods, the regime built on existing community strengths.

At the next step in rural revolution, however, the radicals stumbled. Suddenly in 1958, they tried to do everything at once, introducing bold and untested programs through mass-mobilization techniques which eventually led to mass sit-down strikes by peasants in the fields. Overly close plantings, overly deep plowings, excessive equalization of incomes at the level of the commune, mess halls, and long workhours were all too much. Just in size alone, the 1958-59 communes were overly adventurous. Instead of encompassing the market community, which had become a township (*hsiang*) administrative unit by early 1958, the new communes were expanded to units about three times as large. It was only in 1960-61 that the radicals conceded the errors of many of their programs. Communes were reduced in size, and production and income-sharing—which defined the basic accounting unit—were again returned to the small village or neighborhood constituting the production team.

Though the ideal of returning to the larger brigade and commune for production and income-sharing remained, it was painfully clear to both moderates and radicals alike that this was a very difficult task. The 60 Articles on Agriculture, written and revised by moderates in 1961-62, certified that the production team would long remain the basic accounting unit in most places.[20] Though there were efforts to make the brigade the accounting unit in some places between 1968 and 1971, the 60 Articles remained the guide to agricultural policy.

During the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1968, there were many critiques of moderate agricultural programs. Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, now a member of the Politburo, was among those radical spokesmen who gained new power during the Cultural Revolution. By 1975, however, he too was among those who argued that further change in the level of collectivization of the countryside would follow advances in basic economic processes. He avowed that the change should be hastened by ideological education, leadership mobilization, and constant vigilance against class enemies who would like to turn back the tide of history. But in a style reminiscent of earlier moderates, he pointed to increasing mechanization and industrialization at the level of the brigade and commune as prerequisites laying the groundwork for changes in the level of collectivization. Mass mobilization could not completely supplant economic change as a necessary condition for social change.[21]

The data in this paper suggest that one of the reasons that mass-mobilization techniques are less effective today than in the mid-1950's in generating higher and higher levels of collectivization is that the natural social community around which these new levels of sharing might be structured has become weaker and weaker. To the extent that new levels of production and income-sharing can be introduced, the introduction is going to be in a very complex pattern which is dependent at least as much on surname composition, size of commune, size of brigade, industrial wealth, and the like, as it is on the degree to which local leaders can mobilize the masses.

[19] Kang Chao, *Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-1965*, Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1970; Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974, pp. 246-59.

[20] "Regulations on the Work of the Rural People's Communes (Revised Draft), September 1962," in Union Research Institute, *Documents of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee*, Vol. 1, Hong Kong, 1971, pp. 695-725.

[21] Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, *loc. cit.*

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Books

The Soviet System and the Future

By George Breslauer

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG: *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union.* 3rd ed., New York, Praeger, 1974.
FINNISH POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION: *Politiikka: A Special Issue on the Study of Socialist Societies.* Tampere, 1972.
DARRELL P. HAMMER: *U.S.S.R.: The Politics of Oligarchy.* Hinsdale, Ill., The Dryden Press, 1974.
ROBERT McNEAL: *The Bolshevik Tradition.* 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975.
ALEC NOVE: *Stalinism and After.* London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975.
J. LUCIEN RADEL: *Roots of Totalitarianism: The Ideological Sources of Fascism, National Socialism, and Communism.* New York, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1975.
LEONARD SCHAPIRO: *Totalitarianism.* London, The Pall Mall Press, 1972.
ARYEH L. UNGER: *The Totalitarian Party: Party and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1974.

WHAT IS the nature of the Soviet system? What has been the nature of change in the USSR since Stalin? And what does this process of change portend for future developments? All the books under review deal with the problems involved in answering at least one of these questions. Fortunately, they are not primarily concerned with "essences," or with other such metaphysical approaches to defining the nature of a system. Rather, they are engaged in the detailed work of identifying either features of continuity in the Soviet system since Lenin—whatever the changes along the way—or features of the Soviet system today that set it off from other systems.

At least six of the eight books might properly be described as textbooks. Of these, four—those by Nove, McNeal, Armstrong, and Hammer—describe the Soviet system. (Nove and McNeal have written short chronological surveys of the history of Soviet rule, while Armstrong and Hammer arrange their materials topically.) Schapiro and Radel, on the other hand, have produced surveys of the theory and practice of totalitarianism. Radel writes about the ideological predecessors of 20th-century totalitarian theories, while Schapiro focuses primarily upon the features that distinguish 20th-century totalitarian regimes (primarily Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, though Mussolini's Italy is also included) from all previous forms of governance.

The final two books are not texts. The special issue of *Politiikka,* a publication of the Finnish Political Science Association, contains articles that review the state of Soviet studies and call for greater integration of Finnish and American studies of the USSR. The book by Unger, which is the only real research monograph among these works, compares agitation and propaganda techniques in Nazi Germany with those in the Soviet Union (both past and present) in order to ascertain the scope and nature of mobilization by a "totalitarian party."

While various authors represented in this group of books would disagree about the propriety of using certain emotionally charged terms ("totalitarianism," "elitism," and so on) as summary characterizations of the Soviet system, there seems to be a broad consensus about how to describe the general features and operating characteristics of the system. Most of the authors would agree, for example, that top-level officials of the party-state hierarchy exercise primary responsibility for making fundamental decisions about national policy. These officials, while perhaps not homogeneous in their thinking, nonetheless tend to place a high value on secrecy in their deliberations; to be in-

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tolerant of public challenges to their prerogatives; and to emphasize order, discipline, hierarchy, rank, and deference as means of integrating the system. While the officials seem to have accommodated themselves to an expansion and regularization of access to the policymaking arena in the post-Stalin period, they still make their fundamental decisions *in camera* and refuse to be held regularly accountable for their decisions before a larger public constituency. And while they seem to respect a "limited legalism" in their actions (Nove, p. 162), they will not tolerate the constraints imposed by a "distinct and independent legal order" (Schapiro, p. 115).

ONCE THERE is agreement on the facts, the question naturally arises as to what we do with the information. From a comparative perspective, one might dwell upon problems of characterization and categorization in order to determine what features of the Soviet system are similar to, or different from, those found in other polities. This is the approach taken by Leonard Schapiro in *Totalitarianism* and is also the focus of articles in *Politiikka,* including methodological critiques by Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. Alternatively, we might attempt to specify the historical factors that allowed such a system to evolve—a task taken up by Nove, Radel, and McNeal. A third approach would seek to evaluate the performance of the system in order to determine its strengths and weaknesses in dealing with the problems generated by its domestic and foreign environments. None of the books under review engages systematically in assessing the problem-solving capabilities of the Soviet regime today, though most of the texts intersperse evaluations with their descriptions of the system.

In this regard, the books point up a more general state of affairs. Considerable scholarly energy has been devoted to describing and characterizing the Soviet system and to explaining its historical development—and much remains to be done. However, little thought has been given to developing criteria by which we might assess the likely future performance of the regime. Accordingly, the remainder of this essay will be devoted to a discussion of this question. How well is the regime likely to perform in dealing with the problems of the near future: an increasingly complex economy; an increasingly differentiated social structure; increasingly educated and sophisticated groups in the populace; and a working class whose aspirations for social mobility far exceed the opportunities that exist today?

The quality of Soviet leadership in coming decades, this reviewer would submit, will be defined by its ability to develop strategies for integrating an increasingly complex, heterogeneous, and structured environment, even as it maintains a centrally-directed, hierarchical, one-party system. How likely is it that Soviet leaders will develop such strategies and succeed in implementing them effectively? Obviously, we cannot predict these things with any measure of certainty. As a first step, however, we can inquire into the evolution of Soviet thinking in recent years in order to assess the learning capacity of the regime.[1] Do Soviet leaders recognize and appreciate the problems of complexity and differentiation facing them? How do they define the

[1] What follows is treated at much greater length in the present author's "Transformation and Adaptation in the Soviet Union Since Stalin," in Karl Ryavec, Ed., *Soviet Communism: Adaptation or Continuity,* forthcoming. Another of the author's works, *Soviet Perspectives on Modern Society 1952-1976,* now in progress, presents a comparison of Khrushchevian and post-Khrushchevian approaches to these problems.

Reviewers in this Issue

GEORGE W. BRESLAUER—Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley); currently a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace (Stanford, Calif.); coauthor of *Political Terror in Communist Systems,* 1970.

DALE R. HERSPRING—Foreign Service Officer, US Department of State (Washington, DC); author of *East German Civil-Military Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949-1972,* 1973, and of several articles dealing with Polish and East German military relations.

PAUL HOLLANDER—Professor of Sociology at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst, Mass.) and Associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University; author of *Soviet and American Society: A Comparison,* 1973.

PAUL MARANTZ—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia (Vancouver, Canada); author of various articles and of a forthcoming book, *Soviet Doctrine and East-West Relations, 1917-1976.*

KENZO KIGA—Professor Emeritus, Keio University (Tokyo) and President of Japan Association of Soviet and East European Studies; author of various works on Communist economies, including *Sobietto Keikaku Keizai Ron* (Soviet Planned Economy), 1951, and *Kyosanshugi no Keizai* (Economies of Communist Systems), 1969.

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nature of the problem, and what does this portend for the possibility of creative reformism in the next generation of Soviet officials?

THE TRADITIONAL Soviet ideological paradigm was based upon a relatively simple, undifferentiated view of social and economic tasks. While it contained numerous components, a few are particularly relevant to the concerns of this essay. First, it endorsed an optimistic, teleological notion of social progress: "there are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot storm"; "the present generation will live under communism"; "final solutions" through "correct policies." Second, the commitment to central planning, when coupled with this revolutionary optimism, placed a premium on the use of unremitting pressure as the means of getting the job done.

A third feature of the paradigm has been called the "solidary conception of society." In this conception, "the aims of all are the aims of each; in their goals, society, state, party, and individual are as one. There is no room for particular purposes that diverge from those of society." [2] This monolithic perspective, with its stress on creating homogeneity and consensus, was dominant through the fall of Khrushchev. Ideologically, the interests of one were regarded as the interests of all. The obligation of the individual was to internalize collectivist norms and values and to contribute to the national effort. The role of the state, in turn, was to define the interests of the individual for him and to educate him to a correct understanding of his class interests.

This statist bias was reinforced by a fourth feature of the paradigm: the use of normative terminology in defining the tasks of the regime. Party leaders, for example, continually promised to fulfill the material requirements (*potrebnosti*) of the populace, or to create an abundance of material goods that would satisfy the needs of a "normal, cultured individual." However, the definitions of "needs," "requirements," and "normality" were left to the state.

These perspectives came under increasing behind-the-scenes criticism during the 1950's and 1960's, especially when the regime committed itself to pursuing multiple social and economic goals without the use of mass terror or "revolutions from above." It became necessary at that point to come to grips with the human, material, and administrative environments at hand in order to devise new strategies for guiding them in desired directions. Recognition of the need for a greater understanding of the world as it is, as a precondition for creating the world as it should be, was the motive force behind the changes in perspective of the past decade.

If we examine the speeches of Soviet leaders and the ideological literature of the last ten years, we find significant changes in the perspectives outlined above. To be sure, the basic commitments to optimism, pressure, mobilization, consensus, and statism remain, but they have been supplemented by new themes and concepts. Thus, Soviet pronouncements have replaced the extreme of revolutionary optimism with continual acknowledgement of the "complexity" (*slozhnost'*) of problems; there has been an explicit rejection, on Brezhnev's part, of the notion that final solutions to economic problems exist; and planners have been called upon to base their targets on a more sober assessment of past performance and future potential. All this has been accompanied, as we know, by the indefinite postponement of utopian goals expounded in the Party Program of 1961.

In addition, there has been a rejection of "unremitting pressure as a principle of rule." [3] Soviet leaders call now for clarifying jurisdictions in public administration and for creating a stabler, more predictable task environment in which officials can work. They have also taken some of the onus for mistakes off Soviet officials, acknowledging that cadres and managers must have the resources and rights necessary to fulfill their responsibilities. As Brezhnev put it at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, without these resources and rights, "even the most diligent official often finds himself powerless, and it is difficult to hold him fully responsible for the job assigned." [4] At the 25th Party Congress in 1976, the General Secretary reiterated this point, now calling it "the essence of organizational questions" and the "foundation of foundations of the science and practice of administration." [5] Thus, while Soviet leaders continue to generate somewhat ambitious plans and to rely on pressure and party activ-

[2] Gregory Grossman, "The Solidary Society: A Philosophical Issue in Soviet Economic Reforms," in Gregory Grossman, Ed., *Essays in Socialism and Planning in Honor of Carl Landauer*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, p. 186.

[3] This term was coined by Reinhard Bendix in his *Work and Authority in Industry*, New York, Harper and Row, 1956, p. 390.

[4] *XXIV s"yezd KPSS: Stenograficheskiy otchët* (24th Congress of the CPSU: Stenographic Record), Vol. 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p. 93.

[5] *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 25, 1976, p. 7.

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ism to overcome inertia, they have changed the nature and direction of application of that pressure and their expectation of what it will achieve.

We can also discern an interesting revision of the monolithic image of society, a new appreciation of the complexity of Soviet social structure and of the difficulties involved in social engineering. Society is now viewed as being composed not simply of classes, but of groups, strata, and organizational units (such as the enterprise) that have legitimate interests of their own. Of course, the citizen is still expected to extend his primary loyalty to the state, which defines the larger public interest. However, it is now acknowledged that one of the primary functions of the state and party is to aggregate, coordinate, and harmonize these diverse interests. As Brezhnev put it, "the party's policy yields the desired results when it takes into precise account the interests of all the people and the interests of the classes and social groups comprising the people and directs them into one common channel." [6]

IT SHOULD be emphasized, however, that this new formulation is not a prescription for political pluralism or autonomous political activity. On the contrary, there is an assumption that interests in society *can* be harmoniously reconciled with broader community goals, and that policy, therefore, need not be a resultant of the clash of autonomous social forces. In short, this is not a liberal-democratic conception of politics. True, it is a view that sees some conflict of interest as inevitable, but it makes clear that conflict is to be channeled, and interests are to be aggregated, within established structures. Hence, it affirms by implication that only those interests are legitimate which are capable of being channeled through existing structures. Thus, it follows that associational activity which attempts to form autonomous groupings or which attempts to solicit support for positions that offer fundamental criticism of patterns of authority in the system remains illegitimate.

Although this is not a call for radical political change, it does seem to be an acknowledgment on the part of the regime of the problematic nature of the task of defining and enforcing the public interest. Further, it is a recognition of the complex and contradictory nature of the process. How does one reconcile individual and collective goals? To which collective should the individual extend his secondary loyalties—the workers' collective or the enterprise? How does one increase the responsiveness of the regime to the yearnings of distinct groups and strata of the populace without reinforcing individualism, materialism, or consumerism? How does one respond to the yearning of workers for interclass mobility without violating the "interests" of those strata that now dominate positions in the intelligentsia? How does one spur achievement and efficiency through differential rewards without violating lower class "interests" in greater equality?

Clearly, there are no perfect answers to these questions; they represent conflicting tendencies in all modern societies. All these societies must come to terms with the inherent tensions between individualism and collectivism and between equity and efficiency. However, these tensions are dealt with in different ways by different systems. The current Soviet approach is clearly an organizational one, for it counts upon the rationalization of central planning to harmonize individual achievement and collective interests. Success indicators, Leonid Brezhnev recently pointed out, "must harmonize [*soyedinyat' voyedino*] the interests of the worker with the interests of the enterprise, and the interests of the enterprise with the interests of the state." [7] Beyond this, however, Brezhnev laid heavy stress on the educational and mobilizational role of party organs ("taking into account the distinctive features of various groups of the working people") to spur compliance with these success indicators.[8] Thus, the problem is basically one of finding new forms of consensus-building and new patterns of leadership.

For such purposes, the traditional Soviet image of society was just too simple. It did not recognize conflicts of interest or the necessity of gathering more differentiated information about means of mobilizing different strata of the populace. Since Khrushchev's dismissal, however, Soviet social scientists have been given greater latitude (within strict and shifting limits, to be sure) to explore the distinctive characteristics and "interests" of groups and strata in society. Sociologists are studying opportunities for intraclass mobility and the character of intraclass differentiation. Jurists write about the need for more careful definition of the rights and responsibilities of Soviet citizenship—though they are careful to avoid

[6] *XXIV s"yezd KPSS: Stenograficheskiy otchët*, Vol. 1, p. 97.

[7] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976, p. 7.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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implying that the interests of the individual clash with those of the state, a position that would amount to Yugoslav "revisionism." The philosophical literature has also reflected the change, as ideologists have debated whether the concept of "interest" is essentially an objective or a subjective phenomenon. This has resulted in a widely hailed movement in favor of defining "interest" as the "unity of the objective and the subjective." Since the notion of "unity" is vague, it has been equated with "correlation" and has led to calls for using concrete sociological research to determine the correlation in Soviet society between the objective position of certain groups and their *subjective* definition of their group or class interests.[9]

In line with this trend, Soviet agitators and mobilizers have been called upon with greater frequency to take a more "differentiated" (*differentsirovannyy*) approach in relating to different groups. Moreover, since October 1964 there has been an upsurge of selective public opinion polling, as the regime seeks to increase its understanding of the human environment it is trying to manipulate and transform. After all, one cannot "take interests into account" and channel them in "harmonious directions" without considerable understanding of how citizens define their interests and how these definitions complement and contradict each other.

THESE CHANGES in perspective place an enormous decision-making burden on Soviet planners, officials, and cadres, who insist upon regulating all significant political initiative and maintaining control over the definition of systemic problems and goals. In pursuit of their self-proclaimed goal of "scientific management of society," they have taken upon themselves the task of defining and implementing the "public interest" in ways that will be coordinated, differentiated, and inspiring to the citizenry. They must organize communications processes in ways that will allow them to assess the capabilities of individuals and collectives in the system. Similarly, they must devise incentive schemes that will elicit desired behavior and must monitor results in ways that will ensure responsibility. Furthermore, they must ally with the specialists and professionals to develop a knowledge industry capable of examining the interrelationships and trade-offs among values in different issue-areas and among concrete policy objectives.

Given the inherent limitations on optimal planning, we can predict with confidence that the Soviet system will never achieve such a "computopia." But that is an unfair standard by which to judge any political system. What really matters is whether the goal of purposive guidance of society will be achieved at a level of effectiveness consistent with the expectations of strategic groups in the populace. After all, Leonid Brezhnev may well have tapped the sentiments of many Soviet citizens when he bragged that the party had now made it possible for them to "breathe freely, work well, and live quietly." [10]

What I am suggesting is that we go beyond the dichotomy between those who postulate stability and those who forecast a time of troubles for the Soviet system. Those who emphasize stability usually point to evidence that the political culture of Soviet Russia—with its premium on control and on fear of anarchy—is congruent with traditional Russian attitudes toward authority and is shared by the bulk of Soviet citizens. As long as the regime continues to provide the populace with material and physical security, the argument goes, it will remain acceptable. This appears to be the cautious prognosis advanced by Alec Nove in *Stalinism and After*.

Those who forecast trouble in the future generally believe that authoritarian structures offend the human spirit and will ultimately prove incapable of eliciting legitimacy or compliance. Though not willing to commit himself, Unger hints at this conclusion. He notes that the enormous expansion of party control activities in recent decades "has almost singlehandedly succeeded in ensuring the system needs of control and compliance" but warns that only the future will tell whether this will continue to be effective "as memory of the terror fades" (p. 270).

Predicting the future of any system, of course, is a difficult task, and it calls for specification of the components of efficiency, effectiveness, and stability, as well as an appreciation of the dynamics of opinion formation and of the relationship between attitudes and behavior. Hence, caution in drawing conclusions would seem to be in order.

Yet, we can do more than bemoan the difficulties. This essay

[9] For a summary of this literature, see A. S. Ayzikovich, "An Important Sociological Problem," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 11, 1965.

[10] As noted by Frederick Barghoorn in his *Politics in the USSR*, rev. ed., Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1972, p. 22.

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has sought to document increased realism on the part of Soviet leaders about the complexities they face. To demonstrate learning and adaptation, however, is not to determine whether that adaptation has been sufficient to deal with emerging problems at a given level of efficiency. Nor does it alert us to the impact of a given level of inefficiency on the legitimacy of the authorities, the regime, or the system. Nonetheless, by stating the problem in this way, we are forced to be more specific about the relationship among the numerous factors that contribute to the stability or instability of a system. How well will Soviet authorities pursue their dual (and sometimes conflicting) goals of social integration and economic efficiency? How well will Soviet institutions absorb and process the information being generated about their environment? Will the force of entrenched interests prevent the leadership from acting, even if it recognizes the need for reform? Will the behavior of the next generation of Soviet officials be affected by the more responsive and adaptive concepts introduced in the past decades? Will this affect their political style, approaches to mobilization, and level of dogmatism? And what effect would a less authoritarian style of mobilization have on the regime's ability to elicit contributions from Soviet citizens? Only after we generate some answers to those questions will we be in a position to make informed and specific judgments about the flexibility, learning capacity, and problem-solving capabilities of the Soviet regime.

The CPSU and the Military

By Dale R. Herspring

A. Y. KHMEL, Ed.: *Education of the Soviet Soldier: Party-Political Work in the Soviet Armed Forces.* Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1972.
HERBERT GOLDHAMMER: *The Soviet Soldier: Soviet Military Management at the Troop Level,* New York, Crane, Russak & Co., 1975.

THE MYTHICAL Martian conjured up by the British analyst John Erickson in a recent review in this journal is not alone in being disappointed by the lack of English-language analytical material available—at least until very recently—on the Soviet military.[1] The paucity of research has been particularly noticeable in the area of party-military relations in the USSR. The lack of in-depth analyses on this subject has been disturbing to specialists across a broad range of interests, since the Soviet experience is important not only to scholars and policymakers who deal with the Soviet Union but also to those (including the present reviewer) who focus on party-military relations in the case of other, lesser known Communist armed forces.

In this situation, the volumes under review are to be welcomed. A short description of each may serve as a useful preface to a broader discussion of current views on Communist political-military relations, based on what English-language information is available.

THE FIRST work listed is a Soviet-produced volume edited by Lt. General Khmel, head of the Party-Political Work Department of the Lenin Political-Military Academy.

The opinions expressed in the present review are those of the author and do not represent official US State Department policy.

[1] John Erickson, "Windows on the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1975, p. 63. Happily, Mr. Erickson's review concerns an important current project which helps to fill this gap: the US Air Force is now publishing an ongoing series of translations of Soviet studies under the title *Soviet Military Thought* (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973 to date).

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Although it is hardly an objective analysis, it serves as a highly useful guide to the role of the party in the armed forces. A translation of a collection of articles previously published in Russian, the book presents an overview of the party-political apparatus as well as a discussion of some of the major concepts associated with the party's presence in the military. Although unable to comment on the accuracy of the translation, this reviewer was impressed with its readability, at least as compared to other English-language publications of Progress Publishers.

The contributions to the volume are neatly and logically organized into eleven chapters, though the quality of the selections is uneven. Chapters cover such subjects as the unity-of-command principle; the political apparatus; the party and Komsomol organizations; company-level political activities; the education of armed-forces personnel in areas such as Communist awareness, traditions of the Soviet armed forces, and internationalism; discipline; and party political work in different services. In addition, an introductory chapter attempts—not very successfully—to tie the book together, supplying background and seeking to justify the party's presence in the armed forces.

The contribution dealing with the unity-of-command principle (Chapter 2) is especially interesting. It also provides what is probably the best short history in English to date of the commissar-political officer structure (more on which shortly). In this as in other chapters, however, it is obvious that the authors have carefully avoided discussion of potentially embarrassing topics, such as the effect of the purges on the political apparatus.

According to Chapter 11, which deals with party-political work in the different services, the political apparatus has assumed an increasingly important role in the maintenance of a high level of combat readiness, a functional shift resulting on the one hand from the demands of the scientific-technical revolution and on the other from the decreased need for political supervision over regular officers. As a consequence, the political apparatus in the different services has adjusted its activity in accordance with the unique demands of each service. To cite an example, the authors report that in the more technical services, such as the rocket forces, air defense forces, submarine service, and air force, particular emphasis in political work is placed on producing a high degree of precision, coordination, and instant response, while in the less technical ground forces, a premium is placed on endurance.

This book would have been of considerably greater use to Western scholars had it included fewer adulations of the party and concentrated more discussion on some of the politically contentious, albeit very important, substantive questions associated with the history and function of the political apparatus in the Soviet armed forces. Nevertheless, the Khmel volume provides a rich English-language source for Western scholars working from translated materials.

The second volume under review is the work of American analyst Herbert Goldhammer, a senior staff member of the Rand Corporation, who has written a remarkable account of the life of the Soviet soldier and officer at the troop level. The account is based on data from translations of Soviet unclassified military journals, in particular those made available in *Translations on USSR Military Affairs*, a series issued by the US Government's Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) and available through the Government Printing Office. While some may object to reliance on translations, this reviewer's experience with JPRS translations of Polish and East German documents has been very satisfactory. Goldhammer's volume should encourage others heretofore inhibited by the language barrier to comb the data which is now available in English and hopefully to provide additional studies on the Soviet military.

The basic purpose of his study, according to Goldhammer, is to prove that the Soviets are not "ten feet tall" and that there are "constraints on Soviet military effectiveness" (p. 333). In the course of making his case, the author presents a wealth of data and information on a variety of subjects, such as DOSAAF, civil defense training and attitudes, military training, discipline, solidarity and morale, political indoctrination, and the party and army.

Unfortunately, Goldhammer's research is limited to the time period 1970-74, with the result that the account lacks historical dimension. It is also somewhat disappointing to the extent that it merely provides description of the current situation, as contrasted to an approach which presents data in a useful analytical framework (such as William E. Odom's excellent analysis of DOSAAF [2]). None-

[2] William E. Odom, *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973. DOSAAF is the acronym for the "All-Union Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy," a mass organization promoting various interests of the military services.

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theless, there is little doubt that Goldhammer's work will become a valuable reference work for specialists and nonspecialists alike.

WHILE THESE books are very different in approach and perspective, their mutual concern with the party-military relationship provides an opportunity to review more broadly current thinking on the question of what is the party's role and/or function in modern Communist armed forces.

The political apparatus in Communist militaries has traditionally been viewed in the West primarily as an agent of political control, functioning as the party's arm in the armed forces and preventing the rise of an autonomous, self-directed military.[3] But while Communist writers acknowledge the importance of the party's presence as a tool for assuring party superiority, they have increasingly argued—as in the Khmel volume—that it also serves an important role in guaranteeing a high level of combat efficiency.[4]

Crucial to the traditional view of the party's political apparatus as an agent of political control is the assumption that the party and armed forces are and act as identifiable institutions in their dealings with one another. While those who hold this view recognize that the military is not a "very monolithic, homogenous institution," they argue that "when threatened by a challenge to its basic professional and institutional prerogatives and values, the military usually closes its ranks."[5] Others, however, have argued that the assumption of a party-army dichotomy distorts understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations in Communist countries.[6] Since the party-political apparatus represents the party in the military, a careful analysis of its actions and functions would appear to be a useful means of resolving this debate. Unfortunately, most scholars, particularly those who rely on the interest-group model, assume an inherent conflict between the two over the party's very presence in the armed forces. As a result, they tend to assume that almost all actions by the party in the military are aimed at maximizing party control and are resisted by the armed forces. In this regard, it may be instructive to look at the political officer, long considered to be the party's primary representative in the armed forces.

The Khmel volume goes to great lengths to point out the difference between the political commissar of early days, who had paramount supervisory authority over both the military actions and ideological activities of regular officers, and the political officer or deputy for political work, whose role is described as supportive of the military and whose authority is said to be circumscribed. During the early years of the Soviet army's experience, the authors argue, the political commissar was given supervision over the military owing to the large number of officers present from the old regime. In 1925, as a result of the increasing political reliability of the officer corps, the office of political commissar was abolished and replaced by that of the political officer. The political commissar was reintroduced with slightly modified functions from 1937 to 1940 and again from 1941 to 1942, when it became necessary to provide expanded party supervision over the large number of reserve officers who were recalled to active duty; but the position reverted to the political officer from then on. Since 1942, the authors maintain, the political officer has been subordinate to the commander at the division level and below, and he has assisted the commander in maintaining a high level of combat efficiency. This relationship, they add, is the only feasible one in today's army, where the success of an operation involving the use of missiles or nuclear weapons depends on "absolute subordination to the commander and the faultless fulfillment of his orders" (p. 26).

Goldhammer has a different view. While admitting that the conflict between the party and the army is not a serious one (p. 308), he accepts the dichotomy as a given (pp. 255-57). As a result, he takes it for granted that the company-level political officer functions primarily as a control mechanism. In this regard, he sees the estab-

[3] See, *e.g.*, Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, esp. Chaps. 2 and 4; Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967, rev ed., esp. Chap. 14; and Raymond Garthoff, *Soviet Military Policy*, New York, Praeger, 1966, esp. Chaps. 2 and 3.

[4] See, *e.g.*, Kazimierz Nozko, *Zagadnienia Wspolczesnej Sztuki Wojennej* (Problems of the Art of Contemporary Warfare), Warsaw, Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1973, esp. Chap. 2; M. P. Korobejnikow, Ed., *Soldat und Krieg: Probleme der moralisch-politischen und psychologischen Vorbereitung in der Sowjetarmee* (Soldier and Army: Problems of Moral-Political and Psychological Preparation in the Soviet Army), Berlin, Deutscher Militarverlag, 1972 (East German translation of a book originally published in the Soviet Union under the title of *Soldat i Voyna*); and N. A. Lomov, Ed., *Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1974 (a translation of *Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i revolyutsiya v voyennom dele*, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1973), esp. Chap. 7.

[5] Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," *Comparative Politics* (New York), April 1970, p. 451.

[6] William E. Odom, "The Party Connection," *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1973, pp. 12-26.

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lishment of higher political-military schools in 1967 as an attempt to increase the political officer's ability to "exert influence and control" over members of the armed forces (p. 275). While innovations in training may have been aimed in part at making the political officer more effective as a control mechanism, Goldhammer's stress on the dichotomy between army and party possibly obscures still another, more important reason for the program. One writer has recently suggested that many of the ensuing changes in the Soviet political officer have occurred as a result of party attempts to legitimize his presence in the increasingly more technical armed forces:

The . . . immediate threat to the Party is that it will lose its legitimacy in the military sphere if it cannot prove that its presence is necessary to the development of Soviet military power.[7]

To prove the continuing need for its primary representatives in the modern armed forces, the party has placed increased importance on the moral-political factor in military affairs. Thus, political officers have been launched into training in social psychology, with the aim of establishing a monopoly in the field of personnel management. According to the same writer, regular officers have been willing to accept the specialization of political officers in this area because they believe it to be useful.[8] On the troop level, this means that the political officer has assumed an increasingly important role in areas such as discipline, equipment maintenance, and the efficiency of military performance—as well as political indoctrination.

Thus, it may be that the 1967 modifications in the educational program for political officers were primarily aimed at enabling them to perform a much-needed function in a modern military unit, thereby legitimizing them in the eyes of their regular colleagues.

THIS INTERPRETATION accords with the Polish and East German experiences. The scientific-technical revolution in military affairs in these countries led to an outcry against technically incompetent political officers who, it was suggested, were irrelevant in a modern military organization. These complaints initially brought about the closing of political officers' schools in Poland in 1957 and in the GDR in 1961. As a result, aspiring political officers were selected primarily from among regular officers. Still, the party was dissatisfied with this situation and felt a need to find a legitimate function for political officers. The consequence—particularly in Poland—has been the emergence of a political officer who is trained as a social scientist. Indications are that his usefulness in areas such as discipline and the maintenance of a high level of unit efficiency are welcomed by regular officers. At the same time, the modern Polish political officer functions far less as an overt control mechanism than his predecessor of 25 years ago. With the passage of time and the increasing acceptance by Polish officers of the legitimacy of the current regime, it is becoming less necessary for political officers to devote considerable amounts of time to probing and reinforcing military loyalty to the existing system.[9] As one noted Polish military sociologist told this reviewer, "The change from political commissar to political officer involved more than just semantics. It was a very fundamental change, the significance of which is generally not recognized in the West."

Closely associated with the assumption that the political officer is primarily a control mechanism is the supposition that he identifies more with the party as an institution than with the military. As Goldhammer puts it, "Many of these Party representatives are likely to think of themselves as professional Party workers rather than professional military men" (p. 290). While this assertion may be valid in some cases, the reviewer's experience with the Polish and East German militaries suggests that the question of identification is perhaps more complex. In the East German military, for example, a special control apparatus, the Central Party Directory (*Zentrale Parteileitung,* or ZPL) was created primarily to ease party fears that the two—the regular officer and the political officer—would develop a commonality of interests.[10] Furthermore, a careful reading of Polish military publications, which tend to be quite open in their discussion of such problems, provides no indication of any problems between political and regular officers except those associated with qualifications and relative functions, as mentioned

[7] Christopher D. Jones. "The 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and Party-Military Relations, 1965-70," *Survey* (London), Winter 1974, p. 85.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[9] For more information on these changes, see Dale R. Herspring, "Technology and the Changing Political Officer in the Armed Forces: The Polish and East German Cases," forthcoming in *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles).

[10] Dale R. Herspring, "Technology and Political Reliability in the East German Military," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (De Kalb, Ill.), Fall 1975, p. 161.

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above. In addition, a recently completed study on party-army relations in the Soviet Union suggests that Soviet officers, both political and regular, have never really been at loggerheads over the issue of the party's presence in the military.[11] If anything, they have generally accepted the fact that to survive they have to work together.

The basic nature of civil-military relations in Communist societies in general, and the Soviet Union in particular, is too important a concern to permit us to continue accepting without question many of the assumptions which have underlined much of our research in the past. Goldhammer is probably right in arguing that the Soviets are not "ten feet tall." Nevertheless, their figurative height is of more than passing interest. If, for example, instead of working primarily as a control agent, the political officer— and by extrapolation the political apparatus itself—performs many of the same functions that executive and staff officers do in the West, then the inefficiency which Goldhammer sees resulting from institutional conflict may not be as great as he indicates. In that case, the Soviets may be seven or eight feet tall—still formidable opponents.

TO REVERT to the opening theme, those who have claimed that research on the Soviet military is very difficult, if not impossible, because of the paucity of sources in English will find themselves in an awkward position in the future. Books such as that edited by Lt. General Khmel, along with the ongoing translation program by the US Air Force,[12] are finally providing us with English-language translations of Soviet military writings. Furthermore, as Goldhammer's study shows, translations of periodical material are available for anyone who is willing to take the time and effort to analyze them. What is needed now is a broad discussion of the *dynamics* of party-army relations, not only in the Soviet Union but in other Communist political systems as well. Such an undertaking might show that Western military sociologists have more to learn from one another than some may realize.

At the least, we are now in a position to present Erickson's mythical Martian with some data. The real challenge, however, lies in creating a useful theoretical framework so that we can tell him —and ourselves—what it all means.

[11] Timothy J. Colton, *Army, Party and Development in Soviet Politics*, unpublished PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1974.

[12] See footnote 1.

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Sociology and Socialism

By Paul Hollander

ELIZABETH ANN WEINBERG: *The Development of Sociology in the Soviet Union.* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974.
RUDI SUPEK: *Soziologie und Sozialismus* (Sociology and Socialism). Freiburg, Verlag Rombach, 1970.

THE TWO BOOKS under review could hardly be more different, both in tone and in substance. One is a largely descriptive, matter-of-fact survey of the development of sociology in the USSR. The other is a collection of frequently polemical essays, or "think pieces," of a social-philosophical nature, raising most of the big questions that preoccupy social scientists, cultural critics, and other assorted intellectuals today. Not only the approach but also the subject matter of the two books differs profoundly. As Dr. Weinberg's study shows, Soviet sociology, despite its flourishing in the last 15 years, has remained in many ways a closed discipline with fairly clear-cut topics and subdivisions. On the other hand, the kind of sociology Mr. Supek—a Yugoslav scholar—talks about is an unfettered line of inquiry, largely nonempirical and eclectic, seeking to incorporate concepts and theories of various social scientists and philosophers—Marxists, neo-Marxists, and non-Marxists alike. Of course, the type of political and ideological marginality and independence Yugoslavia has enjoyed since 1948 is conducive to such an undertaking. A Yugoslav social scientist is in a far superior position to infuse sociology with Marxism than either his Western or Soviet counterparts. On the one hand, he is largely free of the ideological constraints that Soviet social scientists must work under; on the other, he is also liberated from the sort of illusions one often finds among Western social scientists and intellectuals who are attracted to Marxism out of alienation from their own society. Even more important, the continuing fascination of Western intellectuals with Marxism and their diverse attempts to resuscitate, revise, and modernize it are not unrelated to the fact that they have not been exposed to the practices which have been sanctioned in the name of Marxism and experienced by East Europeans, including the Yugoslavs. The latter, living in societies attempting to implement Marxism, have come into direct confrontation with the classical dilemmas and difficulties that arise whenever any social theory becomes a guide to practice and gaps between social ideals and realities inevitably become exposed. While such confrontation is rarely agreeable for participants in the historical processes involved, social scientists and critics who live through such an experience can hardly fail to benefit from it intellectually.

The questions raised — purposely or by implication—by these two books direct attention to broad and complex issues that concern the relationship between the social sciences and the political framework in which they function. The reasons why sociology did not exist in the Soviet Union during the Stalinist decades need little explanation or elaboration, and its emergence during the last 15-20 years provides a pleasing and plausible support for the argument that overall liberalization benefits the social sciences. At the same time, notwithstanding the great volume of empirical sociological research now being carried on in the USSR, it has become clear that major theoretical breakthroughs in sociology are unlikely to emerge in a society where generations of intellectuals have been socialized into conformity and where, in addition, overt and explicit political-ideological controls still persist. It is a remarkable fact that no Soviet sociologist—or none known to us—has ever lent his name or pen to any branch of the protest movement and that the ranks of well-known dissenting intellectuals have never included any sociologist.

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Thus, it seems safe to say that Soviet sociology, at least as it has been practiced up till now, has proven eminently compatible with a highly authoritarian system and need not be particularly subversive of prevailing official doctrines or definitions of reality. This is worth stressing since it has often been suggested that the widespread practice of sociology will erode the rigidities of the Soviet, or any other, system. What has happened instead has been the emergence of a relatively docile discipline which, while it has considerably enlarged our knowledge of many aspects of Soviet society, has remained within the bounds of the officially permissible and has made only a negligible contribution to softening the Soviet system. It was not Soviet sociology that acted upon the system as a liberalizing force; rather, it was the emergence of a greater permissiveness on the part of Soviet decision-makers that allowed sociology to emerge and engage in some cautious and limited probing of Soviet social realities.

To be sure, sociology has the potential to contribute to a serious questioning of the status quo and of established official truth, but such "subversive" potential need not necessarily be realized. Sociologists may or may not ask searching questions about the social order; whether or not they will do so will depend on the concrete historical and political context in which they operate. What needs to be stressed here is that what inhibits Soviet sociologists from asking such questions, from realizing what we have called the "subversive" potential of the discipline, is not primarily the institutional framework or the explicit prohibitions and taboos of their society, but rather the limitations of their own critical faculties, imagination, and willingness to take risks by offending the powerholders. Soviet sociologists have not distinguished themselves by the display of any of these attitudes, and it is not self-evident why, in comparison with other groups of Soviet intellectuals, they have lagged behind in this respect.

Some speculations may be offered to explain this phenomenon. First, it may be noted that most Soviet sociologists have come to their profession from heavily politicized (or ideological) disciplines or fields of activity, such as economics, history, or philosophy.[1] Hence their initial professional socialization has not been conducive to intellectual autonomy, in contrast to natural scientists, who have been much freer from ideological pressures in their professional training and activities. Individual choice is also a factor. It is hardly a secret that many in the Soviet Union choose the scientific calling precisely because it affords greater freedom from political-ideological training and control, and that those who gravitate to the social sciences, saturated with the official values and guidelines, are likely to be less concerned with free inquiry, intellectual autonomy, and professional independence. It is possible, too, that the nature of much of current Soviet sociological research — involving teams, institutes, funding, and access to organized research facilities — leaves little room for independent inquiry. A lone sociologist is less likely to be in a position to collect data that call into question the verities of his time than a writer who relies on his personal experience and imagination. It is easier to write a dissenting novel than it is to produce a dissenting sociological study that is "respectable" from a methodological point of view and buttresses its argument with sufficient data or documentation. Soviet sociologists cannot get away with collecting data without official knowledge or authorization, let alone make use of it in unauthorized ways. If, in the West, an individual sociologist is able to produce exposés of the society in which he lives, it is not only because he is motivated to do so and because there are few political-institutional obstacles or prohibitions to overcome, it is also because the conditions exist that make it possible for him not only to perform whatever research and collect whatever data he requires, but also (in most cases) to find financial-material support for his undertaking. None of these conditions exists in the Soviet Union.

MANY OF THESE issues are touched upon, if not fully explored, in Ms. Weinberg's study. It should be noted at the outset that the author produced her work under formidable constraints. To attempt to cover "the development of sociology in the Soviet Union" within the confines of 173 pages (including notes, bibliography, and index) is an extremely difficult undertaking. The more so since the author chose (quite properly) to include chapters dealing with historical background, Soviet views of Western sociology, and the organization of the Soviet

[1] Figures cited by Weinberg (p. 31) indicate that those practicing sociology in the USSR in 1966 had been trained in the following proportions in various fields: philosophy, 25 percent; history, 27 percent; economics, 10 percent; "other humanities," 30.5 percent; psychology, 3 percent; and technical specialties, 4.5 percent. All these fields, except psychology, are heavily politicized in the Soviet Union.

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discipline, as well as the theoretical-ideological disputes which preceded and accompanied the emergence of Soviet sociology—all this in addition to summarizing its subdivisions and major findings. As a result, the specific research areas were given approximately 60 pages, obviously insufficient for a reasonably thorough presentation of the actual work of Soviet sociologists. Thus, for example, the sociology of the family and marriage gets four pages, stratification six, criminology and delinquency four, and so on. Public opinion research, however, does rate a full chapter, and a very informative one at that. Yet it is not entirely clear why the author decided to emphasize this particular area at the expense of others, especially in view of the fact that, as she herself observes (p. 112), the actual volume of public opinion research since 1967 has been negligible. Another instance of questionable allocation of space is the author's extended discussion (over six pages) of the composition and characteristics of the Soviet delegation at the Sixth World Congress of Sociology in 1966, evidently intended to give us a better understanding of the profession as a whole in view of the limited data available about Soviet sociologists. Clearly, within the space limitations set either by herself or by her publisher, Ms. Weinberg could not do full justice to a vast and complex topic such as the evolution, characteristics, and products of Soviet sociology over almost two decades.

At the same time, there is no doubt that the author has an excellent grasp of the major developments and research undertakings in Soviet sociology—and few if any illusions about the limitations of the work being done. For example, she comments insightfully on the connection between the prevailing tendency of Soviet sociology to emphasize the applied, problem-solving aspects of the science and the part played by ideological factors. "By encouraging a broadly empiricist concern with isolated problems . . . ," she writes, "the orientation [of Soviet sociology] prevents the development of theory and research into the dynamics of the whole society" (p. 109). It is indeed one of the peculiar characteristics of Soviet sociology that its findings do not add up to a coherent picture of what Soviet society is like—that the by now massive quantity of surveys and studies produced by Soviet sociologists still do not provide a basis on which one can, without difficulty, attempt to delineate the essential characteristics of Soviet society and social institutions (and their interrelations). But even though this would admittedly have been a difficult task to perform, a study such as Ms. Weinberg's would have benefited from at least an effort to reconstruct the major attributes of Soviet society from their reflections in the work of Soviet sociologists. In particular, it would have been interesting had the author addressed herself to the questions of to what extent and in what way the accumulated work of Soviet sociologists helps to resolve some of the theoretical debates in the West about the nature of Soviet society and the most fruitful concepts by which to describe it. But again one has to acknowledge that such desiderata would have been difficult to fulfill in a slim volume which the author apparently intended to focus on the major subdivisions of Soviet sociology and the historical and ideological factors surrounding its emergence (or reemergence).

For all the reservations expressed above, Ms. Weinberg's study does provide an excellent introduction to the study of Soviet sociology. By placing the development of Soviet sociology in a historical and ideological context, the author gives us great help in understanding its characteristics today.

AS OBSERVED at the outset, Supek's essays are wide-ranging, polemical, and difficult to summarize. Perhaps their main common denominator is an approach that seeks to steer a middle course between a sociology dominated by a vulgarized and discredited form of Marxism (such as prevails in the Soviet Union) and the overly empirical, theoretically shallow forms of sociology commonly found in the West, which fail to confront the great questions of our times. This intellectual orientation has its political counterpart in Supek's determination to disassociate himself equally from "statist socialism" and "bourgeois democracy." He would like to see both of these replaced by a form of socialist democracy that, in his view, came closest to realization in Dubcek's experiment in Czechoslovakia before the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968.

The subdivisions of Supek's collection and the titles of the essays within them reflect these concerns. Part I is entitled "Sociology and Socialism"; Part II, "The Humanization of Work and Management"; and Part III, "Personality and Culture." Appropriately distributed under these three headings, we find essays dealing with such topics as "Dogmatism

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or Revisionism," "Sociology and Marxism," "Alienation Theory and Humanism," "Alienation Theory and Sociology," "Automation, Technocracy and Bureaucracy," "The Psychological and Social Consequences of Automation," "The Transformation of the Wage System," "Man Without Social Norms," "Freedom and Multi-determinism in Culture," and "The Fragmented Character of the Bourgeois Individual." These titles themselves indicate that Supek is not particularly interested in Soviet sociology as such, but rather in the unfettered, creative application of Marxism to the major social, economic, political, and cultural issues of contemporary society—an orientation that is noticeably absent from Soviet sociology. It is at least implicit in Supek's outlook that the kind of problem-solving, applied sociology practiced in the USSR is incompatible with what he considers to be the true mission of sociology—that is, to serve as the critical conscience of any society by mercilessly exposing its institutional defects and contradictions, rather than merely to gather information to be used by the elites to make their controls more efficient.

Ms. Weinberg's account strongly suggests that Soviet sociology has a long way to go were it to set out to become the critical conscience of Soviet society. Her examination of the sub-fields of sociological investigation being cultivated in the USSR makes the reader aware of important areas of inquiry that are being either totally ignored or seriously neglected. These include political sociology and particularly the processes leading to the concentration and abuse of power (at the highest as well as at the local level)—processes which in the Soviet Union produced such phenomena as "the cult of personality," "harebrained schemes," and "subjectivism." They also include the process of recruitment of personnel to high political and managerial positions; the social background and value orientation of elite groups; the attitudes of peasants toward various forms of agricultural organization and property; the reintegration into Soviet society of rehabilitated survivors of Stalinist concentration camps; popular anti-semitism and attitudes toward various ethnic groups; the impact of Western mass media, culture, and values on various strata of the population; the problems of old age; the effects of, and attitudes toward, domestic political propaganda; the precise nature of "capitalist survivals" and the processes of their transmission; and many others.[2]

IN CONCLUSION, it should be pointed out that the relative youthfulness of the discipline and the influences of the political environment are not merely liabilities. Novelty has its invigorating aspects, and it can impart a sense of dynamism and discovery that is not always spurious. The many uncharted areas of Soviet life offer challenge and stimulation to the sociologist. Even the influence of the political environment, insofar as it exerts pressure toward the practical application of sociological knowledge, can give the sociologist a sense of importance and usefulness, and at times even a feeling of elation at being associated with the beneficial aspects of social engineering.

Soviet sociology, like many other phenomena in Soviet life, lends itself to a wide variety of interpretations. Some may view it as a point of departure for unintended social change, as a potential or actual solvent of the restraints and rigidities which continue to characterize the Soviet social order; others may see it as nothing more than a new supplement to the existing mechanisms of social control. Or, still others may write it off as a rather insignificant backwater of Soviet academic life that makes little difference one way or the other.

It would be as futile to speculate on the future prospects of Soviet sociology as it would be to attempt a forecast of the future of Soviet society. So far at least, Soviet sociology has adapted itself to the halting process of political liberalization; its activities have proved to be perfectly compatible with the needs and goals of the regime; and it has shown no signs of becoming "subversive." All that one can safely predict for the future is that the trends in Soviet sociology will continue to reflect the trends prevailing in Soviet society at large, particularly the changing definitions of what is politically sensitive and what is not.

[2] In an article written ten years ago, this author referred to many of these same areas of inquiry which were then being neglected or ignored. They still are. See "The Dilemmas of Soviet Sociology," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1965.

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The Domestic Sources of Soviet Foreign Policy

By Paul Marantz

MORTON SCHWARTZ: *The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors.* Encino, California, Dickenson Publishing Co., 1975.
ERIK P. HOFFMANN and FREDERIC J. FLERON, JR., Eds.: *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy.* Chicago, Aldine Atherton, 1971.
VERNON V. ASPATURIAN: *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy.* Boston, Little, Brown, 1971.
ARNOLD L. HORELICK, A. ROSS JOHNSON, and JOHN D. STEINBRUNER: *The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches.* Santa Monica, Rand, 1973.

OVER THE YEARS, Western analysts have offered a wide range of differing interpretations of Soviet foreign policy. Yet, for all this apparent diversity, there tended to be a broad substratum of agreement. Western analyses were generally predicated on the assumption that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was a direct product of—and indeed was determined by—the very nature of the Soviet system. For this reason, there was a preoccupation with searching out those fundamental features of the Soviet system—its permanent operating factors—which were thought to dominate and control Soviet conduct abroad. Even though there was sharp controversy as to the relative weight to be accorded various factors (such as Marxist-Leninist ideology, the drives and needs of the Bolshevik political personality, the enduring impact of history and tradition, and the influence of Russian national character), there was a general consensus that by comprehending the basic "essence" of the Soviet system, one could penetrate the peculiar mind-set of the Soviet leaders and thereby come to an understanding of the specific nature of the dynamic, highly purposive, goal-directed policy that they were driven to follow.

In recent years, however, there has been growing recognition that Soviet foreign policy is more contingent and open-ended than was earlier believed. While it probably remains true that there is a certain dynamic tendency or forward thrust that lies at the foundation of Soviet foreign policy, the ways in which this is manifested are now seen to be heavily dependent upon a broad spectrum of mediating factors ranging from Western initiatives and responses on the one hand to the interplay of Soviet domestic politics on the other. This departure from what William Zimmerman has termed "essentialist" and "mechanistic" models of Soviet foreign policy [1] has in turn led not only to a greater appreciation of the ways in which Soviet and Western policies interact with one another, but also to an increased concern with the ways in which Soviet foreign policy is affected by domestic factors, especially by the ebb and flow of Soviet internal politics. Each of the four works under review reflects in its own way the increased concern with understanding the domestic sources of Soviet foreign policy.

BEFORE TURNING to the books themselves, it may be useful to note briefly what have been some of the main considerations motivating and influencing this heightened interest in the study of the domestic factors shaping Soviet foreign policy. The first relates to the changes that have occurred in the way that the Soviet political system actually operates and functions. Owing to the establishment of a form of collective Politburo rule (as opposed to the more per-

[1] William Zimmerman, "Choices in the Postwar World: Containment and the Soviet Union," in Charles Gati, Ed., *Caging the Bear*, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1974; William Zimmerman, "Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1970's," *Survey* (London), Spring 1973, pp. 188-98.

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sonalistic dictatorships of Stalin and Khrushchev), the greater regularization of the decision-making process, and the increased regard for expert advice in the Soviet Union, Western scholars must now pay greater attention to the formal structures of foreign policy decision-making and to actual political inputs into this process.

In addition, such developments as the increased complexity of the tasks confronting the Soviet leadership, the further remoteness in time of the Soviet Union's revolutionary origins, and the growth of Soviet economic and military power have all served to create a situation in which the major explanatory variables of the past are much less helpful than they once were, especially when it comes to explaining the formulation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy on a day-to-day basis. The dissection of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, for example, sheds little light on Soviet policy toward SALT, while an analysis of Brezhnev's political personality (if indeed such an undertaking is even feasible, given his great circumspection and the carefully cultivated blandness of his official pronouncements) is much less useful in explaining Soviet policy toward the West than were earlier studies of the operational codes of Stalin and Khrushchev.

The post-Stalin period in the Soviet Union has witnessed the beginnings of a process of partial pluralization. Although it is still too early to speak of interest groups or pressure groups in the Western sense, it is possible to discern different "opinion groups" or "tendencies"—that is, distinct groups (usually based upon occupation) which have differing orientations to various political issues. At the present time, these groups do not have the strength, the means, or the cohesiveness to attempt actively to shape policy. Nonetheless, it is still important to study group cleavages since (1) the articulation in the open press of different points of view (e.g., on the importance of reducing East-West tension) gives an outside observer an indication of the possible range of opinion within the carefully shrouded Politburo; and (2) it is quite possible (though far from certain) that the further modernization of the Soviet Union will eventually increase the political weight of these societal forces.

A SECOND FACTOR reinforcing the trend toward greater concern with internal variables has been the emergence of Soviet studies from its onetime isolation outside the mainstream of political science. Recent developments in decision-making theory, the study of comparative politics, and international relations theory have all found their echo in new approaches to the analysis of Soviet politics. In this area, the work of Graham Allison and James Rosenau has been especially important.[2]

Allison's *Essence of Decision* has been unusually influential through its forceful demonstration of the inadequacy of treating a nation as a unitary rational actor whose every move is explainable as the result of a deliberate effort to maximize benefits and minimize costs. He points out that much of a country's foreign policy may be the product either of bureaucratic politics (the sharp infighting among members of the political leadership with differing individual interests and perspectives) or of the routine application of organizational procedures (the standard operating procedures that organizations often automatically and unthinkingly apply without any clear sense of broader political goals). Our lack of detailed and reliable information on Soviet decision-making is a very serious impediment to the full application of this approach to the study of Soviet foreign policy, but Allison's insight does point up the need to make every effort to gain a deeper understanding of internal political processes in the Soviet Union.

James Rosenau's innovative and systematic exploration of the "linkages" between domestic and international politics has also served to sensitize Soviet specialists to previously neglected phenomena and relationships. Under the impact of modern technology, all political systems—the Soviet system included—are becoming more penetrable by outside influences, with the result that there are increasing interconnections between foreign and domestic policy. Thus, Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was motivated not just by foreign policy objectives, but also by the Politburo's fear that developments in Czechoslovakia would heighten Ukrainian nationalism and increase the pressures for liberalization within the Soviet Union. Similarly, the present Soviet interest in improved East-West relations is due not just to external factors (the Sino-Soviet conflict, West Germany's *Ostpolitik,* changes in American foreign policy, etc.) but to internal forces as well (agricultural

[2] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision,* Boston, Little, Brown, 1971; James N. Rosenau, Ed., *Linkage Politics,* New York, Free Press, 1969; and James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ed., *Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics,* New York, McKay, 1973.

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and technological deficiencies, the search for a politically safe means of modernizing, etc.). Without an appreciation of such linkages between domestic and foreign policy, neither can be fully understood.

The distinctive nature of the present debate in the West over détente is yet another factor promoting a deeper inquiry into the internal sources of Soviet foreign policy. Now that some progress—however limited—has been made toward attaining the original goals of diminishing the likelihood of a nuclear holocaust, lessening international tensions, and increasing political, economic and cultural interchange between East and West, the question naturally arises as to where we go from here. After years of crisis management and day-to-day improvisation, there is a searching for a long-term policy aimed at the creation of a more durable and secure international order. This, in turn, has led to an increased awareness of our need to learn a great deal more about the domestic underpinnings of international order.

In relation to the analysis of Soviet politics, this has meant that a series of questions that have hitherto received insufficient attention have suddenly been thrust to the fore: Is the mellowing of Soviet foreign policy inextricably linked to and entirely dependent upon the prior liberalization of that country's domestic political system? If this is indeed the case, what influence—if any—can Western policy have on the process of Soviet internal liberalization? Can this process best be encouraged by increasing East-West trade and thereby creating a web of interdependence and interpenetration; by using the West's economic advantages in agriculture and electronic technology as bargaining chips to exact specific concessions from the Soviet Union; by denying the Soviet Union Western goods and technology with the expectation that this will intensify domestic pressures to the point where the Kremlin will be forced to move toward liberalization; or by following a policy of benign neglect based on the assumption that direct Western pressure would prove counterproductive and that only forces indigenous to the Soviet Union will be capable of bringing about the gradual transmission of the Communist system? Even if, on the other hand, it is concluded that there is no necessary link between a country's foreign policy and the nature of its internal regime, or if questions of national self-interest are put aside entirely, there is still the question of how the West should respond to the moral questions which exiled Soviet writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and other Soviet dissidents have so eloquently raised. During previous periods of partial détente (*e.g.*, 1955, 1959, and 1963), debate in the West revolved around the question of whether the Soviet Union's proclaimed interest in peaceful coexistence represented a mere tactical shift or a genuine change in the perspectives and goals of the Soviet leadership. This question, too, still remains very much at issue, and the current perception of the importance of internal-external linkages has added a further element of uncertainty and controversy to the search for a deeper understanding of Soviet foreign policy.

MORTON SCHWARTZ'S *The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors* is the first comprehensive book-length study of the impact of domestic factors on the formulation and conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The domestic context in which Soviet foreign policy originates is carefully and systematically surveyed through an examination of such topics as economic, geographic, and demographic inputs; the influence of military capabilities; historically- and ideologically-based political beliefs; and the processes of domestic and foreign policy decision-making. Within this framework, the author presents a sober but stimulating analysis which candidly points out both what we do know and what we remain uncertain about with respect to how various factors (*e.g.*, the Soviet desire for advanced Western technology, the waning of ideology, the rapid increase in Soviet military capabilities) will affect Soviet conduct. In concluding, the author cautions that even though the West has a vital interest in facilitating and encouraging moderate tendencies within the Soviet leadership, our knowledge of external-internal linkages is still too fragmentary to allow us to predict with confidence what effects particular Western actions will have.

Professor Schwartz set himself a notoriously difficult task—namely, writing a book of value both to highly-trained specialists and to undergraduate students just beginning the study of Soviet politics. Nevertheless, he has succeeded with rare and admirable skill. This will long remain an important book, one that not only fills a void in the scholarly literature but which also is highly readable and fully comprehensible to undergraduate students.

The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy is also a very useful work. It is an edited collection which

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brings together 26 major articles covering a broad range of subjects such as approaches and methodology in the study of Soviet foreign policy, the role of ideology, the origins of the cold war, East-West relations, etc. Thanks to its generous length, its reprinting of articles in their entirety, its judicious selection of thought-provoking articles representing a wide spectrum of views, and its comprehensive character, it is a model of what a multipurpose reader should be.

Unlike most earlier collections, this work includes a broad selection of articles dealing with the impact of domestic politics on Soviet foreign policy. These are helpful in giving a sense of what has been accomplished, and also of what remains to be done in this area. Some of the articles are representative of traditional Kremlinology with its almost exclusive preoccupation with Politburo power struggles, while others attempt to transcend this limited approach. Alexander Dallin's piece is especially suggestive in its exploration of the implications of modernization theory for the study of Soviet decision-making, as well as in its careful examination of the persistence of "Left/Right" ("hard/soft," "hawk/dove," etc.) issue-cleavages within the Soviet leadership.

VERNON ASPATURIAN's *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy* is another valuable compilation of some of the most important work that has been done on Soviet foreign policy. The book's most distinctive and useful feature is that it assembles under one cover approximately 600 pages of Professor Aspaturian's earlier writings, which had been dispersed in a large number of separate articles, monographs, and edited books. Those topics not fully covered in Aspaturian's own far-ranging writings are treated in 13 articles by other scholars, also republished in this collection.

Aspaturian has long been a pioneer in the study of the domestic underpinnings of Soviet foreign policy. The present book reprints his extensive analyses of the structures and processes of Soviet foreign policy decision-making, and it also contains his pathbreaking 1966 study, "Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in the Soviet System." Whereas Kremlinology has tended to focus on *individuals* in the top leadership and their struggle for *power,* Aspaturian analyzes the appearance of incipient interest *groups* and their conflicting orientations to political *issues.*[3]

In Aspaturian's view, one of the central and most contentious issues in Soviet politics—and one that involves an overlapping of domestic and foreign policies—has been whether or not the Soviet Union should seek a genuine relaxation of international tension and a concomitant reallocation of resources away from the military-industrial sector. Since the various occupational and functional groups have their own respective vested interests—some in maintaining and others in altering the existing pattern of resource allocation—there is considerable evidence of sharp conflict among these groups. Yet, as Aspaturian recognizes, such findings represent only a starting point in our quest for a deeper understanding of Soviet foreign policy. We are still left with the more difficult problem of ascertaining the degree to which—if at all—such societal forces shape and constrain the foreign policy choices made by the Politburo.

IT IS A CONCERN with hard-nosed practical questions of this kind that animates the Rand study by Horelick, Johnson, and Steinbruner. They begin by asking: Are there models of decision-making in the social sciences which can enhance our ability to understand and predict Soviet foreign policy behavior? In their search for answers to this important question, the authors provide a valuable overview and appraisal of general theories of decision-making and of recent innovative approaches to the study of Soviet foreign policy.

Building upon the work of Graham Allison and others, the authors state that "significant benefits can accrue to the foreign policy analyst if he can generate multiple perspectives on the phenomena he examines," and they further maintain that "the quality of analysis will depend directly upon the analyst's knowledge of, *inter alia,* organizational and bureaucratic context" (p. 23). However, they acknowledge that for the most part we simply do not have the raw data that would allow us to study the organizational and bureaucratic dimensions of Soviet foreign policy decision-making, and this absence of basic source material, combined with the difficulty of applying abstract models to complex reality, leads them to caution against the expectation of achieving great breakthroughs. Instead they call for a series of less ambitious endeavors, such as detailed case studies of episodes in Soviet policymaking where recently published source materials

[3] For a more recent application of this same approach, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex—Does it Exist?," *Journal of International Affairs* (New York), No. 1, 1972, pp. 1-28.

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have not been fully exploited (*e.g.*, World War II decision-making); further studies of the actual belief-systems of members of the Soviet political elite; and efforts to lessen what they term "the imbalance between the high level of effort expended on refining techniques of content analysis, on the one hand, and the comparatively meager investment in basic studies of the press as vehicles of partisan political communication, on the other" (p. 56).

As diverse as the works under review are, they all point to a common conclusion. No matter how frustrating and elusive the study of internal-external linkages and the process of Soviet decision-making is likely to prove, the importance of this area of investigation for scholars and policy-makers alike—especially in a period of increased interpenetration and greater interdependence—dictates a continued search for a sounder understanding of the ways in which the external international environment (including Western policies) affects and is affected by the particular nature of domestic Soviet politics.

Moscow's Approach to Foreign Trade

By Kenzo Kiga

GLEN ALDEN SMITH: *Soviet Foreign Trade: Organization, Operation, and Policy, 1918-1971.* New York, Praeger, 1973.
ANTHONY C. SUTTON: *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945 to 1965.* Stanford, Cal., Hoover Institution Press, 1973.
PAUL DIBB: *Siberia and the Pacific: A Study of Economic Development and Trade Prospects.* New York, Praeger, 1972.
STEVEN ROSEFIELDE: *Soviet International Trade in Heckscher-Ohlin Perspective.* Lexington, Mass., D.C. Heath & Co., 1973.

THE SOVIET APPROACH to foreign trade over the years has reflected at least three major attitudes: a basic orientation toward achieving economic autarky, a commitment to rapid industrialization, and the perception that trade can further the purpose of diplomatic bargaining. However, the net impact of these attitudes on Soviet foreign trade activities has changed from one period to another.

The early Bolshevik leaders viewed the goal of economic self-sufficiency as not only attainable but as necessary for maintaining the independence of the new Communist state. However, they viewed rapid industrialization as an essential precondition for autarky. Therefore, they were willing for a time to trade Soviet agricultural products for imports of machinery to spur industrial development. This commerce was basically a matter of expediency and never signified a renunciation of the fundamental Soviet commitment to autarky in favor of participation in an international division of labor.

When we turn to more recent Soviet foreign trade, we discover that a number of factors have combined to modify its basically autarkic orientation since World War II. For one, there was the postwar birth of a number of Communist states and the establishment of trade relations between them and the USSR. Responding to these new circumstances, Moscow proposed a new concept, "the socialist division of labor," which in effect was an attempt to expand the concept of Soviet autarky to embrace most Communist countries.

Particularly in its trade with Eastern Europe, the USSR found that expansion of the boundaries of the autarkic realm had both favorable and unfavorable effects on Soviet economic life. On the favorable side, some of the East European countries contributed to Soviet industrialization by sup-

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plying machinery and manufactured products. At the same time, however, these countries had their own economic needs and placed increasing demands on the Soviet Union for raw materials, energy, and food. To bring more order into these relationships, the Soviet leaders established the goal of economic and political integration of the countries comprising the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon). While this goal has not been reached, it is reflected in the continuing efforts of the CMEA states to coordinate with one another in devising their respective national development plans and in the fact that roughly two-thirds of the volume of trade of each of these countries is conducted with other Communist states, predominantly other CMEA states.

A second recent change in Soviet foreign trade is an expansion of economic relations with the advanced economies of the West. Moscow has apparently realized that the further development of the Soviet economy requires an international division of labor with the Western countries. In the industrial age, autarkic policies tend to impede industrial growth by cutting off an economy from the benefits of specialization and technology transfer. The Soviet party leaders appear to have placed increased value on trade with the West. Their recent policy of détente may be interpreted in part, then, as being designed to facilitate the importing of Western capital and technology required for the further development of the Soviet economy.

A third major development affecting Soviet foreign trade in the postwar world is the USSR's emergence as a superpower with growing contacts with the less-developed countries. The rise of Soviet political influence has been accompanied by a general increase in economic activities, particularly in association with aid programs for the developing countries. However, Soviet trade with these countries has not necessarily been linked as closely with the political or military interests of the Soviet Union as is often thought. Soviet requirements for raw materials and foodstuffs have been met by importing these commodities from the developing countries, in return for which the USSR has supplied machinery, equipment, and some raw materials. Thus, both sides seem to derive comparative economic advantage from this trade, whatever the political considerations involved.

A peculiar aspect of Soviet trade policy is its reliance on bilateral, barter-type agreements. Economically, this tends to narrow trade opportunities and cannot be justified as a rational method of achieving an efficient international division of labor. From a political viewpoint, however, such a policy may be acknowledged to be useful as a diplomatic bargaining tool. Moreover, it is not entirely without an economic rationale. Where the nations concerned are short of hard currencies, agreements of the bilateral-barter type can be a means of promoting mutual trade. And they may also help to provide trade outlets for Soviet industrial commodities which cannot otherwise find customers in world markets.

FROM WHAT has been said, it is clear that the Soviet search for an efficient way of exploiting its natural resources and productive capacities while adhering to the fundamental concept of autarky has led to a number of "contradictions." The four books reviewed here provide deep insight into how these contradictions have been resolved in Soviet foreign trade and suggest the direction such activity is likely to take in the future.

Glen A. Smith's book gives a broad analysis of the policies, organization, and operation of Soviet foreign trade with each of the three major areas of the world—the West, the Communist states, and the developing countries—from 1918 through 1971. This chronological description of the evolution of Soviet trade with these three major groupings of countries is highly instructive for students of Soviet autarkic policies. In addition to demonstrating Soviet tactics of trade control, it also shows the methods employed by the Soviet Union to finance and promote trade.

In his concluding chapters, Smith foresees the current Soviet efforts to expand trade with the West, to enlist long-term Western credits to finance trade, and to involve Western capital in the exploitation of Soviet natural resources under some form of joint venture. He also anticipates the Soviet efforts to integrate internal CMEA trade, as well as the trend toward liberalization of some of the CMEA members' economies.

On balance, Smith sees no danger to the West in these developments. Consequently, he favors the grant of Western credits and other measures designed to increase East-West trade. He insists that there should be no discriminatory measures taken against Communist countries by Western countries. Thus, he favors repeal of the Battle Act (The Mutual

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Defense Assistance Control Act adopted by the US Congress in 1951) and a continuation of recent moves by the US government to narrow the list of strategic goods whose export to Communist countries by the United States or its allies is restricted.

A sharply contrasting view is presented by Anthony C. Sutton, who claims that the West, in trading with the USSR, has acted imprudently and contrary to its own self-interest. Through this trade, Sutton argues, the Soviet Union, ever since 1918, has been able to acquire new Western technology which it was *incapable* of generating indigenously. This transfer of technology, he contends, has given aid to the headquarters of a world Communist movement that menaces the West, and without such transfers, the Western countries could have saved much of their military expenditures aimed at countering the Soviet threat.

Sutton bases his study of technological development and the role of East-West trade in technological transfer to the postwar USSR on elaborate and painstaking research into the state of technology in various branches of the Soviet economy. He presents an intensive analysis of voluminous Soviet data, supplemented by information from various US delegations which have visited the Soviet Union. The author already has to his credit two earlier books devoted to the same theme and covering the periods 1917-30 and 1930-45.[1] The three books together provide a tremendous volume of evidence supporting Sutton's view that there was no identifiable fundamental technical innovation of Soviet origin from 1917 to 1965. In attempting to explain the inability of the existing Soviet socioeconomic system to generate innovation, the author points to the nonexistence of market competition as a factor but maintains that it is not sufficient to explain the Soviet failure in this regard. He maintains that the concentration of engineering skills on limited objectives has resulted in failure to promote and maintain a complex, self-generative industrial structure.

While the reviewer is inclined to concur in Sutton's hypothesis of a Soviet failure to develop innovative ability, he questions whether trading with the Soviet Union has been totally disadvantageous to the West. This trade has involved an economic *quid pro quo*—an exchange of Western technological know-how for Soviet commodities desired in the West. Moreover, one might ask what practical alternative Sutton proposes. A general Western embargo on trade with the Communist countries would appear to be neither possible nor desirable—not possible because the Western countries differ so much from one another in their political and economic relationships with the Soviet Union; not desirable because such action would only give rise to other kinds of political and economic confusion and intensify tensions with the USSR. Nor can one regard the present half-way embargo as very effective (although the reviewer does not view it as responsible for the Soviet Union's antagonistic attitude toward the United States).

AS WE LOOK to the future of East-West trade, one area where the objectives of Soviet economic development is likely to spur an expansion of commerce is in the eastern part of Siberia where the USSR is undertaking a new program to exploit natural resources. Paul Dibb's study investigates the trade potential of what he calls "Pacific Siberia," an area covering East Siberia and the Soviet Far East and occupying one-half of the whole territory of the Soviet Union. This area is inhabited by only 5 percent of the Soviet population and is very rich in timber, coal, water power, natural gas, iron ore, copper, nickel, and many other minerals. The main obstacle to development there lies in the harsh natural conditions—extremely unsuitable for human labor—and the long distances to markets.

Dibb's analysis of the Pacific Siberian economy is systematic, plain, and intelligible, providing the precise knowledge that is required to assess the Soviet government's Siberian development program. At present, the economic strength of the region lies in the timber and fishing industries; its weakness, in agriculture; the future will belong to the mining and energy industries. Today, the timber and fishing industries generate large surpluses of products for shipment to other regions of the USSR and for export. Given reasonable care, Dibb argues, they should continue to find ready and continuing markets. Agriculture, on the other hand, has been unable to meet official plans for self-sufficiency—Dibb estimates that Pacific Siberia produces only two-fifths of the food needs of its 13 million-plus people. This is to a large part a result of adverse climate and soil conditions, but Dibb also notes the inefficiency of the state farms, which occupy

[1] See Antony C. Sutton, *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917-1930*, and *Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1930-45*, both published by The Hoover Institution Press of Stanford, California, in 1971.

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some 70 percent of the total farmland of the area. As a result of all these factors, Pacific Siberia will, for the foreseeable future, remain heavily dependent on the importation of foodstuffs either from other parts of the Soviet Union, or perhaps from abroad. While imports of food from China are at present improbable, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are would-be suppliers.

For the future it is the mining and energy sectors—still awaiting large-scale development — which will provide products both for domestic use and for export, in particular to Japan and the United States. To raise the necessary capital, the Soviet Union has asked some of the Western countries to cooperate in Siberian development projects. Japan is particularly interested and in fact has entered into several projects which, while small in scale, are urgently needed (*e.g.*, development of lumber exporting operations).

However, larger-scale projects, such as development of Yakutiya gas reserves, or construction of an oil pipeline across Siberia from Tyumen to the port of Nakhodka (or the recent proposal for Japanese cooperation in construction of the second Trans-Siberian Railway—the Baikal-Amur Mainline), are still under negotiation between the Soviet and Japanese governments. The latter has been hesitant to act promptly on these proposals because of the difficulties in making precise economic calculations, the risks involved in providing huge amounts of capital, and various political considerations. While it thus remains to be seen how successful the Soviet Union will be in enlisting foreign capital for exploiting Siberian resources, the policy seems to be a big step toward Soviet participation in an international division of labor.

SUCH A development would argue that economic criteria play an important part in Soviet foreign trade, something which not all observers are prepared to concede. There is the view that Soviet trade policy places greatest priority on political considerations rather than on the principle of comparative advantage. Proponents of this view argue that the Soviet system of domestic price-setting—which is planned and influenced by political objectives —results in a disparity between Soviet and world market prices that makes rational calculation of comparative advantage virtually impossible.

Steven Rosefielde challenges this popular conception in an ambitious and pioneering econometric investigation of Soviet trade. His analysis seems to corroborate the applicability to the structure of Soviet foreign trade of the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem, which asserts that a nation's comparative advantage or disadvantage is determined by the relative abundance or scarcity of its domestic productive factors vis-à-vis those of a would-be trading partner. The study reveals that over the period 1955-68, there existed "a tendency for Soviet Leontief statistics to be positively associated with [the] per capita GNP proxy for capital-labor availabilities" (pp. 62-64)—that is to say, during the period in question Soviet trade with countries with a relatively low per capita income, *e.g.*, third-world countries, was marked by a capital-intensive export bias, while Soviet trade with countries having a high per capita income, *e.g.*, Western states, showed a labor-intensive export bias.

Rosefielde's computation covers factor proportions generated in Soviet trade as a whole, in Soviet bilateral trade, and in trade with three political groups—CMEA, the Western nations, and a group of less developed countries. He also attempts to analyze the mechanism which has resulted in a structure of Soviet trade which seems to conform to the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem. His conclusion is that the Soviet pattern results from comparative advantage calculations based on labor value.

Now, Rosefielde's findings do not preclude microeconomic irrationalities in Soviet trade, nor do they say anything about the *optimality* of overall Soviet trade or of its present distribution among the three major political groupings. Indeed, the fact that two-thirds of total Soviet trade has long been confined to the Communist states must be explained on political, not commercial, grounds. Likewise, the fact that total Soviet exports of machinery and equipment—low-priced compared to other Soviet goods—are less than Soviet imports of similar foreign goods may be an outcome of political manipulation.

Thus, we see that Soviet foreign trade policy still reflects the conflicting requirements of a growth-oriented economic policy and an underlying penchant for autarky. For the former, the Soviet Union must increasingly adhere to the principle of comparative cost, whereas the latter forces it to cling to political protectionism. On balance, however, at present the trend seems to be for the imperatives of growth to take precedence over the quest for autarky.

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MAOISM AND METHODOLOGY

TO THE EDITORS: Louis A. Barth's review entitled "The Maoist Ideology: Roots and Political Impact" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1975) raises some interesting points in a period when paradoxical events seem to be taking place in Communist China—when a rational, technological society is being inexorably established at the same time that nativistic and antibourgeois ideologies are being promoted. Barth made the point that a question of importance for social science—namely, the explication of a methodology for the study of ideology—was apparently ignored or left implicit in the 1973 volume edited by Chalmers Johnson, *Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China*. The point is well taken, particularly with regard to two articles of significance in the volume, Benjamin I. Schwartz's discussion of Mao's conception of science and Rensselaer W. Lee III's essay on the interplay of politics and technology. Both articles suggest that political action and outlook in Communist China acquire vitality and complexity from the interaction of ideology and science, but neither uses a methodological approach to define ideology.

Barth proceeds to posit a methodology, but one which gives short shrift to the contextual role of ideology in society. This is curious, since he takes note of John Israel's suggestion (in another article in the volume) that it is necessary to find a methodology which accounts appropriately for cultural nuances. The marriage of the social science of "logic" and cultural "facts" has been less than fruitful across a whole range of issues, and this accounts to a large degree for current dilemmas in setting out a culturally-relevant methodology. Just any methodology will not do; after all, there are a lot of them around, as Barth well implies by his discussion of debate in the Soviet Union over the functions of ideology.

The "logic" which drives ideologies may only be discernible when we concede that going "mad" may well be a cultural necessity for visionaries to become "men of the people," to voice aspirations which then refocus relevant political actions. Political analysis may not be as "clean" as Barth would like; letters do not necessarily make an alphabet. Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* and Merleau-Ponty's *Primacy of Perception* suggest that political institutions do fundamentally and significantly interact with the "madness" of needs and vision. A culturally-relevant methodology will not be set out here; suffice it to say that the "root" of ideological functions is not to be found in logical exegesis. Dynamic analysis still waits to be achieved; it will come about only if we grasp the political consequences of Maoist thinking, the way it motivates and agitates, not if we merely focus on the "logic" of the thought Mao began with.

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CORRECTION

In the article, "Modernization and Baltic Nationalism," by V. Stanley Vardys (*Problems of Communism*, September-October 1975), a reference work cited in footnote 28, page 38, was incorrectly dated.
The proper citation is: *Narodnoe khoziastvo Latviiskoi SSR v 1971 godu* (The National Economy of the Latvian SSR in 1971), Riga, Statistika, 1972, p. 56.

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